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Abstract
Throughout the history of economic thought, there have been numerous attempts to model an
early era of Malthusian economic stagnation as well as the transition to an era of economic
development in one coherent framework, or, in other words, a uniﬁed growth theory. In recent
years, uniﬁed growth models have attracted a large readership among economists, challenging
the conventional exogenous neoclassical growth theory. However, in most of these models, an
important eﬀect suggested by Malthus has been frequently omitted. By including what he had
called the great preventive check in the conventional Malthusian trap model, which is based
on the principle of population, the principle of diminishing returns and the principle of labor
division, the transition can be modeled in a very simple dynamic macroeconomic framework.
The correspondingly advanced theory suggests that increasing life expectancy tends to create a
demographic structure that is much less prone to overpopulation. This new interpretation of the
classical growth model is suggested to be capable of integrating the mechanisms of economic stag-
nation and economic development. Although the vaguer intuitions of the classical economists
provided deeper and more profound insights than those of most modern uniﬁed growth theorists,
the verbal form of their arguments has at the same time tended to be more favorable to misin-
terpretations. It is the intention of this work to identify these misinterpretations and to restore
the main ideas of classical economics by building a basic classical uniﬁed growth model.
I
Zusammenfassung
In der Geschichte des ökonomischen Denkens gab es zahlreiche Versuche, eine Ära Malthusian-
ischer ökonomischer Stagnation sowie ihren Übergang zu einer Ära ökonomischer Entwicklung
in ein und derselben kohärenten Darstellung zu modellieren, oder in anderen Worten, in einer
ganzheitlichen Wachstumstheorie (Uniﬁed Growth Theory). In den vergangenen Jahren haben
Uniﬁed Growth Modelle eine zunehmende Leserschaft auf sich gezogen. In den meisten dieser
Modelle wurde allerdings ein wichtiger klassischer Argumentationspunkt ausgelassen. Bezieht
man die Auswirkungen dieses  von Malthus als großen präventiven Check (great preventive
check) bezeichneten  Eﬀektes in das konventionelle Malthusianische Modell, basierend auf dem
Bevölkerungsprinzip, dem Prinzip der abnehmenden Grenzerträge und dem Prinzip der Arbeit-
steilung, mit ein, so lässt sich der Übergang in einer sehr einfachen dynamischen, makroöko-
nomischen Darstellung illustrieren. Die zu Grunde liegende Theorie besagt, dass ein Anstieg der
durchschnittlichen Lebenserwartung eine demographische Struktur hervorruft, welche die Gefahr
der Überbevölkerung zu großen Teilen eindämmt. Obwohl die vagen Intuitionen der klassischen
Ökonomen tiefere und profundere Einsichten als die der meisten modernen Wachstumstheoretiker
lieferten, war die verbale Form ihrer Argumente häuﬁger anfällig für Fehlinterpretationen. Die
Intention dieser Arbeit liegt darin, diese Fehlinterpretationen mit Hilfe einer neuen Darstellung
eines klassischen, ganzheitlichen Wachstumsmodells zu identiﬁzieren und den wichtigsten klassis-
chen Ideen wieder ihren rechtmäßigen Platz in der ökonomischen Wissenschaft zu sichern.
II
Preface
During my studies, I had numerous encounters with Uniﬁed Growth Theory in a wider sense.
I ﬁrstly started to explore endogenous growth theory after realizing in a course on growth the-
ory that neoclassical exogenous macroeconomic growth theory still appeared limited in modeling
longrun growth. While I was always interested in a historical perspective, I discovered that most
exceptional historical phenomena were rooted in economic causes when studying international
economic history at Cardiﬀ University. At Constance University, I was introduced to demograph-
ics in a seminar on population economics. As part of my focus on econometrics at the above
universities, I also chose to analyze an econometric paper on economic stagnation employing
preindustrial demographic and economic time series. However, it was Clark's (2007) book A
Farewell to Alms that made me rethink the entire process of human economic development, and
having discussed Malthusian dynamics in a course on economic development, I was impressed
by the idea of a population trap. Building on Galor's (2011) idea of a uniﬁed growth theory,
my diploma thesis dealt with demography and wealth over the long run, trying to sustain the
theoretical ideas of stagnation and development with empirical data. During the past ten years
I was constantly seeking to maintain an inquisitive attitude, which led me to study numerous
classical economic authors, who stressed the role of demographic changes. After I had reviewed
the classical Malthusian dynamics, I realized that a consistent framework of the classical theory
of population on which ecnomists can universally agree has not been established until today.
To me this meant that either the theory lacks consistency or it has been misunderstood in im-
portant ways. With this dissertation I will argue that the latter is the case. Moreover, as I see
the interplay between demographic change and population growth in developed and developing
countries as the most urgent economic problem mankind is currently facing, I intend to design
a classical mathematical model to enable projections of economic growth under diﬀerent demo-
graphic circumstances to equip the science of economics with a more consistent understanding
of the potential future economic development.
The objection might be raised that research of population development has traditionally been
restricted to demographic science. However, an analysis of overpopulation needs to be based
on economic observations, as it is concerned with the ratio between production and population.
Historically, the interactions between population and economic production have attracted sci-
entiﬁc interest for many centuries. Political considerations certainly contributed to suppress the
population question from fully entering economic theory during the twentieth century. How-
ever, political correctness should not prevent the scientist from engaging in the broader taks of
individual or collective progress:
III
IV
Employed as he is upon a science, in which error, or even ignorance, may be productive of
such intense and extensive mischief, he is bound, like a juryman, to give deliverance true
according to the evidence, and to allow neither sympathy with indigence, nor disgust at
profusion or at avarice; neither reverence for existing institutions, nor disgust at existing
abuses; neither love of popularity, nor of paradox, nor of system, to deter him from stating
what he believes to be the facts, or from drawing from those facts what appear to be the
legitimate conclusions.1
Unfortunately, there exists no automatism that guarantees continuous scientiﬁc progress in the
ﬁelds of economics and demographics as time advances, for every generation has to acquire anew
the knowledge the former had accumulated by its own experience while facing very diﬀerent
environments. If we are lucky enough, we might encounter a historical ﬁgure in our studies
who had the same deep thoughts many years before. The best way by which the scientist can
try to improve the transmission of ideas between generations is by most transparently depicting
his theory after having convincingly synthesized the body of literature of all former theories.
Although this idealistic view might be wishful thinking, there should at least be a realistic eﬀort
to progress toward generalization and not to advance specialization and therefore fragmentation
of the science, since knowledge is ultimately useless if it cannot be communicated between diferent
scientiﬁc ﬁelds. In the case of fragmentation, ingenious methods developed from thousands of
diﬀerent viewpoints would be forgotten as soon as they cease to be useful and millions of unread
articles will pile up without having ever been read. In the case of generalization, we may be able
to unite and structure our collected knowledge in the most transparent and most accessible way.
In writing this dissertation, I received inspiration and assistance throughout the entire economic
profession. I experienced great support from my teachers, colleagues und fellow students at
the universities of Constance, Cardiﬀ, Frankfurt and Darmstadt as well as at the IfW Kiel.
First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor and doctoral advisor Volker Caspari
for his overall support, without which this project certainly could not have been completed
within the past three years. I also thank Jens Krueger for his support as my second supervisor.
Moreover, I am greatly indebted to Heinrich Ursprung, Ralf Brueggemann and Derek Matthews
for their decisively inspiring suggestions. This work also beneﬁted from extensive discussions
with Christian Berker and Guenther Rehme. Besides, I would like to express my thanks to Uwe
Hasser, Balint Tatar, Sabine Eschenhof-Kammer as well as an anonymous econometric reviewer
for all the valuable support in methodological issues. Futhermore, I am indebted to Uwe Cantner,
Oded Galor and an anonymous economic historian for mindfully assessing the relevant discussion
papers, Bernard Beaudreau, John Bernell and Michael Neugart for important feedback on my
presentations as well as Benjamin Friedman, Olivier de la Grandeville, Bertram Schefold and
David Weil for very helpful theoretical comments. The completion of this dissertation was
strongly accelerated by proofreading and administrative support from Casian Bardeanu, Ines
Balta and Philipp Savage. I want to thank my parents for the unconditional trust and support
during all the years of education. Finally, an especially heartfelt expression of gratitude is owed
to Noélle-Christin for her loving, trust and patience.
1 Senior (1836), p. 130.
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Introduction: Uniﬁed Growth Theory
1.1 Overview
The aim of this dissertation is to construct and validate a uniﬁed model of economic growth that
can explain the stylized (crude) evolution of GDP per capita over the very long run, i.e. over
the complete history of mankind, in a single coherent model. It proceeds as follows.
In the introductory chapter, the evolution of GDP per capita will be illustrated and the two
most prominent uniﬁed growth models will be presented.
The ﬁrst part of the work (chapter two and three) deals with early human economic development.
In chapter two, we will empirically evaluate the two models and conclude that there existed a
regime of economic stagnation in Britain until around 1800 AD. Since the model of stagnation is
chieﬂy based on a mechanism that had already been described by the classical economist T. R.
Malthus in the year 1798, it is called the Malthusian trap. In chapter three, this mechanism will
be traced back to Malthus' and other classical economists' original understanding, which made
use of three universal principles. On this basis, the plausibility of the classical Malthusian trap
will be illustrated by the Darwinian process of evolution. In order to arrive at an empirically
testable macroeconomic growth model, the principles will ﬁrst be translated qualitatively into
causal relationships. Then, these relationships will be quantitatively deﬁned in a system of
linear equations, exemplarily calibrated and simulated to show that the classical model can
indeed account for the regime of stagnation.
Part II of the work (chapter four and ﬁve) proceeds with the more recent human economic
development. In chapter four, the stylized facts of the second regime of economic development
will be analyzed and the classical model of chapter three will be used to explain this process
of development. Here, it will also be shown that the most popular contemporary approaches
cannot explain the escape from the Malthusian trap. As a promising alternative, this work
will advance a fourth classical principle in chapter ﬁve, by which the switch from a regime of
stagnation to a regime of development can be explained.
Part III (chapter six, seven and eight) unites the ﬁndings of the former two parts into one uniﬁed
growth theory. In chapter six, the mechanism of the Malthusian trap as well as the escape from
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the Malthusian trap will be simulated in one and the same uniﬁed growth model. Having
checked the validity of the classical model with regard to the stylized facts, chapters seven and
eight will deal with the separate empirical identiﬁcation of each principle on which the classical
uniﬁed growth theory rests. To this end, we will employ conventional OLSestimations and a
VARframework using countryspeciﬁc annual historical data on crude birth rate, crude death
rate and GDP per capita growth rate. The employed time series are mainly based on Mitchells
(2013) International Historical Statistics and World Bank (2018) data.
From the results of Part III it will be concluded in Part IV that a reduction in mortality is
generally capable of mitigating the rate of population growth responsible for stagnation and
is a necessary condition for economic development. Consequently, it is argued that emerging
economies follow a universal macroeconomic pattern of development. A decreasing death rate
is succeeded by a decreasing birth rate, which at the same time induces GDP per capita to rise
sustainably. Based on this ﬁnding, we will speculate about the future evolution of mortality
and its consequence for economic development. The work concludes with the insight that the
economic principles classical growth theory was built upon are found to prevail universally and
that the explanatory power of classical growth theory remains, even after two hundred years,
superior to most recent uniﬁed growth theories.
1.2 Evolution of GDP per Capita
It will certainly not be rated as an audacious statement to announce that the average person on
Earth enjoys, in the year 2019, the highest material living conditions that have ever been recorded.
Over the past two hundred years the world has experienced, albeit very unevenly distributed
across countries and regions, unprecedented growth rates in terms of real gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita. Maddison (2006) estimated that in the year 1830 the value of all goods
produced amounted to about USD 700 billion, measured in 1990 USD. In the same year, the world
population amounted to approximately 1.1 billion inhabitants. By the year 2003, population had
grown to around 6.4 billion people, while GDP per capita had risen tenfold from approximately
USD 640 to USD 6,400. Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that this most spectacular success
story in the history of mankind is currently fading out, with the world economy gradually moving
toward a stationary state, which some authors have already denoted as the return to secular
stagnation.1 It may, therefore, be worthwhile to pause for a moment, to take stock of what has
happened and to review and reassess this unique period of growth with the beneﬁt of hindsight.
It is the general task of the growth economist to analyze and to explain economic development
over the very long run, i.e. to reveal causes for changes in GDP per capita from the dawn
of history until today. Although the reconstruction of historical data determining past living
conditions has always been and will always be subject to some debate, it is obvious that GDP
per capita cannot have increased over the past few thousand years at the same speed as it did over
the past two hundred years. A reprojection of those growth rates would result in absurdly low
1 See, for example, Cervellati et al. (2017a).
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living conditions during medieval times.2 Consequently, it is plausible to presume a premodern
era of stagnation or at least very slow growth that J. M. Keynes3 (1930) had described as follows:
From the earliest times of which we have recordback, say, to two thousand years before
Christ  down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was no very great change
in the standard of life of the average man living in the civilised centres of the earth.4
By that time, he was well aware of the fact that  roughly since the year 1800  his country-
men had experienced a transitional phase from economic stagnation to growth, optimistically
concluding that
assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the economic problem
may be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within a hundred years.5
Among others, Clark (2009) and Broadberry et al. (2015) seized on the economic problem and
collected British historical data of GDP per capita to provide evidence of the transition from a
historical regime of stagnation or very slow growth to a regime of development in the form of
the popular hockey stick, as is depicted in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Stylized facts of stagnation and development.
Sources: Broadberry et al. (2015), Clark (2009) and Mitchell (2013).
These data are often assumed to not simply reﬂect British economic history, but to represent a
global development pattern in so far as every economy once found itself or is currently located in
2 See Mokyr and Voth (2010). A reprojection of the initial example would thus suggest a GDP per capita
value of approximately USD 60 in the year 1650.
3 Sir John Maynard Keynes (18831946), British economist, member of the Royal Commission in 1913, ﬁnancial
representative for the Treasury to the 1919 Versailles peace conference, founder of modern macroeconomics.
4 Keynes (1930), p. 1.
5 ibid., p. 4.
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a regime of stagnation or slow development. Moreover, the data suggest that something changed
around the year 1800, when Britain apparently became the ﬁrst economy to mircaculously
generate sustained economic development.6 As Broadberry and O'Rourke (2010) put it,
viewed in the grand sweep of history, this change was undoubtedly radical, and must be
ranked alongside other epochmaking changes such as the change from hunting and gathering
to settled agriculture.7
Reluctantly during the ﬁrst hundred years, then progressively catching up, the major part of the
world economy succeeded the British example.
When staring at these facts, almost automatically some questions come to mind. Why was
there economic stagnation for so long? Why have some economies experienced development
while others are still caught in stagnation? Will this improvement in material well-being be
a lasting one? Or in summary: Why and when does longrun economic development occur?
With Lucas (1988) arguing that the consequences for human welfare involved in questions like
these are simply staggering8 and North (2013) urging that the elucidation of the transition to
economic development seems to be the most important historical question that might conceivably
be possible to answer, the primary object of this work is to analyze the eﬀects that made for an
era of stagnation or slow growth as well as those enabling the transition to growth and thus to
build a very longrun economic growth model, or to use Keynes' wording, to solve the economic
problem. If we are able to explain the past, we may also be better able to assess the potential
future development.
1.3 Uniﬁed Growth Theory
1.3.1 The demographic view on uniﬁed growth theory
As a starting point for theoretical analyses of GDP per capita growth, economists usually refer to
the conventional neoclassical Solow (1956) growth model, for which Solow was awarded the Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in the year 1987 due to his contributions to the theory of
economic growth. However, as this model appeared to be merely intended to describe longrun
growth during the twentieth century, numerous authors began to look beyond its limitations,
attempting to build a framework that could encompass the complete history of mankind to
account for the very long run. Mokyr and Voth (2010) summarized the emergence of this
theoretical literature by stating that
From the 1990s onwards, scholars started to search for an overarching theory that could
encompass both slow growth and the transition to rapidly increasing per capita incomes 
a uniﬁed growth model. The ﬁeld has ﬂourished since. A number of themes stand out
 demography, the inﬂuence of institutions, human capital and culture, and the role of
technology.9
6 The date 1800 is often chosen as a rough estimate to mark the British takeoﬀ.
7 Broadberry & O'Rourke (2010), p. 1.
8 Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think of anything else. Lucas (1988), p. 5.
9 Mokyr and Voth (2010), p. 8.
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Firstly, as is noted in the above quote, a uniﬁed growth theory ought to be able to connect
an early historical regime of stagnation or slow growth with a more recent historical regime of
growth in productivity.10 Secondly, a uniﬁed growth theory is expected to explain economic
development endogenously, i.e. from within the model.
1.3.2 Endogenous uniﬁed growth theory
Over the past 25 years, countless theories in the spirit of Romer's (1986) growth theory of en-
dogenous technological change have been developed by growth economists with the intention
to explain the observed economic development. Out of Mokyr and Voth's above list, this work
will support the ﬁrst, the demographic view on uniﬁed growth theory and can indeed be de-
clared as one long argument in favor of the deep virtues of population dynamics as a decisive
component of verylong run economic growth.11 Given the  in the following brieﬂy reviewed 
recent literature on endogenous growth theory, the focus on demographic variables is certainly
not surprising. Notable merits of this view are that records of demographic data are among
the most reliable, objective and transparent historical sources, relatively easy to collect, and
arguably possess the longest historical time series. Furthermore, demographics might be most
appropriately considered as a hard social science, since their index numbers do not leave much
room for interpretation.
More importantly, as real GDP per capita (in the following denoted as y) is deﬁned as the
ratio of real gross (total) production and population size (in the following simply denoted as
production (Y ) and population (N )), it merely reﬂects the productivity of the production
factor population YN and must be considered as a function of the two variables. On the one hand,
the denominator simply reﬂects the degree of abundance or scarcity of population. On the other
hand, the numerator production incorporates the value of all produced wealth within a given
territory in a given period and is again a function of all available production factors (C) in
addition to population. It does not require much abstraction to envision that the existence of
a population requires a certain amount of production and that the latter requires a population
to be produced, i.e. the one cannot exist without the other. A synthesis of these two elements,
where production may be determined by population and vice versa, allows us to call this mutual
relationship y(Y,N) = Y (N)N(Y ) an endogenous (demographic) growth theory. The ﬁrst component
of such an endogenous growth theory  a theory of production  seeks to model the eﬀect of
population on production. The second component is expected to explain  in contrast to the
traditional exogenous Solow model  the causes for population growth by some other variable
from within the model, ideally by production. Such an explanation will be referred to as a
10 As a simpliﬁcation, long run models often assume production per capita, income per capita and average
living standards to be identical. Furthermore, production per capita will be abbreviated as productivity (of
the production factor population). We will also, following Lucas (1988), refer to an increase in productivity
(intensive growth) as economic development, whereas the expression economic growth will be used to charac-
terize an increase in gross production (extensive growth). These terms have often been confused in the past,
in particular in that literature which is concerned with growth in economic development.
11 The great events of history are often due to secular changes in the growth of population and other funda-
mental economic causes, which, escaping by their gradual character the notice of contemporary observers, are
attributed to the follies of statesmen or the fanaticism of atheists. Keynes (1919), chapter I.
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theory of population. In summary, the demographic view on uniﬁed growth theory is illustrated
in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: The Demographic View on Economic Growth.
Consequently, most growth economists seem to accept some mechanism of a mutual relationship
between population and production. However, they often disagree on the corresponding growth
rates gi that are related linearly in the following way:12
gy = gY (gN )− gN (gY )
With regard to the demographic theory of production, two opposing lines of thought can be
identiﬁed until this day, which might be marked as the optimist and the pessimist view on
the population question.13 While the optimists claim that an increase in population growth
will  chieﬂy owing to concomitant specialization and technological progress  raise average
production per capita (gY (gN ) > gN (gY )), the pessimists maintain that productivity would
decline as a result of resources becoming relatively more scarce (gY (gN ) < gN (gY )). To provide
examples, we will brieﬂy contrast the two most prominent uniﬁed growth theories.












−1⇔ ln(1+gy) = ln(1+gY )− ln(1+gN )⇔ gy ≈ gY −gN .
The approximation holds for small growth rates (as rule of thumb, growth rates should not be larger than
10% such that the deviation from the true growth rate amounts to less than 5%).
13 See, for example, Bloom et al. (2003). For an optimist view, see, for example, Becker (1988) or Boserup
(1965). Examples of a pessimist view are Hardin (1968) or Ehrlich (1968).
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1.3.3 A uniﬁed growth theory consisting of one regime
Although theoretical considerations on the interaction between population and production are
older than the science of economics itself, Kremer (1993) seems to have been one of the ﬁrst
authors to advance a mathematical framework for an endogenous uniﬁed growth theory. Follow-
ing the demographic view, the two variables production and population in his model are crucial
to roughly describing the historical evolution of GDP per capita. In a nutshell, his theory of
production states that a larger population would generate a larger number of technological
improvements, which would in turn increasingly upgrade to eﬃciency of some other production
factor and thus raise production.14 As for his theory of population, Kremer intuitively assumed
that growth in production would in turn tend to raise population. The resulting parallel move-
ment of population and production can be modeled by assuming an exponential increase in both
variables as is depicted in the left graph of Figure 1.3. Kremer suggested a virtuous cycle between
both variables, by which production would constantly outgrow population and therefore lead to
a long gradual increase in GDP per capita since primitive times (see right graph of Figure 1.3).15
The stylized facts of the model can be mathematically summarized as follows:






Figure 1.3: Stylized evolution of production (left, blue), population (left, orange) and productivity (right, green)
over the very long run according to Kremer (1993).
14 To the economic historian, increasing GDP per capita is often depicted as the result of improvements in
technology. While economic theory still lacks a precise deﬁnition of technology, the usual broad deﬁnition
includes productivity improvements due to factors like culture, institutions, enlightenment etc. Kremer (1993),
for example, uses positive externalities from knowledge spillovers to model this eﬀect, others emphasize
increasing returns of population from a division of labor. We wil return to the problem of technology in the
third and fourth chapters.
15 Early models in uniﬁed growth theory, such as Kremer's paper, modelled the transition from stagnation to
growth as one long, gradual acceleration of [per capita] growth rates. [...] Kremer's model assumes that more
people spell faster technological change, since the probability of a person having a bright idea is more or less
constant. [...] Since 1,000,000 BC, growth rates of population can be predicted from the current size of the
population. Mokyr and Voth (2010), p. 8.
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1.3.4 A uniﬁed growth theory consisting of two regimes
In contrast to the view of a slow gradual evolution over the whole time span under observation,
more recent uniﬁed growth models emphasize the more diﬀerentiated view of two regimes of de-
velopment: One regime of stagnating GDP per capita until about 1800 AD and another regime
of economic development thereafter.16 Galor and Weil (1999), for example, challenged the con-
ventional Kremerian view by adding that production growth did not succeed in outperforming
population growth until about 1800 AD and that the latter would eventually fully consume any
productivity gains from technological improvements. In addition, since economic development
had obviously begun by the end of the nineteenth century, they extended their model of stag-
nation by suggesting that the positive eﬀect of production on population broke down after 1800
AD and that a slowdown in population growth became a main determinant of the simultaneously
observed growth in GDP per capita, whereas production continued to grow in the same manner
as before.17 The corresponding stlylized facts are illustrated by Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Stylized evolution of production (left, blue), population (left, orange) and productivity (right, green)
over the very long run according to Galor and Weil (1999).
As a result, the regime of stagnation might be summarized by writing






while the regime of development may correspond to the following formulation






Although, therefore, population is in both frameworks regarded as a positive endogenous source
of production and vice versa, Kremer's theory spurs a cycle of economic development over the
very long run (in the following denoted as the cycle of prosperity), while Galor and Weil
16 See, for example, Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Tournemaine and Luangaram (2012).
17 The main ﬁndings of Galor's research are summarized in his book Uniﬁed Growth Theory (Galor 2011).
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suggest a cycle of economic stagnation that weakens after 1800 AD (the cycle of misery).18 To
investigate which of the two views appears to be conﬁrmed by the real economic development,
this work will proceed chronologically and ﬁrst analyze the interactions between demographic
and economic variables during the early era until about 1800 AD (Part I) and afterwards examine
the corresponding interactions during the late era of development after approximately 1800 AD
(Part II).
18 See LiviBacci (2012) for a historical description of this eﬀect and for an overview of population history.
Part I
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Chapter 2
The Regime of Economic Stagnation
2.1 Evolution of GDP per Capita
2.1.1 The data  why Britain?
As in the introductory chapter, our investigation on the evolution of GDP per capita during the
early regime will heavily focus on the British data.1 This happends for the following reasons.
Firstly, due to her early takeoﬀ and British global economic leadership during the nineteenth
century, the country is often viewed as a globally representative case in economic development,
attracting more interest among economists than any other. Secondly, the resulting discussions
among economic historians have favoured the collection/reconstruction of a large number of
British highquality historical longrun data series related to economic development, more than
for any other country. Thirdly, the extraordinarily long period of relative peace on the British
Islands without much foreign intervention since the eleventh century allowed for a comparatively
steady development without large breaks in the time series, i.e. for a natural development.
In spite of these merits, the pattern of the British historical GDP per capita evolution remains
debated. To examine its evolution until the economic takeoﬀ during the nineteenth century, the
currently most common collections of British data from Figure 1.1 are displayed on a shorter time
scale in Figure 2.1, starting in 1541 and ending in the mid-nineteenth century. The left graph
of the Figure illustrates Broadberry et al.'s (2015) GDP per capita data, the right graph shows
Clark's (2009) data. In the latter case, although there exist pronounced ﬂuctuations in living
standards, a linear regression of the series does not display an obvious positive trend. Broadberry
et al.'s data, on the other hand, exihibit, at least after the year 1650, an upward trend. While
Broadberry et al.'s empirical calculations yield some support for Kremer's theoretical view of a
slow gradual increase in GDP per capita, Clark's historical estimates suggest a period of economic
stagnation, sustaining Galor's ideas with regard to a uniﬁed growth theory.2 We will therefore
now roughly evaluate the reliability of both data series and conclude that the Clark time series
appears to be the much more plausible one.
1 We will in the following crudely refer to Britain as the entity for which representative data are provided. A
more diﬀerentiated use of the term would require a tedious examination of regional data.
2 Clark even speculates that the average English person was in the year 1800 not better oﬀ than their ancestors
on the African plains millennia before.
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Figure 2.1: Indexed British GDP per capita 15411848. Left graph Broadberry et al. data, right graph Clark
data.
Sources: Broadberry et al. (2015) and Clark (2009).
2.1.2 Quantitative evidence of early stagnation
First of all, it has to be kept in mind that the diﬀerent pattern of the above series might have
merely been the result of personal rivalries. In his 2007 book A Farewell to Alms, Clark
elaborated (although not mathematically) on a uniﬁed growth theory incorporating the two
regimes mentioned in the last chapter. Since his main theses seemed to be ad odds with the at that
time prevailing main source of historical data series of GDP per capita by Maddison (2006), Clark
(2008) blamed  arguably deservedly  the Maddison data series for being predominantly random
extrapolations and constructed his own series of British GDP per capita.3 As a response and
probably in avoidance of leaving the monopoly of historical interpretation to Clark, Broadberry
et al. (2015) constructed another historical series of British GDP with the apparent aim of
updating the Maddison Project Database. Their main argument was that Clark's data did
not take into account the increasing number of working days of laborers over the course of the
centuries. Clark (2018) naturally rejected these allegations.4
Since this work is more concernced with the stylized facts of economic development, giving much
less weight to single historical instances, we will defer the debate on the detailed reconstruction
of the data series in question and focus on their empirical plausibility. Firstly, Clark's critique
that the Broadberry et al. series would imply implausibly low GDP per capita values during
preindustrial times appears to be the most convincing argument for rejecting the latter series.
Secondly, if we hypothetically accepted the Broadberry et al. data series as being the true one,
the question of stagnation would merely be deferred to an earlier period. As we can see from
Figure 2.1, stagnation exists in the Broadberry et al. data as well, merely some 150200 years
before the takeoﬀ in the Clark data. If we were to agree on this ﬁnding, there would be no
question about the existence of two regimes, but rather a question about the exact timing of
3 See Clark (2008).
4 See Clark (2018).
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the transition between the regimes of stagnation and development. Thirdly, in contrast to the
two above depicted data series on GDP per capita, Allen's (2001) data series on real wages of
London laborers is less suspicious of opportunism, as it was constructed well before the above
debate had begun. The real wage, or the value of labor, is a useful proxy variable for GDP
per capita as, in growth theory, it is supposed to move proportionally with GDP per capita and
often serves as an alternative measure of living standards. As can be seen from Figure 2.2, the
trend of the real wage series seems to ﬁt the pattern of the Clark data much better than that
of the Broadberry et al. data in the sense that a signiﬁcant increase in real wages cannot be
observed until the year 1800. LiviBacci generalizes this ﬁnding by even stating that
real wages in general declined throughout Europe during the eighteenth century and into the
ﬁrst decades of the nineteenth.5
This view is hardly compatible with a slow permanent increase in GDP per capita as suggested
by Broadberry et al. Fourthly, indicators regarding the pros and cons of stagnation or a gradual
change include anthropometric and archaeological evidence. Even if Clark's estimates on GDP
per capita and Allen's estimates on real wages were questioned, the generally observed stagnation
of body stature due to insuﬃcient nutrition until around 1800 AD would provide strong evidence
of economic stagnation.6 As Livi-Bacci continues,
Another indication is variation in average height, which seems in this same period to have
declined in England, in the Hapsburg Empire, and in Sweden.7
If we were to follow the Broadberry et al. dataset, we should instead suppose that increasing
GDP per capita would be wellreﬂected by a parallel growth of body stature. Altogether, the
evidence for a regime of economic stagnation seems to be stronger than the evidence for a regime
of slow growth. We will continue this line of thought in the next section.
Figure 2.2: Indexed London real wages 1209-1848.
Source: Allen (2001).
5 LiviBacci (2012), p. 72.
6 See Tanner (1994), or more recently in Hinde et al. (2018).
7 LiviBacci (2012), p. 72.
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2.2 Evolution of GDP and Population
2.2.1 Quantitative evidence of parallel growth in production and population
At ﬁrst sight, the idea of premodern economic stagnation seems to contradict the intuition
of the modern layman that growth followed a positive longrun trend. At second glance,
however, we ﬁnd that we have to distinguish between economic growth (in GDP) and economic
development (in GDP per capita). Although the notion of stagnation might lead to the suspicion
that production and population had stagnated as well until the midnineteenth century, Figure
2.3 refutes this view by illustrating the development of production and population separately,
again based on the Broadberry et al. data (left) and the Clark data (right). Population estimates
are in both cases based on the relatively wellestablished estimates of Wrigley and Schoﬁeld
(1981) and accordingly not subject to major debate. Since both series uncover that the two
variables not only increased over time, but also increased steadily and exponentially, the fact
of continuous growth in production seems incontrovertible and with it the conﬁrmation of the
idea of continuous technological progress. However, the favored Clark data (right graph) again
tend to support a vicious cycle of misery as advanced by Galor rather than a virtuous cycle of
prosperity as suggested by Kremer. This implies that population growth used to win the race
against growth in production, writing gN ≥ gY , leaving no room for economic development in
terms of GDP per capita.
Figure 2.3: Indexed British rise in GDP and population size 15411848.
Sources: Broadberry et al. (2015), Clark (2009), Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981).
If we proceed to conjecture that the Clark data are a good description of reality and are repre-
sentable for other economies, we ought to observe roughly proportional increases in GDP and
population over the long run not only for Britain, but for every country. Consequently, we ex-
pect plenty of evidence from international comparisons. The observation of stagnation in some
African states up to this day, in spite of strong simultaneous population growth therefore serves
as a ﬁfth argument in favour of Galor's view. Moreover, the quite generally displayed histor-
ical constancy of productivity in economies with considerable total economic growth must be
equally accredited to a rapidly growing population. Among the largest economies we ﬁnd that
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the lowest levels of GDP per capita are regularly preceded by strong growth in both production
and population, be it China (during the years 19591961), India (1943) or Russia (19321933),
rejecting once again the possibility that production would steadily outgrow population. It seems
on the contrary rather reasonable to categorize the current global situation of economies into
two groups: Those economies still trapped in stagnation and those that escaped from a low level
of stagnating productivity. Examples of both groups are depicted in Appendix 11.1.
Sixthly, past British economists were very well aware of their own economic situation in the
nineteenth century and one of the best ways to ﬁnd evidence of stagnation in early nineteenth
century Britain is, of course, to adhere to the writings of the contemporaries who witnessed this
stagnation. The time frame of Figure 2.1 has been chosen deliberately, since the ending year 1848
marks the latest possible date at which we may still talk about existing economic stagnation.
Nonetheless, even as late as 1848, J. S. Mill8 doubted the superior power of growth in production
and technological progress as compared to growth in population:
Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's
toil of any human being. They have enabled a greater population to live the same life of
drudgery and imprisonment.9
Clearly, Broadberry et al.'s data series contradicts this assessment, insinuating that these authors
had a better knowledge of the classical British economy than the classical economists themselves.
This point will be explored more extensively when the precise mechanism of stagnation is pre-
sented in chapter three. Finally, as the presumption of population tending to outgrow production
seems to be supported by the data, this view has found broad acceptance in the discipline of
cliometrics.
Cliometrics conﬁrms that [the cycle of misery in] the preindustrial economy is a good de-
scription for much of demographiceconomic history;10
In summary, since the (former) existence of a regime of stagnation in GDP per capita is sustained
by sources with all kinds of evidence, we will eventually assume that production and population
grew roughly proportionally until around 1800 AD.
8 John Stuart Mill (18061873), British philosopher, Rector of the University of St Andrews, Member of Par-
liament for Westminster.
9 Mill (1848), book IV, chapter VI.
10 James Foreman-Peck (2019).
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2.3 The Regime of Economic Stagnation: Stylized Facts
Nonetheless, we must remark that, when trying to generalize the British case on a global scale,
it is reasonable to consider the term stagnation merely in its abstract form as a stylized fact
and not to insist on the prevalence of a ﬁxed productivity level in every single historical instance.
There was certainly some sporadic economic development in the ancient Greek and Roman
economies as well as in some regions of late medieval China, Europe or Japan. However, as
a starting point for theoretical investigations on the occurrence of the transition to modern
exponential development, the abstraction of stagnation will be extremely useful in contrasting
the two regimes of a uniﬁed growth theory. Hence, the stylized facts of the regime of stagnation
can be summarized as follows.
1. We observe economic stagnation: GDP per capita is constant over the long run:
gy = gY (gN )− gN (gY ) = 0
2. We observe a cycle of misery: GDP and population grow roughly with the same positive







Since this stylized regime of stagnation has been found to have prevailed for at least four hundred
years on a comparatively low level of production per capita, it may be properly called the era
of economic stagnation. The stylized facts of the regime of stagnation are illustrated in Figure
2.4.
Figure 2.4: Left: The stylized fact of the cycle of misery of increasing population (left, orange) and production
(left, orange) in Britain. Right: The stylized fact of stagnation in GDP per capita (green).
Chapter 3
A Classical Growth Theory of
Stagnation
3.1 Advancing the Malthusian Interpretation of History
3.1.1 Galor's Malthusian trap
So far, we have merely employed descriptive statistics to follow the evolution of GDP, GDP per
capita and population. In this chapter, we will investigate the theoretical mechanism yielding the
cycle of misery between production and population more closely to account for an endogenous
theory of growth. As we have seen, the historical evolution of the three variables seems to
be roughly in line with the theory of stagnation advanced by Galor and Weil. As Galor and
Weil borrowed their theory from the classical economist T. R. Malthus1, they referred to the
responsible mechanism as Malthusian trap. Although the relatively neutral wording population
trap is still widely employed as describing the theoretical mechanism of stagnation, a number of
quite diﬀerent labels have been circulating ranging from F. Lassalle's2 (1863) iron law of wages
to Keynes' (1930) struggle for subsistence. Since all of these terms share the same theoretical
fundament, namely the apparent inevitability of stagnating productivity under the prevalence
of excessive population growth, they are in the following summarized under the now established
expression among uniﬁed growth economists, the Malthusian trap.
The Malthusian trap as a more detailed mechanism of the cycle of misery may be assumed to
be owed to three eﬀects that are described in equation 3.1. Firstly, Galor and Weil seem to have
agreed with Kremer that population growth might trigger the invention of new technologies and
therefore positively aﬀect growth in production (1). Secondly, although it is not always explicitly
stated, population growth is usually assumed to be somehow positively initiated by growth in
production (2). Thirdly, Galor and Weil suggested that the higher growth rate in population
seems to have steadily operated to neutralize its simultaneous advances in production in the
1 Thomas Robert Malthus (17661834), British professor of history and political economy at the East India
Company College in Haileybury, fellow of the Royal Society.
2 Ferdinand Lassalle (18251864), writer, socialist politician and founding father of the German social democrat
party.
17
Chapter 3. A Classical Growth Theory of Stagnation 18
British economy before 1800 AD, decreasing productivity and emphasizing diminishing returns
to population (3). These three eﬀects seem to have held productivity roughly on a constant














Galor and Weil's research resuscitated  together with Clark's (2007) book  a debate that had
lingered subliminally in economic thought for about two hundred years.3 As a result, Malthusian
ideas have attracted renewed interest among growth economists over the past two decades. As it
appears to oﬀer a simple framework in explaining economic longrun stagnation in productivity,
some interpretation of a Malthusian trap is today commonly viewed as a cornerstone of a uniﬁed
growth theory. However, notwithstanding their reference to Malthus, it appears that the fewest of
those uniﬁed growth authors have actually read Malthus' original publications on the subject, as
their theories often grossly contradict Malthus' original statements.4 To make up for this defect,
this work will advance the original view of classical economics, supplementing Malthus' theory
with theories established by other classical and neoclassical economists. This retrospective view is
considered to be necessary, since a thorough understanding of the mechanism of the Malthusian
trap is both essential to perceive the social, macroeconomic scope of population growth and
crucial in understanding the transition toward economic development.5 Once we have established
the classical view, we will ﬁnd that understanding the answer to the question why was there
stagnation? is even more illuminating to all social sciences than solving the puzzle of why there
was development. Once the principles responsible for stagnation are understood, only a small
step remains to understanding the uniﬁed growth process.
3.1.2 Classical economics
Among others, North (2013) reminded us that the origins of the question of stagnation could be
traced back to classical economic theory, which had already deeply inﬂuenced philosophy and
natural sciences until the middle of the nineteenth century and whose agenda was not much
diﬀerent from that of current uniﬁed growth theory.
Over a full century, roughly ranging from 17701870, when economics was known as political
economy, demographics played a vital role in the theory of growth. The earlier mercantilist
theory, facing regular devastating mortality crises, had viewed a large population as the funda-
ment of (total) national economic prosperity in the international race for scarce resources (see,
for example, Mun (1664)). Thereafter, the French economist and statesman Turgot (1767), wit-
nessing the French population explosion, seems to have been one of the ﬁrst authors to announce
3 See, for example, Artzrouni and Komlos (1985).
4 Hardin (1999).
5 Or, in Wicksteeds words: For it is one thing to be practically familiar with a principle and to assume it in
simple cases as a matter of course, and it is another thing to grasp it so consciously and so ﬁrmly as never to
lose hold of it or admit anything inconsistent with it, however remote from familiar experience and however
complicated and abstract may be the regions of enquiry in which we need it as our clue. Wicksteed (1894),
p. 8.
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a law of diminishing returns to labor, according to which some constant production factor (e.g.
capital, land) would limit the rise of production induced by an increase in the labor force. A
few years later, A. Smith6 (1776) partly revised this physiocratic view in the light of the English
Industrial Revolution by stating that higher population density and urbanization would cause a
greater variety of professions, raising the degree of specialization. If increasingly specialized in-
dividuals would reasonably engage in trade, the division of labor between these subjects would
be enhanced, raising production more than proportionally. Another twenty years later however,
the idea that the wealth of nations was based on population growth was struck again when it had
become clear that in spite of great technological advances resulting from the division of labor,
the British population explosion had eﬀectively pushed down real wages and GDP per capita.
Malthus (1798) proposed the principle of population, by stating that population had the in-
herent tendency to inevitably outgrow production. Another ﬁve years later however, as we will
show in Part II of this work, Malthus (1803) provided the great preventive check as apparently
constituting the only justiﬁable remedy for economies facing excessive population growth and
by which individuals were generally susceptible to birth control. Since then, as predicted by the
ﬁrst professor of political economy, fertility abated and productivity increased.
3.1.3 Endogeneity of the Malthusian trap
To extend our theoretical understanding of stagnation in productivity from a rather ad hoc re-
lationship between production growth and population growth toward the classical, more sophis-
ticated endogenous growth theory, we will distinguish between a classical theory of production
and a classical theory of population. Accordingly, we will explore the eﬀect of population growth
on productivity growth ( ∂gy∂gN ) as well as the eﬀect of productivity growth on population growth
(∂gN∂gy ) separately. The underlying principles guiding these eﬀects must be veriﬁable and univer-
sal, even though they may outweigh each other to the extent that some principle may not be
perceptible at a given point in time. Consequently, in the following sections much emphasis is put
on exhaustive deﬁnitions and logical deductions. Once we have uncovered the main principles
of the theory of production as well as of the theory of population, we may unify them in one
coherent endogenous growth framework to simulate an era of stagnation. We will now start with
the classical theory of production.
6 Adam Smith (17231790), British professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, one of the
founders of classical economics/political economy.
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3.2 The Classical Theory of Production
The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the nec-
essaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes [...]7
3.2.1 A labor theory of production
3.2.1.1 Introduction
Firstly, to frame a longrun demographic theory of production as outlined in chapter one, growth
in production must be exhaustively deﬁned. An important beneﬁt of using an exhaustive deﬁni-
tion of production is that it allows us to structure our economic thinking by keeping everything
in mind at the same time. To account for an exhaustive theory of production, we will employ
the (static) neoclassical macroeconomic aggregate production function approach that incorpo-
rates a relationship between production and every factor of production. Instead of explicitly
accounting for technology, all other production factors apart from population will be collected
in the variable generalized capital. This section will show that this traditional production
function approach is largely in line with classical theory. Secondly, while production may be
deﬁned as all value produced within a given year, it is essential to model population as only
source of production. Only if these two preconditions are fulﬁlled for a theory of production and
analogously for a theory of population, the latter two might be synthesized into an endogenous
theory of growth that can suﬃciently explain the process of economic development.
In this ﬁrst section, building on the Smithian assumption of an eﬃcient division of labor, the
(static) production function approach by P. Wicksteed8 (1984) is extended toward the (dynamic)
Solow growth model, where (exogenous) labor is assumed to aﬀect all other production factors in
addition to production itself. In the second section it will be clariﬁed that what was commonly
meant by the variable labor should be substituted by the variable unskilled labor, which is
well approximated by population size. On this basis, a new model of population as source of
all value is presented, where regular innovations are supposed to be completely embodied by
population growth through a division of labor and subsequent specialization and a structural
equation, deﬁning the simultaneous operation of two universal economic principles, is derived.
This structural equation will later be used for the simulation and estimation of our model.
3.2.1.2 Static Theory
The one decisive regular cause by which population growth is classically assumed to enhance
production is the division of labor. Smith (1776) suggested that, in an environment favoring the
security of property and income, the inherent tendency to exchange their products would result
in a division of labor between individuals.9 What Smith meant by division of labor can be
7 Smith (1776), Introduction.
8 Philip Henry Wicksteed (1844-1927), British Unitarian minister, one of the founders of neoclassical economics.
9 Throughout this paper we will presume the existence of such institutional conditions. A more abstract point
of view would even suggest relaxing this presumption by stating that eﬃcient institutions are one result of
such a perfect division of labor.
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understood as the eﬃcient cooperation of all productive individuals in the economy to maximize
total production. This eﬃcient level of cooperation would be achieved if all production processes
were perfectly subdivided between those individuals. Such a perfect division implied that every
new individual entering the economy would tend to induce a new subdivision of production into
smaller, more easily conductible, eﬃcient production processes and therefore raise production.
Nonetheless, in spite of the generally observed tendency toward an eﬃcient division of labor in
a free market economy, the classics had already noted large regional diﬀerences in individual
productivity. Obviously, these diﬀerences were owed to the relative abundance or scarcity of
some other production factor. N. W. Senior10 (1836) extended the doctrine of labor division by
stating that what Smith had really meant was the eﬃcient subdivision of production processes
through an eﬃcient combination of several production factors.11 He argued that this concept
ought in fact be termed the division of production instead of the division of labor and could
be formulated as a relationship between production and an eﬃcient use of all these production
factors  a production function.12
Perpetuating this production function approach, neoclassical economists argued at the end of
the nineteenth century that, since production factors are in reality dynamically interconnected,
a separate analysis of the eﬀect of every single factor required the consideration of an abstract
static state of an economy where production factors were assumed to be independent. To J.
B. Clark13 (1899), it seemed obvious that the economist had to start with the easier task of
modeling a static production function ﬁrst, where all except the production factor of interest
were held constant (ceteris paribus) such that no causal relationships between production factors
interfered.14 Roughly at the same time, the static model was mathematically advanced by
Wicksteed (1894), adding to the above considerations the perhaps most powerful proposition
for employing a valid aggregate production function: the replication argument. It states that
under static conditions, a replication of an exhaustive list of production factors must universally
generate a replication of production. Correspondingly, an aggregate production function is to
be deﬁned as a static production function fulﬁlling the replication argument, which was later
formulated as the doctrine of constant returns to scale.15
Now it must of course be admitted that if the physical conditions under which a certain
amount of wheat, or anything else, is produced were exactly repeated the result would be
exactly repeated also, and a proportional increase of the one would yield a proportional
increase of the other. The crude division of the factors of production into land, capital and
10 Nassau William Senior (17901864), British lawyer, professor of political economy at the University of Oxford,
member of Royal Commissions in 1832, 1837 and 1861.
11 A production factor being deﬁned as an input resource that positively contributes to production.
12 [...] division of production would have been a more convenient expression than division of labour; but Adam
Smith's authority has given such currency to the term division of labour, that we shall continue to employ
it, using it, however, in the extended sense in which it appears to have been used by Adam Smith. Senior
(1836), p. 159.
13 John Bates Clark (1847-1938), USAmerican professor of economics at Columbia University, founder of the
American Economic Association.
14 Why, then, do we wish to know the laws of an imaginary static state? Because the forces that act in such a
state continue to act in a dynamic one. [...] In dealing with the complex problems of an advancing economy,
the key of success is the separate study of the static forces that constantly act within it. Clark (1899), p. 60.
15 See Hicks (1936).
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labour must indeed be abandoned [...]. We must regard every kind and quality of labour that
can be distinguished from other kinds and qualities as a separate factor; and in the same way
every kind of land will be taken as a separate factor. [...] Each of these may be scheduled in
its own unit, and when this has been done the enumeration of the factors of production may
be regarded as complete. On this understanding it is of course obvious, that a proportional
increase of all the factors of production, will secure a proportional increase of the product.16
Notwithstanding the requirement of an exhaustive list of factors, most classical economists seem
to have agreed on the usage of merely two factors required for production Y : labor L and
capital K.17 Wicksteed declared the just use of this simpliﬁcation as long as capital was viewed
to serve as an approximate residual catchallvariable to incorporate an exhaustive list of
all hitherto omitted production factors required for total production, measured in a complex
unit, for example in exchange value.18 As a result, capital could be deﬁned as all things of
value required for production, whereas the explicit use of other production factors would have
unnecessarily complicated the theoretical and empirical analysis  a simpliﬁcation that was later
used by Keynes, Robinson19, Solow20 and many others. Obviously, when following this deﬁnition,
a potential factor speciﬁcally accounting for technology21 would become obsolete.
Alongside this generalized capital, labor remained the main production factor of interest as long
as labor productivity YL seemed to best approximate individual productivity, i.e. production per
capita. As J. R. McCulloch22 (1863) concluded,
[he]re, then, is the simple and decisive test by which we are to judge of the expediency of
all measures aﬀecting the wealth of the country, and of the value of all innovations. If they
make labour more productive, [...] they must be advantageous; [...] Considered in this point
of view, that great branch of the science which treats of the production of wealth will be
found to be abundantly simple, and easily understood.23
To this end, Wicksteed suggested that labor had to be isolated from an inﬁnite number of
production factors:
What we really want is to separate out labour and dose it with landpluscapital, if possible
to satiety.24 [. . . ] It is perfectly legitimate to start with a unit of [labour], assume that
16 Wicksteed (1894), p. 33.
17 Often, the additional factor land has been added: [. . . ] it has been usual to take each of the great factors
of production such as Land, Capital and Labour, severally, to enquire into the special circumstances under
which that factor cooperates in production [. . . ]. Wicksteed (1894), p. 7. Thereafter, a production function
with constant returns to scale is mathematically deﬁned as follows: F (K,L) = Y ⇔ F (λK, λL) = λY.
18 All the constituents of this generalised `capital' are regarded as reduced to their expression in money.
Wicksteed (1894), p. 13.
19 The capital in existence at any moment may be treated simply as `part of the environment on which labour
works.' Keynes (1936) in Robinson (1954), p. 214.
20 Were the data available, it would be better to apply the analysis to some precisely deﬁned production function
with many precisely deﬁned inputs. One can at least hope that the aggregate analysis gives some notion of
the way a detailed analysis would lead. Solow (1957), p. 312, footnote.
21 As is suggested by the use of the production function Y = F (A,K,L), which is for example done by Solow
(1957) or Romer (1986).
22 John Ramsay McCulloch (17791864), British professor of political economy at London University, comptroller
of Her Majesty's Stationary Oﬃce.
23 McCulloch (1863), part I, chapter I, section II.
24 Wicksteed (1894), p. 14, footnote.
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the command of the other factors of production is so exercised as to secure the maximum
productive result, and then treat the product as a function of [labour] and pounds sterling.
[. . . ] and we may, if we choose, select any one factor to measure in its proper unit while
measuring all the rest in a common unit.25
Furthermore, Wicksteed concluded that such an aggregate production function implied diminish-
ing returns to each production factor in the fashion forwarded by Turgot (1767) and von Thuenen
(1842), i.e. that an incremental static use of any separate factor would yield an increasingly di-
minishing marginal product as well as diminishing productivity of that factor.26 Hence, the idea
of diminishing returns became a universal law for the accumulation of any production factor,
which is one of the conclusive statements of the static theory of production.27 Cobb and Douglas
(1928) built on Wicksteed's approach and suggested a speciﬁc form of an aggregate production
function that would account for the above conditions.28 Their aggregate production function
Y = F (K,L) = KαL1−α with 0 < α < 1, where α reﬂects the constant production elasticity
of capital, is still a commonly taught instrument of the neoclassical growth school, although it
does not necessarily display the true form of the aggregate production function.
In summary, we may conclude that Smith's classical concept of labor division has survived the
marginal revolution in the form of a neoclassical aggregate production function centering on
the production factor labor. Consequently, the static theory of production supports the idea
that each additional amount of labor entering an eﬃcient division of labor causes production to
rise and labor productivity to shrink due to diminishing returns. However, it does not tell us
anything about the interdependencies of the variables over time.29
3.2.1.3 Dynamic Theory
By merely assuming that all production factors are eﬃciently employed, thus far nothing has
been said about the potential dynamic eﬀects, or gains, derived from a division of labor. On this
account, Smith emphasized that
[T]he greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the
skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have
been the eﬀects of the division of labour.30
25 Wicksteed (1894), p. 39.
26 Then if [labour] remains constant and capitalplus[land] increases, we shall have increasing returns per unit
of [labour] and decreasing returns per unit of capital. But if capital is constant and [labour] increases, we
shall have increasing returns per unit of the former and decreasing returns per unit of the latter. Wicksteed
(1894), p. 14, footnote
27 See also Humphrey (1997).
28 The theory referred to (due to J.B. Clark, Wicksteed et al.) states that production, labor and capital are so
related that [...] production is a ﬁrst degree homogeneous function of labor and capital. Cobb and Douglas
(1928), p. 151.
29 The dimension of time enters negatively into all the quantities we are discussing. `Land' is use of land per
unit of time. Labour is hours of work per unit of time, etc. But the universality of this condition enables us
to dispense with any special consideration of it. Wicksteed (1894), p. 20, footnote.
30 Smith (1776), book I, chapter I. Italics by the author.
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The development of the subdivision of production processes can be illustrated using a simple
example. One might conceive of a potato farmer owning a hectare of land. Having spent all
his life in farming, he gradually developed a wooden plow to simplify his eﬀorts. If one were to
duplicate this onemaneconomy, constant returns to scale would require all production factors,
i.e. the farmer, his accumulated skills in building the plow and tilling the soil, one hectare of land
as well as the plow and the remaining quality of the land. The result would be two economies
with two economic agents and with output per person staying unchanged. If some factor (e.g.
land) would remain constant, diminishing returns would even decrease production per capita.
However, as soon as the dynamic factor time is introduced, the farmers will, given this option,
start to communicate on their methods of production and will very soon realize the merits of
cooperation and specialization. Once they decided to specialize into two diﬀerent tasks, say the
one in building plows and the other one in tilling the soil, the above duplication of production
factors yields after some time a more than proportional total increase in output that can make
up for possible losses due to diminishing returns.
Extending the static theory of production toward a dynamic theory of growth, Solow (1956)
and Swan (1956) integrated the CobbDouglas production function into Harrod's (1939) and
Domar's (1946) concepts of intertemporal capital accumulation by using as central dynamic
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(3.2)
with time index t for the corresponding year, annual savings rate s and annual capital depreciation
rate δ. Considering the direction of causality between the production factors, this framework
assumes that the amount of labor is exogenously supplied, while the amount of capital is allowed
to adapt over time. The level of labor is therefore assumed to be unaﬀected by capital changes,
whereas changes in the amount of labor may generally cause changes in the amount of capital.
Again, the rationale behind the exogenous use of labor as compared to capital can be traced back
to classical economics and in particular to Locke (1689) and McCulloch (1863), who considered
labor as the only source of value, without which capital would be not worth anything:
'Tis labour, then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would
scarcely be worth of any thing. Tis to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products;'
[. . . ] Locke has here all but established the fundamental principle on which the science [of
economics] rests. Had he carried his analysis a little farther, he could not have failed to
perceive that neither water, leaves, skins, nor any one of the spontaneous productions of
nature, has any value, except what it derives from the labour required for its appropriation.
The utility of such products makes them be demanded; but it does not give them value.
This is a quality which can be communicated only through the agency of voluntary labour
of some sort or other. [. . . ] It is to labour, therefore, and to it only, that man owes every
thing possessed of value.31
31 Locke (1689) Of Civil Government book ii  42, 43 in McCulloch (1863), part I, chapter I, section II.
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On these grounds, dynamic changes in labor productivity can be modeled as a response to an
exogenous labor shock as follows. As a starting point, neoclassical economists reasonably assume
a static equilibrium in which capital accumulation is equal to zero and capital depreciation equals















= K0L0 is marked on the xaxis
of Figure 3.1 (ignoring gL2 at this instance). In this situation, a positive labor shock would
statically reduce capital per labor toward K0L1 , where savings are higher than capital depreciation.
Subsequently, additional capital will be accumulated and capital per labor eventually reconverges
to its original steady state such that K0L0 =
K1
L1
with K1 > K0 and L1 > L0. As a result, although
diminishing returns have reduced labor productivity in the short run, a growing labor force
seems to be capable of accumulating and maintaining a larger amount of capital in the long run,
reﬂecting the abstract gains from a division of labor, which will be examined in more detail in
the next section. The same mechanism applies reversely if labor shrinks. In that case, relative
labor scarcity increases labor productivity in the short run without being able to maintain the
old amount of capital in the long run. As a general result, it might be deduced that every change
in the variable labor is in the long run followed by a proportional change in the variable capital
such that we may write in terms of growth rates
gY = αgK + (1− α)gL = gL, (3.4)
where gY , gK and gL denote the growth rates of production, capital and labor respectively.32
Consequently, labor productivity YL would in this framework ultimately remain constant after a
labor shock, since we have gY/L = gY − gL = 0.
32 As Solow emphasized, [T]he common rate of growth is just the exogenously given growth rate of the labor
force. Solow (2001), p. 357.
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Figure 3.1: A labor growth slowdown in the Solow model.
It is often argued that the conventional Solow model is incomplete as it can not account for
longrun changes in labor productivity.33 This claim often overlooks the eﬀect stemming from a
potential change in labor growth. Supposing that labor would increase every period at the same
constant rate gL =
Lt+1
Lt
























Since, as can be seen from the right equation of 3.5, higher labor growth reduces the steadystate
value of labor productivity, we ﬁnd that an exogenous decrease in labor growth from gL1 toward
gL2 (see Figure 3.1) is wellqualiﬁed for causing labor productivity to increase.
3.2.2 A demographic theory of production
3.2.2.1 Static Theory: The Principle of Diminishing Returns
To test the validity of the above neoclassical model, empirical longrun estimates for production
Yt are, as we have seen in the last chapter, generally readily obtainable. However, since gener-
alized capital Kt can only be measured as a residual, we require empirical values for labor Lt
as well as those for the production elasticity of labor (1− α). To this end, the crucial questions
arise concerning how labor is supposed to be deﬁned in theory and in what units it thus ought
to be measured empirically.
33 As a direct consequence, the additional factor technology (Solow (1956)) or measure of our ignorance
(Abramovitz (1956)) was introduced , embodied in the socalled SolowResidual.
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Theoretically, we will again follow the classical view of Senior (1836), who deﬁned labor as the
voluntary exertion of bodily or mental faculties for the purpose of production.34 In addition,
McCulloch seems to have suﬃciently diﬀerentiated as to how far labor has to be viewed as part
of the production process:
So long as an individual employs himself in any way not detrimental to others, and accom-
plishes the object he has in view, his labour is obviously productive; while, if he do not
accomplish it, or obtain some sort of equivalent advantage from the exertion of his labour,
it is as obviously unproductive. This deﬁnition seems suﬃciently clear, and leads to no
perplexities; [. . . ] it is not possible to adopt any other without being involved in endless
diﬃculties and contradictions.35
Such a deﬁnition comprises the quality and the quantity of labor, or to use a slightly diﬀerent
modern wording, skilled as well as unskilled labor.
Empirically, the ﬁrst assessment of economic growth based on the aggregate production function
used in the former section was conducted by Cobb and Douglas (1928). Problematically, they
used Wicksteed's production exhaustion theorem36 to interpret the empirical share of labor
income on total income as production elasticity of labor (1 − α), whereas they measured the
production factor L in units of laborers with the following reservation:
Such an index [L] of course makes no allowance for possible changes in the quality of the
laborers [. . . ]. When they can be measured, then they should be included.37
Notwithstanding this qualiﬁcation, current empirical and theoretical studies still seem to erro-
neously follow Cobb and Douglas' provisional model and continue to confuse the production
elasticity of labor with that of the number of laborers without considering the quality of the
laborers.38 To make up for this defect we may ﬁrst attempt to assess whether a labor measure-
ment exists that can account for the quality as well as the quantity of labor.39 However, once
ﬁnding that it is still not possible to measure a unit of labor quality without making fantastic
assumptions, it will  in pursuing the population question and in explaining economic develop-
ment  appear much more promising to focus on a theoretical conception that separates out the
quantity of labor. We will therefore now discuss the necessary adjustments for a neoclassical
model based on unskilled labor as central variable.
34 Senior (1836), p. 152.
35 McCulloch (1863), part I, chapter I, section II.
36 Since F (K,L) is homogeneous of degree one, the Euler theorem can be applied as follows, where r represents
the marginal product of capital and w the marginal product of labor:






L = αY + (1− α)Y = rK + wL⇔ 1− α = wL
Y
.
[...] under ordinary conditions of competitive industry, it is sensibly or approximately true that if every
factor of production draws a remuneration determined by its marginal eﬃciency or signiﬁcance, the whole
product will be exactly distributed. Wicksteed (1894), p. 38.
37 Cobb and Douglas (1928), p. 149.
38 Barro and SalaiMartin (2003), for example, use units of labor instead of units of laborers, workers or
population in order to calculate output per worker and output per capita, pp. 2728.
39 Unfortunately, while the Cambridge capital controversy has questioned the correct measurement of the pro-
duction factor capital, no such debate can be found on the empirical use of the production factor labor.
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In contrast to Cobb and Douglas, who employed the number of laborers to measure the overall
amount of unskilled labor, this work intends to use the size of the population since our analysis
of economic development centers around the variable production per capita, i.e. population
productivity, instead of productivity per laborer.40 From a theoretical point of view this seems
perfectly valid, since unskilled labor moves  although with a maturity lag  almost proportionally
with population. Empirically, this substitution greatly simpliﬁes and improves the subsequent
economic and econometric analysis.
To exhaustively subdivide labor into two independent components, we will then refer to the
production factor displaying the quantity of labor as population N , while terming the remaining
factor human capital H, incorporating the residual quality of labor. The latter is supposed to
comprise every acquired productive skill in addition to unskilled labor. Statically, like every other
production factor, human capital and population must necessarily exhibit diminishing returns
 a notion we will use in the following to express our ﬁrst universal principle, the principle of
diminishing returns to population (in the following PoDR). Following Mankiw et al.'s (1992)
extension of the Solow model, this subdivision suggests the use of the following production
function:41
Y = KαL1−α = KαHβN1−α−β with 0 < α, β, (1− α− β) < 1.
40 Firstly, we deﬁne an unskilled individual i as an individual who has just entered the labor market and has
therefore become productive for the ﬁrst time. We may then deﬁne a unit of unskilled labor lu as the amount
of labor provided by such an unskilled individual. Eventually, the aggregate amount of unskilled labor Lu is
deﬁned as one unit of unskilled labor multiplied by the number I of all productive individuals, i.e. Lu = i·lu·I.
Since we are interested in the annual amount of unskilled labor of the average individual, i and lu can be
standardized to 1.
41 This paper makes two important deviations from the Mankiw et al. (1992) model: Population is used instead
of labor and total factor productivity is assumed to be nonexistent, i.e. A = 1, following the Wicksteed
(1894) approach.
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3.2.2.2 Dynamic Theory: The Principle of Labor Division
Given our new static division of production, we will now again inquire into the relationships
between the production factors and account for the currently popular concept technology. In
the former subsection, we assumed that the decisive causal relation runs from labor, the source
of all value, to capital accumulation. We will see that this causal eﬀect can be renewed inasmuch
as population growth may be considered as the source of all human capital accumulation as
well as physical capital accumulation  a result that can be derived if we take a more detailed,
microeconomic look at Smith's dynamic eﬀects from the division of labor. According to Smith,
all men are born equal and every worker acquires in the same way both productive skills and
productive capital over his lifetime to optimize individual production. Senior remarked about
Smith's central idea:
The advantages derived from the division of labour are attributed by Smith to three diﬀerent
circumstances. `First, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to
the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another;
and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour,
and enable one man to do the work of many.'42
These eﬀects are all reducible to gains from specialization and can account for an exhaustive
dynamic theory of growth. Firstly, the saving of time is owed to specialization across a given
territory. Obviously, as soon as new individuals are added to the division of labor, the economy
becomes more densely populated and the eﬃcient geographical distribution reduces any kind of
transport costs between production processes. This advantage simply reﬂects the static use of the
factor N including diminishing returns through the relative abundance of this factor. Secondly,
the increase in dexterity is owed to specialization over time. If the same production process
is performed frequently on tighter geographical constraints, individuals will successively tend
to improve their productive skills by way of learning and subsequently use their experience to
become a specialist in their ﬁeld.43 Since skilled labor H can only be accumulated by repeatedly
employing unskilled labor N , population growth can be rightfully viewed as the only source of
human capital accumulation. Thirdly, the invention of machines refers to a regular tendency to-
ward automation of specialized processes. Whenever production processes have been subdivided
into such small steps that their repetition can be easily conducted through some nonhuman
agency, capital K tends to be substituted for labor H and N . As a result, the accumulation of
any production factor is rooted in the use of unskilled labor, approximated by population. Every
increase in population will eventually raise the amount of the other production factors, raising
in turn production Y and population productivity YN . Accordingly, we may state that popula-
tion, the starting and ending point of all economic activity44, is really the source of all value
and the most regular trigger of economic growth  a notion we will refer to in the following as
the principle of labor division (in the following PoLD). Consequently, since the demographic
42 Smith (1776) in Senior (1836), p. 159.
43 Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole
attention of their minds is directed towards that single object. Smith (1776), book I, chapter I.
44 Bairoch (1988), p. 127.
Chapter 3. A Classical Growth Theory of Stagnation 30
theory is the only view capable of explaining longrun growth in production exhaustively, it is
the only valid view of a uniﬁed growth theory. Hence the peopling process is essential45 and
we shall begin every inquiry on economic growth by examining the eﬀects stemming from any
foregoing population changes. As Young (1928) put it,
Senior's positive doctrine is well known, and there were others who made note of the circum-
stance that with the growth of population and of markets, new opportunities for the division
of labour appear and new advantages attach to it. In this way, and in this way only, were
the generally commonplace things which they said about 'improvements' [. . . ].46
Based on Smith's theoretical considerations of the gains from a division of labor, we can derive
additional static and dynamic interpretations of the neoclassical growth model. Since capital
K and human capital H are in the same way frequently and proportionally accumulated after
new productive individuals have entered the economy, we should reasonably assume that human
capital is subject to the same law of accumulation as capital (δH = δK ≡ δ, sH = sK ≡ s) and
can be measured  like any other production factor  in the same complex unit. Thus, we can
make use of a model, where population N is separated out of the iniﬁnite number of production
factors and where human capital and physical capital are aggregated into one and the same
complex production factor generalized capital 2.0, or broad capital C, as follows.47
Y = KαHβN1−α−β ≡ CγN1−γ with 0 < γ < 1
In analogy to equation 3.5, we write our new dynamic law of broad capital accumulation as
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With regard to the causal relation between production factors, we conclude again that, since
exogenous changes in population are the source of all value, broad capital would in the long run
react proportionally to population. Consequently, population growth would once more cause
capital growth and economic growth without, however, raising production per capita. The
corresponding stable steady state with Ct+1Nt+1 =
Ct
Nt






















where we have deﬁned the constant (natural) population growth rate as gN = b − d = (crude)
birth rate  (crude) death rate48 and made the simplifying assumption that over the longrun
45 Lange (2012), p. 21.
46 Young (1928), p. 529.
47 Intuitively, the argumentation follows Smith: The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in
the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though
it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a proﬁt. Smith (1776), book I, chapter I.
48 The birth rate and the death rate, both generally denoted as vital rates, are deﬁned as the ratios of births
and deaths respectively to the total population size in a given year. With the natural change in population
size being given by ∆N = Births−Deaths = B −D, the natural population growth rate can be computed
by gN = ∆N/N = (B −D)/N = b− d.
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δ = d, since the skills of a population as well as the (unskilled) population itself depreciate with
the death rate (δ = δH = δN = d).49 Allowing for a varying birth rate, the productivity ratio
of two subsequent steady states providing the following unitfree measurement of the growth









with 0 < γ < 1. (3.6)
In summary, this intertemporal representation of productivity allows us to distinguish between
the essentially conﬂicting eﬀects of population growth in the theory of production. While the
numerator of the right hand side of equation 3.6 has a delayed positive eﬀect on productivity
growth, representing the gains from labor division, the denominator aﬀects productivity imme-
diately negatively, representing the losses from diminishing returns. Ultimately, the population
question boils down to these two opposing forces describing the essential conﬂict by which we
have to judge population growth economically.
The `population' question [. . . ] will then be found ultimately to turn on a balance between
the signiﬁcance to each man of other free men regarded as appliances and the signiﬁcance to
him of the space those other men occupy. Is their room [eﬀects from diminishing returns] or
their company [eﬀects from labor division] the more important?51
From equation 3.6 it also becomes apparent that the steadystate growth rate of productivity
is determined neither by the level of population nor by population growth itself. Instead it is
governed by the (inverted) growth of population growth. As is illustrated in Figure 3.2, whenever
the birth rate increases, the losses from diminishing returns tend to outweigh the gains from
labor division and to create a situation of economic regress. This subject of overpopulation due
to diminishing returns seems equally obvious as scientiﬁcally neglected or avoided.
49 Obviously, if the death rate is zero (and the birth rate positive), population grows inﬁnitely together with
human capital and physical capital. However, if population is heavily written oﬀ due to a high death rate,
H is increasingly lost and K cannot be maintained, eventually depreciating. Commonly, depreciation rate
as well as death rate both lie within the range [0.01, 0.04] (see also Mankiw et al. (1992), p. 410). These
observations lead to the conclusion that death rate and depreciation rate move proportionally.
50 The author is well aware of the vast literature on endogenized savings. However, this issue should be separated
from attempting to answer the population question. Consequently, we will hold aggregate savings constant
throughout this work.
51 Wicksteed (1894), p. 22, footnote.
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Figure 3.2: A population growth slowdown in the Solow model.
3.2.3 Recapitulation: A demographic theory of production based on the di-
vision of labor and diminishing returns
In this brief exercise on the theory of production, the conventional Solow model has been mod-
iﬁed by renewing classical assumptions. Firstly, the production factor labor has been replaced
with the production factor population. Secondly, the model expressly excludes exogenous tech-
nology. In particular, instead of modeling technology endogenously, the following assumptions
have been used to account for economic innovation. As the CobbDouglas production function
is theoretically based on Smith's assumption of an eﬃcient division of labor, the accumulation of
production factors is theoretically based on Smith's gains from the division of labor, which are
made up of specialization across space and time as well as automation of repetitive laboring pro-
cesses. As a side note, this means that every improvement that is commonly very loosely termed
measure of our ignorance should be included in the production factor broad capital. Thirdly,
as we have seen, it is a wellestablished fact in neoclassical economic theory that increasing the
amount of population tends to increase overall production. Nevertheless, by holding the stock
of all other production factors constant, a growing population is generally acknowledged to yield
diminishing returns, i.e. to decrease production per capita. The mathematical formulation of
this eﬀect is displayed by the use of the static neoclassical production function developed by
Wicksteed (1894) and popularized by Cobb and Douglas (1928). Nonetheless, fourthly, since
those diminishing returns are successively compensated by an increasing division of labor, Solow
(1956) answered the population question by stating that every increase in population has a neu-
tral impact on productivity over the long run. To allow for a clear empirical distinction between
the static eﬀect of diminishing returns (PoDR) and the dynamic eﬀect of labor division (PoLD)
on production, the analysis will subsequently be greatly simpliﬁed.
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Firstly, the PoDR is assumed to provide a negative static causal eﬀect running from population
to productivity and was obviously the decisive eﬀect omitted in the Kremerian framework. This
negative eﬀect will be modeled using a contemporaneous relationship between GDP per capita y
and population growth gN , which is reduced to changes in the birth rate b. The resulting causal
eﬀect by which a newborn individual will by deﬁnition instantly aﬀect GDP per capita might be
written as ∂gyt∂bt < 0.
Secondly, the PoLD relates the production factor population positively to its level of production,
yielding the gains derived from the division of labor. The eﬀect stemming from the PoLD can
be interpreted to roughly correspond to the Kremerian (or Boserupian (1965)) idea by which
a larger population raises the chance of discovering more productive innovations, embodying
the conventionally used concept technology. Nonetheless, the Smithian principle is less owed
to probability, but the logical consequence of a more sophisticated process of specialization.
However, an increase in population will not yield beneﬁts from the division of labor contempora-
neously, but rather lagged. With respect to a newborn individual, the minimum delay to account
for a positive increase in production as a response to an increase in population is given by the
time span reserved for a basic education, enabling the succeeding generation to participate in the
labor market, i.e. to be productive. For simplicity and as it is suﬃcient to illustrate the role
played by the PoLD in the classical framework, the eﬀect of only one birth cohort per generation
will subsequently be employed in our model. Furthermore, we also make the assumption that
all gains from an eﬃcient labor division are realized within the ﬁrst year in which an individual
enters the labor market, determining the growth rate in a given year by writing ∂gyt∂bt−g > 0, with
g accounting for the generational lag. Since the overall positive eﬀect of population growth on
production operates in reality through the gradual accumulation of capital over a number of
years, it is not easy to simulate. We will return to this eﬀect more precisely when evaluating the
model empirically in the last chapter. At present, to provide a simple linear relationship of the






Verbally, the principles might be formulated as follows. Firstly, that at the very moment of
entering into the economy, every additional individual will statically lower production per capita
(PoDR). Secondly, that with a delay of approximately one generation, production per capita
responds positively, proportionally and indeﬁnitely to an increase in population under the condi-
tion that the additional part of the population participates in the division of labor of the economy
(PoLD).
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3.3 The Classical Theory of Population Part I: The Principle of
Population
Population, we must allow, is one of a numerous class of subjects which serve to remind us
that man has frequently left him only a choice of evils. Whatever may have been its design,
suﬀering has entered into the plan of Providence. [...] It is of no use to rebel against this
order of things; for it envelopes us; it is the atmosphere in which we live and breathe; and
it is with [the] alternative of restriction and prevention before us, which we cannot get rid
of, and cannot lose sight of that we proceed, with Malthus, to enter upon the problem of
population.52
In section 3.2, we have assumed exogeneity of the population growth rate and endogeneity of
the growth rate of production. Having thus modeled the impact of population on productivity,
the third classical principle deﬁned in this section determines the impact of productivity on
population. First and foremost, every classical theory of population must be based on the
principle of population. In contrast to the PoDR and the PoLD, this third principle is much
less utilized in neoclassical models. Thence, this section provides a new introductory account of
the principle of population. As a byproduct, prevalent misconceptions will be clariﬁed. Since
some confusion seems to exist with regard to the terms principle of population and Malthusian
trap, this work intends to settle the distinction. To adhere as closely as possible to Malthus'
own, undistorted thoughts, deductions will often be sustained by quoting Malthus himself. Also,
as it is the author's conviction that the signiﬁcance of the principle is most thoroughly grasped
by evaluating the intellectual impact it exerted on some of the most celebrated contemporary
scientists, these corresponding authorities, providing ﬁrst-hand evidence, will be frequently cited
as well.
3.3.1 The power of population
Malthus' (1798) ﬁrst important presumption on the theory of population was to state that every
population possessed the power to grow exponentially, or as the classical authors used to call
it, in a geometric ratio. Although it became controversially debated during the ﬁrst years
after its appearance, the presumption was soon well-received among the profession of political
economists. By the year 1836, Senior had outlined the classical theory of population, beginning
with the assertion that
it is now generally admitted, indeed it is strange that it should ever have required to be
pointed out, that every species of plant or animal which is capable of increase, either by
generation or by seed, must be capable of a constantly increasing increase.53
Likewise, Mill (1848), referring in turn to Senior, granted the power of population an important
role in his Principles of Political Economy:
52 Bastiat (1860), p. 400.
53 Senior (1836), p. 141.
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To this property of organized beings, the human species forms no exception. Its power of
increase is indeﬁnite, and the actual multiplication would be extraordinarily rapid, if the
power were exercised to the utmost.54
To provide an illustration, the following calculation will demonstrate the power of (hypotheti-
cally) unregulated exponential population growth. It has been estimated that the global human
population of the year 1804 amounted to about one billion people.55 If the maximum life ex-
pectancy was assumed to be eighty years, which is certainly under the mark, and with maximum
fertility having been calculated at about 16.7 children per woman56, these values imply, given
a stationary57 population, a birth rate of 10.43% and a death rate of 1.25%.58 The maximum
natural59 growth rate of population can therefore be computed by
gN = ∆N/N = (B −D)/N = b− d (3.8)
to be 9.19%. Thus, if the power of population had operated unrestrictedly since the year 1804, the
correspondingly projected population size would in the year 2017 have amounted to 135,155,105
billion inhabitants, i.e. the average person would have produced over 135 million descendants
after 213 years.60 For other species, the case can be even more strikingly portrayed. H. Spencer61
(1852) reported in the context of Malthus' theory instances experiencing the enormous power of
population.
In the polygastric animalcules, spontaneous ﬁssion takes place so rapidly that it has been
calculated by Prof. Ehrenberg that no fewer than 368 millions might be produced in a
month from a single Paramecium; and even this astonishing rate of increase is far exceeded
in another species, one individual of which [. . . ], is calculated to generate 170 billions in four
days.62
Nonetheless, the bulk of more recent discussions by uniﬁed growth economists seems to have
systematically overlooked that the term power of population was merely intended to be used as
a theoretical reference point that would only be realized under optimal environmental conditions,
or  as an economist would call it today  under optimal economic incentives.
54 Mill (1848), book I, chapter X.
55 See, for example, Bloom et al. (2003).
56 See Livi-Bacci (2012), p. 12.
57 A variable is considered as stationary if its mean and variance do not change over time.
58 In a stationary population, changes in the birth/death rate accurately reﬂect changes in fertility/mortality
and the inverse death rate displays life expectancy.
59 The natural population growth rate excludes net migration. Empirically, in the majority of states migration
accounts for a small fraction of population growth only. It is therefore regarded as negligible in most works.
60 The reason for our inclination to meet these numbers with disbelief and skepticism might be rooted in our
thinking being limited to changes which take place during our lifetime. After eighty years, the average
individual would have generated an oﬀspring of merely 1,000. However, as we are slow in observing gradual
changes that last longer than a few generations, the eﬀects of the subsequent 133 years are rarely taken into
account and intuitively underestimated.
61 Herbert Spencer (18201903), British anthropologist, biologist, sociologist, subeditor for the journal The
Economist, nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1901 and the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1902 (declined).
62 Spencer (1852), 3.
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3.3.2 The tendency to increase in numbers
Secondly, having thus stated the potential of exponential population growth, Malthus eventually
suggested to what extent it was exerted in reality. Yet, by claiming that every population was
observed to display the tendency to multiply in an exponential manner, he argued deductively,
without examining the underlying motivation that induced each individual to generate progeny.
It was left for C.R. Darwin63, building on Malthus and Spencer, to remark that the origin of
high individual rates of propagation was rooted in genetically varying inheritable traits:
The fertility of each species will tend to increase, from the more fertile pairs producing a
larger number of oﬀspring, and these from their mere number will have the best chance of
surviving, and will transmit their tendency to greater fertility.64
Hence, reproductive success might be seen as a dominant evolutionary strategy to every species,
for if they did not conform to this rule they would, generation after generation, be reduced to
a minor share of the population of the earth. As a result of this evolutionary process, every
individual is with a high probability inherently equipped with a strong pursuit of procreation. In
stating what economists would denominate a microeconomic theory of fertility behavior, Darwin
argued that
in looking at nature, it is most necessary [. . . ] never to forget that every single organic being
may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in numbers.65
3.3.3 The limits to growth
A third premise of Malthus was oﬀered by the quite incontrovertible statement that the space
as well as the physical matter supplied by the Earth was limited. The limited space on Earth is
unquestionably welldeﬁned, and since extraterrestrial resources have not yet been accumulated
in any considerable amount, we shall also agree on the ﬁniteness of resources from the beginning
of the existence of life until present times. Given that space is limited and presupposing that
population consumes space, it is undeniable that there must exist some point at which population
growth would have to come to a halt. More practically spoken, it should be obvious that there
exists a limited amount of supply provided for the maintenance of all living beings that Malthus
had, in the case of the human species, deﬁned as means of subsistence. From the existence of
a limited resource constraint, in turn, he derived his ﬁrst proposition that
population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence.66
63 Charles Robert Darwin (18091882), British naturalist, geologist, biologist, founder of the theory of evolution
by natural selection and sexual selection, fellow of the Royal Society.
64 Darwin (1871), p. 319.
65 Darwin (1859), chapter III.
66 Malthus (1826), book I, chapter II.
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3.3.4 Modeling the principle of population
Malthus combined the tendency for increase and the existence of a resource constraint to formu-
late the principle of population (in the following PoP):
According to the principle of population, the human race has [. . . ] a constant tendency to
people a country fully up to the limits of subsistence; meaning, by these limits, the lowest
quantity of food which will maintain a stationary population.67
To that eﬀect, deﬁning the means of subsistence as production Y and the average individual
subsistence level as production per capita y = Y/N , the denominator of the latter would tend
to rise until an economy was fully peopled up to the limits of subsistence, holding productivity
roughly on a constant minimum subsistence level. Once an economy was fully peopled, changes
in production are decisive in determining the growth rate of the population. In his second
proposition, Malthus wrote unambiguously that
population invariably increases, where the means of subsistence increase, [. . . ].68
Combining this proposition with the power to increase, the PoP can also be formulated as
the tendency of population to increase whenever production has been raised. Consequently, the
relationship deﬁning the PoP will subsequently be modeled through a positive proportional eﬀect
running from production to the number of births. While it is biologically evident that a positive
wealth eﬀect on the number of births cannot, on average, be realized earlier than nine months
after a shock in production, and accounting for a lagged fertility decision of not more than one
year, it is plausible to suspect the number of births to react on average at least one year after
the shock in the means of subsistence took place, written for simplicity as Bt = Yt−1. Again, as
the natural population change consists of the diﬀerence between births and deaths, the principle
of population may be modeled by using a law of population accumulation of the form
Nt = Bt −Dt +Nt−1 = Yt−1 − dtNt−1 +Nt−1.






⇔ bt − dt = yt−1 − dt ⇔ bt = yt−1.
Reformulating the last relation in terms of growth rates and logarithmizing both sides to receive






⇔ ln bt ≈ ln bt−1
PoP︷ ︸︸ ︷
+gyt−1 . (3.9)
We have thus preliminary modeled the principle of population as only component of the theory
of population in such a way that changes in productivity have a positive impact on the birth
rate of the form ∂bt∂gyt−x
> 0, with x = 1 accounting for a fertility lag.
67 Malthus in Senior (1836), p. 147.
68 Malthus (1826), book I, chapter I.
Chapter 3. A Classical Growth Theory of Stagnation 38
3.4 Classical Endogenous Growth Theory: The Malthusian Trap
The Malthusian law of population is one of the great achievements of thought. Together
with the principle of the division of labor it provided the foundations of modern biology and
for the theory of evolution; [...] the objections raised against the Malthusian law as well as
against the law of [diminishing] returns are vain and trivial. Both laws are indisputable.69
The best illustration and at the same time overwhelming evidence of the concerted operation
of the three above deﬁned principles is provided by their application to the theory of evolution
by natural selection. Darwin as well as A.R. Wallace70 developed their idea of natural selection
independently from each other only after they had read Malthus' book on the principle of popu-
lation.71 Since the key driver of the evolutionary mechanism was in addition to genetic variation
found in a constant tendency toward a state of overpopulation in which the least favored individ-
uals were weeded out, the survival of the ﬁttest was, according to Wallace, better characterized
as the extinction of the unﬁt.72 Taking this process of evolution by overpopulation for granted,
it must  at least at some early period  have been applicable to homo sapiens as well. Clark
(2007) even concluded that at least until about 1800 AD, human and animal evolutions were
governed by the same essential laws of population growth and that economic outcomes did not
crucially diﬀer, suggesting that human beings were not able to restrict their numbers consciously.
Similarly, the principle of population was in classical economics held to be responsible for the
Malthusian trap. North characterized this ﬁnding as the big dark cloud above the enlightenment
movement.73 To better understand his conclusion, we will in this section provide illustrations
to show that the Malthusian trap is established by the simultaneous operation of the PoDR, the
PoLD and the PoP. To sustain the universality of the principles, we will start with the illustration
of the nonhuman economy, exhibiting a low degree of labor division, before entering the subject
of the human economy with a high degree of labor division.
3.4.1 The principles of population and of diminishing returns in the non-
human economy
Firstly, to depict the concerted action of the principle of population together with the principle
of diminishing returns, we will consider the most primitive case of a nonhuman economy with
a ﬁxed resource constraint, in which the inhabitants are assumed to be incapable of artiﬁcially
increasing the means of subsistence. In addition, as it is often asserted that homo sapiens is the
only species capable of birth control, the latter is equally supposed to be nonexistent and will
be examined at a later point after having considered the human economy. We will, therefore,
turn to an economy where the principle of population is reﬂected by an unrestricted maximum
69 v. Mises (1949), p. 663.
70 Alfred Russel Wallace (18231913), British naturalist, co-founder of the theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion, fellow of the Royal Society.
71 [...] I saw, on reading Malthus on Population, that natural selection was the inevitable result of the rapid
increase of all organic beings [...] Darwin (1868).
72 Wallace (1890), p. 337.
73 North (2013).
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birth rate. In this simple case, the population pressure resulting from the principle of population
could merely be released by a proportionally rising death rate.
Assuming the principle of population to have operated for millions of years, Darwin justly con-
cluded that in reality, to secure survival, every established species must have occupied an eco-
nomic niche providing subsistence.
Owing to the high geometrical rate of increase of all organic beings, each area is already fully
stocked with inhabitants.74
The presumed steady operation of an (unrestricted) exponential increase in numbers implied ﬁrst
and foremost that the emerging generation of a group of living beings tended to outnumber the
former generation. However, since the supposedly stable environment did not provide additional
niches for the upcoming generation, some individuals had to remain nicheless. As a result, there
would of necessity arise competition between these abundant individuals, resulting in a struggle
for existence, which is one of the most consolidated ﬁndings in biology.75 The following example
illustrates a very simple and obvious case of the pressure arising from the principle of population.
In a forest that is fully covered by beeches, it is impossible for seeds to start growing until
an existing tree has died oﬀ. If, on the other hand, an old tree has recently vanished and
thus supplied a vacant spot under the sunlight, the free area will, according to the principle
of population, soon be covered by seedlings. While growing up, however, each seedling will
consume an increasing amount of space and resources until irreconcilable conﬂicts emerge, as it
is physically impossible for all seedlings to grow up to a full tree. Although the precise outcome
of these conﬂicts may be uncertain in general, they cannot be bypassed and reveal themselves
through regular competition between individuals.
Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case
be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with
the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of
Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this
case there can be no artiﬁcial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage.
Although some species may be now increasing, more or less rapidly, in numbers, all cannot
do so, for the world would not hold them.76
Even though we might allow animal and human populations to respond far more dynamically
to these conﬂicts, they are nonetheless subjected to the same laws of competition derived from
the principle of population and the principle of diminishing returns. According to Darwin, some
of these inevitably redundant individuals were determined to die prematurely, ultimately by
starvation, although among most species advanced mechanisms of high mortality prevailed such
as disease, infanticide, suicide or homicide. Malthus deﬁned these economies where an abundant
part of the population was regularly swept away through high mortality as being positively
checked. From his deﬁnition that
74 Darwin (1859), chapter IV.
75 See, for example, Weiner (1995).
76 Darwin (1859), chapter III.
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the positive checks to population [. . . ] include every cause [. . . ] which in any degree con-
tributes to shorten the natural duration of life,77
it becomes clear that the strength of the positive checks and the quantity of the death rate are
measured by the same magnitude.78 Whenever the positive checks operate powerfully, the death
rate is high. Where the death rate is close to its minimum level and the average individual lives
out its natural duration of life, the positive checks are the weakest. However, when measuring
the operation of the positive checks, it should be borne in mind that their existence alone does
not prove the presence of a strong degree of population pressure. Where they are measured it is
merely proven that population growth is kept below its maximum rate. Although a high death
rate is a byproduct and a good indicator, it is neither a suﬃcient nor a necessary condition for
the existence of deadly competition resulting from the principle of population and the principle
of diminishing returns. In summary, the economy here outlined will tend to exhibit a constantly
high death rate that can be modeled as part of our theory of population by
dt = dt−1 (3.10)
What is more, it should already be noted that there are instances in which the struggle for
existence does not necessarily follow from an excess of newly born individuals expanding beyond
the subsistence provided for it. Competition might also be called into action after an already fully
stocked territory has been struck by a diminution of natural conditions, lowering the resource
base, or from an increasing population owing to improved conditions for survival such as the
disappearance of predators or diseases lowering mortality (we will return to the corresponding
form of competition in chapter ﬁve). Nonetheless, the principle of population remains the most
regular driving force for competition, for if there were no tendency for the number of births
to exceed the number of deaths, each territory would not categorically be fully stocked. Only
from the steadily repeated application of this universal natural process of competition on a given
amount of territory may we derive the rule
that each [individual] lives by a struggle at some period of its life; that heavy destruction
inevitably falls either on the young or old, during each generation or at recurrent intervals.
Lighten any check, mitigate the destruction ever so little, and the number of the species will
almost instantaneously increase to any amount.79
3.4.2 The Malthusian trap in the nonhuman economy
Secondly, to fully understand the process of the Malthusian trap that led to the cycle of misery
and economic stagnation, we will add the idea of the principle of labor division to extend the
above illustration of a nonhuman economy. Notwithstanding the assumption of a ﬁxed resource
boundary in the former section, we should not too hastily fall into the error of believing that
77 Malthus (1826), book I, chapter II.
78 As has been mentioned above, in a stationary population, the natural duration of life (life expectancy)
corresponds to the inverted death rate.
79 Darwin (1859), chapter III.
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the limits of subsistence in fact remain constant in every animal economy. By analyzing the
divergence into diﬀerent animal species from a common ancestor and establishing a mechanism
for evolutionary development, Darwin proposed a way by which the natural resource barrier
would be steadily raised. Although deadly conﬂicts were the rule, the pressure of population
comprised milder forms of competition, for example pushing individuals into niches that could
not possibly be occupied by the former generation. Since the progeny of most species diﬀered
from its parental generation in genetic endowment, it happened to explore living spaces that
were denied to its ancestors, as is illustrated in the following example.
One might imagine a rodent colony having initially fully populated the ground of a given territory.
Arising from exponential population growth, an abundant number of young individuals might
be pushed into an environment so far unsuitable for the common rodent. With this progeny
displaying genetic variation, there may at some point appear a specimen endowed with the
ability to climb trees, another to dive into water and a third to dig into the soil  abilities
that were denied to the parent generation. If these speciﬁc abilities, by exploring new kinds of
nutrition providing additional subsistence, were suﬃcient to sustain oﬀspring, the specimen had
created their own niches. Once they were established in these specialized niches, their growing
number of oﬀspring, displaying another large pool of variation, would again be subjected to
competition. By the process of natural selection, the abundant descendants unﬁt for survival
were, generation by generation, frequently weeded out, while those displaying the highest genetic
ﬁtness under the prevailing conditions tended to propagate most rapidly. In this way, becoming
ever more slightly adapted to the new environment, the species squirrel, otter and mole emerged.
Thus, Darwin had derived two important outcomes of a freely operating principle of population.
Firstly, in the case of the animal economy, genetic variation and the operation of the two prin-
ciples of population and of diminishing returns are critical in generating specialization and as
a byproduct to lift the natural resource constraint. Since the overall population of individuals
N increased the number of available niches, the natural limits of subsistence Y must have been
raised as well. Hence, by the simple means of population growth and variation, competition
had not only generated new species, but had also created a symbiosis of specialized species by
which the resource constraint was permanently elevated, which can account for parallel increases
in population and production. Secondly, although genetic variation ameliorated the original
individual's prospects for survival, it did not enhance the material situation of its respective
descendants in the long run, since the speed of increase of the means of subsistence derived from
specialization was clearly inferior to the speed of population growth. Individual specialization
was merely intended to secure immediate survival, not to accumulate wealth, and the oﬀspring of
the ﬁrst individual was in most cases not much better oﬀ than those living before the divergence
of the species had started, holding productivity on the same subsistence level y over the course of
evolutionary development. Thus, it is due to the supreme power of population in outperforming
innovation by genetic variation that the mechanism of natural selection could endure a very long
time without producing any permanent individual material gains. To Darwin, the struggle for
existence, which is a logical implication of the second outcome, formed the fundament of the
theory of evolution by natural selection. He unambiguously urged his disciples to realize that
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nothing is easier than to admit in words the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more
diﬃcult  at least I have found it so  than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet
unless it be thoroughly engrained in the mind, the whole economy of nature, with every
fact on distribution, rarity, abundance, extinction, and variation, will be dimly seen or quite
misunderstood.80
We will in the following realize that the superior power of population can be equally assumed to
neutralize the beneﬁts from all those innovations commonly referred to as technological progress,
when introducing the operation of the principle of labor division into the human economy.
3.4.3 The principles of population, of diminishing returns and of labor divi-
sion in the human economy
Although the operation of the three principles has been suﬃciently proven by the existence
of natural selection among non-human species and is widely accepted in natural sciences, its
relevance for mankind is not rarely doubted. Assuming the validity of the above Darwinian
process of innovation, the most regular critique Malthus' theory has faced over the last two
hundred years was the argument that homo sapiens apparently possessed the ability to raise
its natural resource constraint self-dependently without necessarily having to rely on slow and
arbitrary genetic improvement. Malthus however, as well as any other classical economist, was
fully aware of the fact that increasing production was a regular phenomenon accompanied by
human population growth. They understood that growth of production was to the largest part
owed to individual specialization and exchange based on Smith's division of labor.
However, as will be shown subsequently, the emergence of the Smithian division of labor in human
economies, or of what is today sometimes called Smithian growth,81 is not much diﬀerent
from what we have observed in the animal economy in the form of a symbiosis of specialized
species. As was the case in the animal economy, the process of human specialization into diﬀerent
professions might be traced back to the competition derived from the operation of the principles
of population and diminishing returns. As we proceed to presume that the preventive checks
are nonexistent and that fertility is exerted at its maximum level, we continue to argue that a
newly emerging generation will tend to outnumber their foregoing cohorts, creating population
pressure, competition and thus conﬂicts due to diminishing returns to population. In analogy to
the case of the animal economy, this pressure of population would induce abundant individuals
to explore new methods of production as is exempliﬁed in the following.
Starting out as hunter and gatherer communities, those abundant members of a tribe deemed
redundant by the community tended to venture capturing new species of prey or testing un-
known fruits. If the exploration was unsuccessful, the respective individual would ultimately be
exterminated. If it was successful, the new way of production could be permanently integrated
into the overall production of the community, securing an additional niche for survival and again
providing subsistence for further progeny. As with the tendency for growth, the number of suc-
80 Darwin (1859), chapter III.
81 See, for example, Kelly (1997).
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cessful explorations steadily increased by trial and error, the community tended to accumulate
numerous forms of production.
Notwithstanding these similarities to the animal economy, the mechanism by which specialized
professions were accumulated seems to have been largely independent of genetic variation in the
human economy. That the new processes were indeed regularly integrated into the economic
system was, according to Smith, owed to the inherent and apparently unique tendency of human
beings to exchange their products. The introduction of exchange and the correspondingly
increasing demand brought with it the obvious advantage of economies of scale  to specialize
in the production of one good and to supply the demand for the whole community, thus creating
a division of labor among the working population. As long as such employment was suﬃcient
to provide subsistence for a family, it could be properly denominated profession.82 It does not
require a large degree of abstraction to imagine this evolutionary process to be responsible for
every subsequently emerging profession, gradually diﬀusing from the gatherer to the rice farmer
to the watchmaker up to the modern era. Smith used the production of the woolen coat as an
example to demonstrate to what extent the division of labor and specialization had created a
symbiosis in the human economy during preindustrial times.
The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the woolcomber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the
spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others [. . . ] how many shipbuilders,
sailors, sailmakers, ropemakers, must have been employed to bring together the diﬀerent
drugs made use of [. . . ] let us consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in order to
form [. . . ] the shears with which the shepherd clips the wool. The miner, the builder of the
furnace for smelting the ore, the seller of the timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made
use of in the smelting-house, the brick-maker, the brick-layer, the workmen who attend the
furnace, the mill-wright, the forger, the smith, must all of them join their diﬀerent arts in
order to produce them.83
As with the animal economy, the same two important rules could be derived if the here illustrated
human economy was empirically conﬁrmed. The ﬁrst rule being the idea that the combination
of the principle of population, the principle of diminishing returns and specialization might have
constituted the only source of permanent economic innovation and the second being the tendency
to return to a subsistence level of productivity, since the speed of generating new innovations
seems to have lagged behind the speed of population growth in most preindustrial economies,
preventing production per capita from sustainably increasing. The latter point would certainly
not come as a surprise as the growth of population is regarded to be the primary stimulus to
innovations, for if population would not have kept up with production, there would have been no
strong degree of competition. Indeed, following Mill's assessment, most classical economists were
82 This is not to say that the Darwinian process of specialization had vanished. While still facing competition
arising from the principle of population and thus constantly being forced to improve their productivity,
the members of the community were in the long run determined to focus again on those processes that
corresponded most eﬃciently to their individual natural endowments - a tendency that might be denoted as
Ricardian growth. This tendency to redistribute labor according to genetic ability is perhaps best illustrated
by the sexual division of labor prevailing in many aboriginal societies where hunting is largely conducted by
the males and gathering by the females. Smithian growth, in contrast, is independent of the individual
natural endowment.
83 Smith (1776), book I, chapter I.
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convinced that the tendency toward innovations improving economic output generally exhibited
in a human economy must be fully owed to this kind of competition derived from the cooperation
of the principles of labor divsion, of population and of diminishing returns.84 The tendency for
competition and to correspondingly specialize was to Spencer  as it was to Smith, Malthus and
Darwin  the chief source of what he very generally termed progress:
From the beginning, pressure of population has been the proximate cause of progress. It
produced the original diﬀusion of the race. It compelled men to abandon predatory habits and
take to agriculture. It led to the clearing of the earth's surface. It forced men into the social
state; made social organization inevitable; and has developed the social sentiments. It has
stimulated to progressive improvements in production, and to increased skill and intelligence.
It is daily pressing us into closer contact and more mutually dependent relationships.85
In summary, the three illustrated classical principles are assumed to have been working toward
growth in population and production as well as constant productivity during the regime of
stagnation. Hence, adhering to Galor's Malthusian trap, we observe a cycle of misery between





gN (gY +)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PoDR
≈ 0 (3.11)
3.4.4 Evidence of the Malthusian trap
As we have seen, the most striking logical argument in favor of the here outlined simultaneous
operation of the three principles is provided by the establishment of the theory of evolution by
way of natural selection. If more individuals had not been produced than could possibly survive,
nature could not have weeded out the unﬁt, since every individual would have simply survived
and passed on their niche to the next generation. In this case, the genetic pool would have stayed
unchanged and specialization may not ever have occured.
In addition, from a historical point of view, there are three facts that hint at once strongly at
the functioning of the above evolutionary model of economic growth in the human economy up
until the year 1800. Firstly, most economic historians will concur with the stylized fact that
human production per capita did not crucially diﬀer in the year 1800 as compared to the year
10,000 BC.86 Secondly, it has been estimated that, although with no inconsiderable oscillations,
the human population rose exponentially from roughly six million to about 1,000 million over
the same time span.87 Thirdly, presuming in addition that, as with every species, the Earth
had already been fully stocked with human individuals in the ﬁrst place, it is obvious that an
increase in professions took place over the same period.88 From the last point it seems proven
84 Only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension to the character of a science.
Mill (1848), book II, chapter IV.
85 Spencer (1852), 16.
86 See, for example, McCloskey (2010), p. 2.
87 See Livi-Bacci (2012), p. 25.
88 If the number of professions had not changed, we would today witness a population of eight billion hunters
and gatherers.
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that specialization had occurred. Since, however, productivity had not increased in the long run
although specialization had lifted the resource constraint, it is evident that population growth
must have fully consumed the gains from specialization. This deduction represents the logic of
the Malthusian trap as it was intended by Malthus in his original essay to form a cycle of
misery.
As a ﬁnal point of evidence, Malthus' original notion that the number of niches created by spe-
cialization is regarded to be insuﬃcient to provide the emerging generations with employment is
well supported by high rates of mortality and emigration that often accompanied high growth
rates in population. More speciﬁcally, when turning to the testiﬁed pattern of historical pop-
ulations, innumerable instances can be found in which the negative eﬀects of the principle of
diminishing returns outweighed the positive eﬀects of the principle of labor division due to an
unrestricted principle of population, inducing concomitant mortality crises and migration. This
is, for example, well documented for the Viking and Mongolian expansions89, the Crusades90
or the Irish Famine 1846184791 and plausibly depicted for the case of native American civi-
lizations92 Likewise, McCulloch observed this form of overpopulation as a regular historical
phenomenon, stating that
wars, plagues, and famines, those terrible correctives [. . . ] of the redundance of mankind,
set the operation of [diminishing returns] in a striking point of view. They lessen the number
of the inhabitants, without, in most cases, proportionally lessening the capital that feeds and
maintains them.93
3.4.5 Simulation of the Malthusian trap
Having stated the established and classical literature and having found suﬃcient evidence for the
existence of the three classical principles forming the Malthusian trap, the structural equations of
the neoclassical theory of production and the Malthusian theory of population are mathematically
summarized in this subsection to form a simulation that can illustrate the operation of the
Malthusian trap in accordance with the concomitant stylized facts of the cycle of misery and
89 [F]or we are aware that the hordes of Central Asia and of the Northern parts of Europe, and the surplus
inhabitants of some small communities, such as the petty States of ancient Greece and Phoenicia, appear to
have found, the one in colonization, the others in armed migrations, a periodical outlet; Senior (1836), p. 41.
90 Your land is shut in on all sides by the sea and mountains, and is too thickly populated. There is not much
wealth here, and the soil scarcely yields enough to support you. On this account you kill and devour each
other, and carry on war and mutually destroy each other. Let your hatred and quarrels cease, your civil wars
come to an end, and all your dissensions stop. Set out on the road to the holy sepulcher, take the land from
that wicked people, and make it your own. That land which, as the Scripture says, is ﬂowing with milk and
honey, God gave to the children of Israel. Pope Urban II. speech at the council of Clermont (1095).
91 [T]he recent condition of Ireland and of the Highlands (...) ought not be regarded merely as a visitation of
Providence, calling for temporary aid from the rest of the nation, but as an indication of a previously unsound
condition of the population, [...]. Alison (1847), p. 9.
92 In fact, one of the main lesson to be learned from the collapses of the Maya, Anasazi, Easter Islanders,
and those other past societies [...] is simple: maximum population, wealth, resource consumption, and waste
production mean maximum environmental impact, approaching the limit where impact outstrips resources.
Diamond (2005), p. 509.
93 McCulloch (1863), part I, chapter VIII.
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economic stagnation. The resulting system of linear equations provided by the above derived
equations 3.7, 3.9, 3.10 can be written as
gyt = α1ln bt−15 − α2ln bt
ln bt = α3ln bt−1 + α4gyt−1
dt = α5dt−1
, (3.12)
where two additional assumptions have been made to arrive at this system. Firstly, the length of
one generation is reduced to ﬁfteen years, which seems also to be the lowest plausible average age
at which a regular employment is secured in the human economy. Secondly, leaving some room
for the interpretation of the relative operation of the principles over time, the magnitude of each
eﬀect is represented by an undeﬁned (potentially timevarying) coeﬃcient. A full econometric
account for the signiﬁcance of the three principles based on this system of equations will be given
in chapter seven. At present, however, we are satisﬁed with a simulation of a very simple model,
where all parameters are set to unity. Moreover, for illustrative purposes we leave aside the
exponential character of the relation between birth rate and productivity growth. This merely
implies that the eﬀect of birth rate on productivity and the positive eﬀect of productivity on











Table 3.1: Calibration of the system of 3.13
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 b0 d0 gy0 gy15
1 1 1 1 1 0.035 0.020 0.000 0.025
Calibrating the parameters and initial values according to 3.1 and simulating a shock in pro-
ductivity after 15 periods yields Figure 3.3, the Malthusian trap. More explicitly, shocking the
growth rate of productivity in period ﬁfteen raises the birth rate one period later owing to the
PoP. This increase in population instantly consumes the former gains in productivity due to the
PoDR. Hereafter, ﬁfteen periods of stagnation follow until the larger birth cohort has come of
age to participate in the labor market, thereby increasing productivity growth via the PoLD,
resulting in a further increase in births and so forth. Over time, as is illustrated in Figure 3.4,
this shortrun mechanism leads to a steady increase in the level of production and population,
whereas the growth rates as well as productivity are observed to be relatively stable over the
long run. Consequently, our model can also account for the recorded stylized facts of the cycle
of misery and economic stagnation. An overview of the theoretical ﬁndings of Part I of this work
is provided by Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.3: A simulation of the mechanism of stagnation in growth rates (birth rate (blue), death rate (red),
GDP per capita growth rate (light green)).
Figure 3.4: A simulation of the mechanism of stagnation in level variables (population (orange), production
(blue) and GDP per capita (green)).
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Figure 3.5: Theoretical ﬁndings of Part I.
Part II
The Era of Economic Development
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Chapter 4
The Regime of Economic Development
This law [of population] cannot be denied by anybody. I could list as many referees support-
ing it as there are great and prominent names in the science of economics, and in particular,
of the [classical] school itself, since it is precisely this [classical] school, that has uncovered
and established this law. This iron and cruel law, gentlemen, you have to deeply, deeply
engrain into your mind and use as a reference point on your entire thinking.
At this occasion, I will provide you and the whole laboring profession with an infallible
way of arguing to escape all of those misdirections and delusions once and for all. You will
have to confront every man who is talking about the improvement of the situation of the
laboring profession with the following question: Whether he accepts the law or not. If he
does not so, you will have to presume that this man either tries to deceive you or that he is
of the most miserable inexperience in the science of economics. Since there exists, as I have
already mentioned, in the [classical] school itself not even one prominent economist denying
this law. Adam Smith as well as Say, Ricardo as well as Malthus, Bastiat as well as John
Stuart Mill uniformly agree in acknowledging it. Here, agreement prevails between all men
of the science.
Now, if this man, speaking about the situation of the laboring profession, has answered
to your question to accept the law, you ask further: How does he intend to release it? And if
he does not know an answer, you may calmly turn your back on him. He is an empty talker,
who wants to deceive and blind you or himself with empty phrases.1
4.1 Evolution of GDP per Capita and GDP
In this chapter, it will be attempted to reveal the eﬀects responsible for releasing the pressure
of population and for the successively observed increase in GDP per capita  the breakout from
stagnation. The analysis of the regime of development starts with a graphical examination of
the British data series employed in chapter two, extended to the year 2016 by using oﬃcial data
sources provided by Mitchell (2013) and the Worldbank (2018). In Appendix 11.2, examples
are depicted to conﬁrm the impression that the British stylized facts also reliably account for
a global generalization. The right graph of Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of British GDP per
capita. A ﬁrst glance reveals that GDP per capita slowly rose during the nineteenth century
1 Lassalle (1863).
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and began to rapidly increase during the twentieth century. Having introduced the regime of
stagnation and notwithstanding the correctness of the considerations made in the last chapter,
it is evident that the interpretation of a Malthusian trap cannot be upheld after the year 1800,
as the cycle of misery broke down (left graph of Figure 4.1). Today, the pressure of population
as formulated by the classical economists plays almost no role in economic policies of developed
countries any longer.
Figure 4.1: Divergence of GDP (left, blue) and population size (left, orange) in Britain 15412014. GDP per
capita (right, green) in Britain 15412014.
Sources: GDP: Clark (2009) for 15411871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010, Population: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for
15411871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010.
To analyze the breakout from stagnation in more detail, the time series of GDP and population
displayed in the left graph of Figure 4.1 provides important additional information. Firstly, the
year 1847, which was characterized by economic depression and widespread famines throughout
Europe  eventually causing equally widespread political unrest during the year 1848  seems to
be the latest possible date at which we may speak of stagnation in GDP per capita, since the ratio
between GDP and population is found to be below the level of the year 1541 for the last time.
Accordingly, the year 1848 should be chosen as the latest possible date for the initiation of the
British breakout. Secondly, GDP and population appear to have accelerated during the period
17601815. Even though the graph does not capture the complete series, the acceleration of GDP
continued well into the 20th century and has slowed down only recently. Thirdly, population
growth started to slow down during the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Subsequently, the underlying forces that caused GDP per capita to increase will be investigated
by analyzing the evolution of GDP and population separately. The author has identiﬁed three
major fallacies of currently circulating economic theories that deserve a more explicit clariﬁcation,
as they continue to disguise the real cause for and to prevent a proper understanding of the
breakout from stagnation. To enlighten these fallacies and to advance a resuscitation of the
classical framework, the next sections will explore and criticize currently and formerly established
theories of growth and development, before returning to the classical position.
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4.2 Fallacy 1: The Conventional Wisdom that an Increase in Pro-
duction Produced the Breakout from Stagnation
4.2.1 An endogenous shock in production?
We have seen that Kremer's idea of population being generally capable of raising production more
than proportionally cannot be supported by the British data until around 1800 AD. We will now
brieﬂy examine that even after the year 1800, the notion of increasing returns to population
by way of technological progress does not stand the test of reality and can therefore not be
regarded as a general economic principle during the era of development either.
Naturally, the simplest way to explain a lasting increase in production per capita is to claim that
production possessed the power to outgrow population. Although British average production
gains generated during the period 17601820 had been regularly outperformed by population
growth, Smith's considerations had already inﬂuenced some economists to believe that the bene-
ﬁts stemming from the division of labor had the potential to outperform increases in population.
This view had already attracted widespread sympathies during the early nineteenth century:
On the one side are those who believe that an increase of numbers is necessarily accompanied
not merely by a positive, but by a relative increase of productive power; that density of
population is the cause and the test of prosperity; and that, were every nation under the
sun to be released from all the natural and artiﬁcial checks on their increase, and to start of
breeding at the fastest possible rate, many, very many generations must elapse before any
necessary pressure could be felt.2
Confronted with this argument and being very well acquainted with the process of labor division,
specialization and therefore technological progress, Malthus defended the idea that the power
of population growth was superior to the power of growth in production:
The power of the earth to produce subsistence is certainly not unlimited, but it is strictly
speaking indeﬁnite; that is, its limits are not deﬁned, and the time will probably never arrive
when we shall be able to say, that no further labour or ingenuity of man could make further
additions to it. But the power of obtaining an additional quantity of [subsistence] from the
earth by proper management, and in a certain time, has the most remote relation imaginable
to the power of keeping pace with an unrestricted increase of population.3
Employing a simple illustration, H. C. Carey4 (1837) equally hinted at the fact that the principle
of diminishing returns to population would ultimately prevail:
If land would always yield in proportion to the quantity of [population] applied to it, there
would be no need to cultivate more than a single farm, or a single district, for the supply of
any number of inhabitants; and because such cannot be the case, it is assumed that every
fresh application of [population] to cultivation, must be attended with a diminished return.5
2 Senior (1836), p. 146.
3 Malthus (1826), book V, chapter I.
4 Henry Charles Carey (17931879), USAmerican economist, chief economic adviser to US president Abraham
Lincoln.
5 Carey (1837), vol. 3, p. 8.
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As a matter of fact, it ought to appear utterly impossible to the modern economist to supply
a population of the aforementioned potential of around 135,000 trillion inhabitants of the earth
that arose from an unrestricted growth in population within about two hundred years even
under the most favourable conditions for specialization and technological progress. In spite of
those exceptional historical instances in which the discovery of new territory or of rare natural
resources raised the production of an economy tremendously over the short run, Senior (1836)
argued likewise that this cannot be the permanent state of aﬀairs.
Although, therefore, it is not possible to assign any certain limits to the progress of improve-
ment, it is notwithstanding evident that it cannot continue for any considerable period to
advance in the same proportion that population would advance supposing [resources] were
abundantly supplied.6
Furthermore, while it is observed that the annual longrun growth rate of production rarely
exceeded ﬁve or six percent in historically recorded economies, we have shown that population
possessed the ability to grow by around nine percent annually. Accordingly, we would have to
expect a permanent growth rate of more than nine percent in those economies that have still
succeeded in departing from a subsistence level to justify the idea that production had outrun
population. Consequently, as it is neither theoretically nor empirically convincing, the doctrine
that population growth would generally raise production more than proportionally through faster
accumulation of technology cannot constitute an economic principle.
4.2.2 An exogenous shock in production?
Often, the takeoﬀ date for the increase in productivity is observed to closely correspond to
the beginning of the socalled industrial revolution7. This coincidence has often been viewed,
in particular by historians, as a turning point in the history of mankind toward a new path
of sustained economic development. What is more, it led to the conventional wisdom among
economic historians that the industrial revolution, in the form of rapid technological progress,
even caused the breakout from stagnation.8 To be sure, since it is almost identical with a
lasting increase in the human resource constraint, technology was certainly fundamental in
inducing the British industrial revolution. However, if we continued to argue that technology
is simply caused by population growth, we would have to point again to an endogenous shock in
production, which has already been falsiﬁed in the former subsection.
To circumvent the endogeneity problem, contemporaneous economic historians devoted their
eﬀorts to a clearer understanding of the original emergence of an exogenous shock as causing
the British industrial revolution. For example, Clark (2007) proposed a unique British social
upward mobility, by which richer individuals had more oﬀspring and spread their hardworking
attitudes by passing it on to their children. Allen (2009) suggested that increasing British
nominal wages allowed for rapid capital substitution and technological progress, whereas Mokyr
6 Senior (1836), p. 147.
7 A term that might need some reassessment, as it is, for scientiﬁc purposes, not suﬃciently well deﬁned.
8 See, for example, Allen (2009).
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(2016) ascribed the emergence of this technological revolution to a unique British culture of
enlightenment. Each of these causes seem to be assumed to have raised production tremendously
by inducing an industrial revolution, causing the breakout from stagnation.
To avoid a common misunderstanding, on this occasion the point must be stressed that the
exaggerated role the industrial revolution played in explaining the transition to economic devel-
opment is arguably rooted in the ambiguous use of the term economic growth. However, the
industrial revolution as well as the term technology both refer to growth in terms of total GDP
Y only. They can much less account for the increase in GDP per capita y, since its observed
evolution in the eigteenth century is well in line with the hitherto regular pattern of a Malthusian
trap, as is illustrated in the next paragraph.
Beginning in the eighteenth century, aided chieﬂy by the introduction of the potato and the
disappearance of the plague epidemic, European economies started to experience strong popu-
lation growth.9 Since an increasingly growing population meant an increasingly larger number
of innovations from trial and error, the pace of specialization increased  a process that would
culminate in the industrial revolution, which was again an important reference point for Smith's
considerations on the division of labor. However, the emergence of a process of industrialization,
as is often drawn by historians in connection with the process of urbanization, did not overcome
the regime of stagnation but seems to have followed the traditional cycle of misery. The industrial
revolution was merely another exploration of new production tasks resulting from the competi-
tion of a growing labor force, as in the case of the huntergatherer society. When the countryside
became ever more densely (over)populated, the markets and harbors of ﬁrst villages, then towns
and ultimately cities represented a natural resort for absorbing the abundant farm workers into
specialized factories and transport companies making use of economies of scale without, however,
raising productivity of the average laborer in its early stages.10 On the contrary, the industrial
revolution most arguably even aggravated the population pressure by providing subsistence for
an additional population, further stimulating the population explosion that culminated in the
year 1815 in a population growth rate of 1.8%. Determining the beginning of the ﬁrst British
industrial revolution to the late 1760s, as is conventionally done, we observe parallel growth in
GDP (75%) and in population (78%) during the ﬁrst ﬁfty years (17701820), meaning that GDP
per capita stagnated or even declined during this period.
As a consequence, the only substantial diﬀerence between the process of the ﬁrst British industrial
revolution and the process of the neolithic revolution seems to have consisted in the speed they
exhibited in spreading innovations due to a varying total population increase, while both events
were subject to the same underlying Malthusian and Smithian principles. Another indication
that the Malthusian trap was still well in existence during the industrial revolution is given by
an international comparison: Even today we observe in most industrializing, emerging economies
that concomitant strong population pressure tends to force abundant individuals to emigrate or
to drive them into deadly competition, often by collectively waging war.11
9 See Nunn and Qian (2011) on the potato, Langer (1963) on the plague.
10 According to Allen (2001) and Clark (2009), a lasting increase in English wages cannot be observed until after
1820.
11 Korotayev (2011).
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In addition to the above considered theories employing an exogenous shock in production, there
exist countless further attempts to justify the breakout from stagnation by stating that coun-
tries have produced more of which we may merely list the currently two most popular ones.
While Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) follow the institutional approach of North (1992), by which
proper political and economic institutions might have triggered the breakout from stagnation,
McCloskey (2010), criticizing all of the above approaches, suggested that economics can't ex-
plain the modern world before proposing that British burgeois dignity may have induced the
breakout. Apart from the fact that these approaches are rather ad hoc theories and therefore do
not qualify for an endogenous growth theory, they all lack one crucial insight: The breakout from
stagnation was not decisively triggered by better ways of production, which include better ways
of political organization. The increase in GDP per capita was chieﬂy caused by a deceleration
in the denominator population. Although most of the above authors accept the existence of a
Malthusian population trap at some earlier point in time, almost all of these theories do not
attempt to explain why population would, from the nineteenth century onwards, fail to catch
up with production. However, as we will see in the following section, a framework of a growth
regime cannot simply disregard the mechanism of stagnation, but must incorporate its principles
and explain why population growth slowed down, if it was intended to yield a uniﬁed growth
theory.
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4.3 Evolution of GDP per Capita, GDP, Population and Birth
Rate
If we date the beginning of the British industrial revolution to the introduction of Watt's steam
engine in 1769, it clearly preceded the British demographic slowdown, the ﬁrst sign of which
cannot be detected before the year 1815.12 Moreover, following Clark and Allen, we may identify
the period during which the take-oﬀ must have taken place to lie somewhere in the period
18151848. Challenging the conventional wisdom, since the demographic slowdown coincides
more closely with the breakout from stagnation than the industrial revolution, the former seems
to be the more suitable candidate as a cause for growth. This is conﬁrmed when displaying
growth rates of GDP and population instead of level variables over the last two centuries, as has
been done in Figure 4.2. Here, the trended GDP per capita growth can easily be derived as the
approximate diﬀerence between the linear trends of GDP growth and population growth. As
we observe a divergence between population (orange) and production growth (blue), GDP per
capita growth becomes increasingly positive. Moreover, one ﬁnds the deceleration of population
growth to have about two to three times as much explanatory power compared to the acceleration
of GDP growth. Accordingly, the largest share of the increase in GDP per capita growth must
be attributed to the demographic slowdown and much less to an (howsoever deﬁned) industrial
revolution.
Figure 4.2: Divergence of British GDP growth (blue) and population growth (orange) 18002010.
Sources: GDP: Clark (2009) for 18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010, Population: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for
18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010.
12 Alter and Clark conclude that the Industrial Revolution and the Demographic Transition are the two great
forces that explain the upward march of modern incomes. So far they have stood independently, the Industrial
Revolution preceding the [Demographic Transition] in Europe by more than 100 years. Alter and Clark
(2010), p. 44.
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Since we have already seen that the variable (natural) population growth can be exhaustively
split up into birth rates and death rates and since, as we will see further below, both vital rates
display relatively continuous negative linear trends after the year 1815, the decline in population
growth must be solely assigned to the falling birth rate  a process that has been named fertility
decline. As part of the population slowdown, the latter must by deﬁnition have, to a certain
degree, been associated with increasing GDP per capita. As is illustrated in Figure 4.3, the British
fertility decline accompanied the increase in GDP per capita after around 1800. When employing
Mitchell's (2013) international historical statistics, this idea is conﬁrmed by recognizing that no
signs can be found of any economy in which a sustained rise in GDP per capita can be detected
before a sustained decline in birth rates has been realized (see again Appendix 11.2 for a number
of examples). Thus, the stylized fact cross of wealth pictured in the right graph of Figure 4.3
is assumed to properly display the general pattern between birth rate and GDP per capita.
Figure 4.3: Left graph: British cross of wealth: Birth rate (blue) and GDP per capita (green) 18022007.
Right graph: Stylized fact cross of wealth.
Sources: GDP: Clark (2009) for 18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010, Birth Rate: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for
18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010.
4.4 The Regime of Economic Development: Stylized Facts and
Theory
The most comprehensive recent elaboration on the stylized facts of growth is probably summa-
rized in Galor (2011), who suspects a causal link between the deceleration of the birth rate and
the breakout from stagnation. In summary, Galor's uniﬁed growth theory builds on the following
observed stylized facts of economic development:
1. Every economy was at some point over the past three centuries caught in a regime of stagna-
tion, where productivity remained at a low level and birth rates at a high level.
2. Today, almost all economies have left the regime of stagnation in favor of a growth regime,
where productivity increases from a low level to a high level.
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3. Roughly at the same time as these economies left the regime of stagnation, a fertility decline
set in, by which the birth rate declined from a high level to a low level.13
Having established a negative relationship between birth rate and GDP per capita growth, it is
the task of the growth economist to model hypotheses incorporating causal eﬀects. Advocates
of the Kremerian model tend to neglect the fertility decline, maintaining the conventional view
that production increased suﬃciently rapidly not only to outpace population growth, but to
overcome diminishing returns,14 which is no longer tenable, given the considerations made in
the former sections. Proponents of Galor's uniﬁed growth theory must object to this assessment,
as the data show that more mitigated population growth was responsible for the divergence
between GDP and population. However, if a fertility decline is globally found to coincide with a
GDP per capita takeoﬀ, the question is frequently raised whether the transition to growth was
an immediate consequence of or an immediate cause for the fertility decline. While the second
hypothesis will be discussed in section 4.7, demographers tend to treat the fertility decline rather
as a cause for an increase in productivity, inverting the concept of stagnation as follows. If
initially strong population growth has been shown to impede increases in living standards, a
deceleration of population growth opens up the possibility of modern economic development.15
In the next two sections, it will be argued that this demographic predicition is well in line with
classical theory.
4.5 Fallacy 2: The conventional wisdom that the principle of pop-
ulation has been falsiﬁed
Two hundred years ago, Malthus' principle of population was widelyknown and its importance
with regard to economic theory seemed, although controversial among laymen, generally accepted
among economists. During the nineteenth century, it constituted the theoretical foundation not
only of the science of political economy, but also of the emerging sciences of sociology and bi-
ology. However, over the course of the centuries, since new generations were not confronted
with the same everyday problems the classical economists were facing, its popularity declined
sharply as it was ﬁrst increasingly misinterpreted and ﬁnally considered to have been falsiﬁed.
The controversial and famous argument Malthus had brought up was to conjecture that the
principle of population would in reality inevitably induce population, rising exponentially (ge-
ometrically), to permanently catch up to any higher level of production, which rose merely
linearly (arithmetically), for Malthus (1798) had written in his original essay that
natural inequality of the two powers of population and of production in the earth, and
that great law of our nature which must constantly keep their eﬀects equal, form the great
diﬃculty that to me appears insurmountable in the way to the perfectibility of society. All
other arguments are of slight and subordinate consideration in comparison of this. I see
no way by which man can escape from the weight of this law which pervades all animated
nature.16
13 See Thompson (1930), who observed the fertility transition as part of the demographic transition.
14 See Komlos (2003).
15 See Livi-Bacci (2012).
16 Malthus (1798), chapter I.
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Against this statement, an important criticism regarding the great diﬃculty that appears un-
surmountable was legitimately raised. Even today, in spite of the illustrated early stagnation of
GDP per capita and the recorded evidence in many animal species, the notion of the inevitability
of a regime of stagnation does not attract too many economists for the following two reasons:
Firstly, they observe globally increasing GDP per capita. Secondly, they observe at the same
time decreasing population growth.
However, in his later editions Malthus became more optimistic and clearly admitted that his
original version of an unrestricted principle of population inevitably resulting in a permanent
regime of stagnation was misleading. Having travelled within large parts of Europe, gathering
impressions and population data, he arrived at the insight that it was possible to embank the
exponential power of population, attenuating his former conclusions in his later editions (1803-
1826) by employing more frequently the term tendency. Accordingly, the principle of population
was to be interpreted as a permanently operating, abstract tendency (using the word tendency to
express a propensity toward an increase in numbers) employed as a reference point for theoretical
considerations. The actual historical era of stagnation, in contrast, had to be viewed as a readily
testable empirical fact, employed as a practical benchmark on real observations. Hence, the
principle of population had to be accepted as a ﬁxed law, like the law of gravity, whereas the
mechanism of a Malthusian trap and the resulting regime of stagnation could be circumvented
under proper conditions. Consequently, as it would sometimes not reveal itself at ﬁrst glance,
the operation of the principle of population alone does not require every population to exhibit
exponential growth in reality at all times, as is sometimes asserted, but rather reﬂects a latent
pressure steadily operating toward an increase of numbers. Among others, McCulloch (1863)
sustained the universality of the principle, maintaining that humanity had indeed been facing
the principle of population at any point in history:
The principle, whose operation under favourable circumstances has thus developed itself, is,
in the language of geometers, a constant quantity. The same power that has doubled the
population of Kentucky, Illinois, and New South Wales in ﬁve-and-twenty or thirty years,
exists everywhere, and is equally energetic in England, France, and Holland.17
Notwithstanding Malthus' reconsideration, the majority of modern economists seems to stay
intellectually trapped in his ﬁrst essay on population, inclined to put the tendency of the
principle of population on the same level with a selfevident fact, the era of stagnation.18
Senior had already perceived a widespread ignorance regarding Malthus' renewed formulation
and he realized that it would become hard to eradicate the original, more popular, more insistent
but wrong version:
On the other side are those who maintain that population has a tendency (using the word
tendency to express likelihood or probability) to increase beyond the means of subsistence;
or, in other words, that, whatever be the existing means of subsistence, population is likely
17 McCulloch (1863), part I, chapter VIII.
18 As has been remarked, even the most recent attempts to resuscitate the classical Malthusian view seem to
refer to a perception of history in which population would permanently and inevitably outgrow production
as a self-evident fact and not as a tendency.
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fully to come up to them, and even to struggle to pass beyond them, and is kept back
principally by the vice and misery which that struggle must produce.19
Obviously, when confronting a person with this older Malthusian statement, he will most proba-
bly reasonably reject it and be inclined to consider this viewpoint as empirically falsiﬁed. If he,
moreover, regards this argument as being the central one of the Malthusian theory of population,
he will also erroneously be inclined to reject the principle of population. Consequently, when
Mill and McCulloch employed phrases like
that there is a constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment
prepared for it, no one can possibly doubt20,
Senior felt obliged to comment on their wording and clariﬁed that
we believe that they [Mr. Mill and Mr. McCulloch] have used it without being misled by it
themselves, and, perhaps on that very account, without perceiving its tendency to mislead
others. But that those whose acquaintance with Political Economy is superﬁcial (and they
form the great mass of even the educated classes) have been misled by the form in which the
doctrine of population has been expressed appears to us undeniable. When such persons are
told that it is the tendency of the human race to increase faster than food.  to people a
country fully up to the means of subsistence, they infer that what has a tendency to happen
is to be expected. Because additional population may bring poverty, they suppose that it
necessarily will do so [. . . ] [Such a doctrine] furnishes an easy escape from the trouble or
expense implied by every project of improvement. What use would it be, they ask, to
promote an extensive emigration? the whole vacuum would be immediately ﬁlled up by the
necessary increase of population. [. . . ] It is because we believe these misconceptions to be
extensively prevalent that we have ventured to detain our readers by this long discussion. A
discussion which some may think a mere dispute about the more convenient use of a word,
and others an attempt to prove a self-evident fact.21
In summary, following Malthus' later editions, the principle of population will in this work
be treated as a ﬁxed law that continues to operate during the era of development (although
potentially outweighed by some other eﬀect), whereas his original statement of a Malthusian
trap is considered as falsiﬁed after the breakout from stagnation. Consequently, since the end of
the regime of stagnation does not mean the end of the principle of population, the positive eﬀect
of productivity growth on population must further be modeled as a part of the here advanced
uniﬁed growth mechanism.
19 Senior (1836), p. 146.
20 Mill (1848), book I, chapter VII.
21 Senior (1836), p. 149.
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4.6 The Classical Theories of Population and Production in the
Regime of Economic Development
4.6.1 An exogenous shock in fertility
Consequently, having shown that Malthus suggested that the principle of population displayed
its full power to increase merely in theory, it should be asked by what forces its pressure has
been attenuated, or checked, in reality. Stating in his second proposition that
population invariably increases where the means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by
some very powerful and obvious checks,22
he implicitly determined the conditions under which population would not hit the limits of sub-
sistence. Having exhaustively determined productivity as the ratio of production to population,
the pressure of population could only be relaxed by either increasing the means of subsistence
Y or by checking powerfully and obviously population N . To advance the latter remedy, we
will ﬁrst have to exhaustively deﬁne the checks to population, employing again the deﬁnition of
a change in population, i.e. ∆N = B −D.
Mr. Malthus has divided the checks to population [N ] into the preventive and the positive.
The ﬁrst are those which limit fecundity, the second those which decrease longevity. The ﬁrst
diminish the number of births [B], the second increase that of deaths [D]. And as fecundity
and longevity are the only elements of the calculation, it is clear that Mr. Malthus's division
is exhaustive.23
Hence, the three dinstinct remedies eligible for mitigating the pressure of population and con-
sequently raising the level of productivity are positive checks, increasing the means of subsis-
tence and preventive checks. It has been argued that neither positive checks nor increasing
production are in the case of an unrestricted principle of population capable of releasing the
pressure of population permanently and therefore raising productivity in the long run. When
thus excluding these options as potential forces toward a more permanent increase in production
per capita, it remains to evaluate the ﬁnal option, i.e. to reduce the pressure of population by
checking the number of births preventively and to conclude that the preventive checks are solely
responsible for the escape from the Malthusian trap. It is regularly overlooked that this result
follows directly from one of Malthus' most crucial illustrations.
In an endeavour to raise the proportion of the quantity of provisions to the number of
consumers in any country [y = Y/N ], our attention would naturally be ﬁrst directed to the
increase of the absolute quantity of provisions [Y ]; but ﬁnding that, as fast as we did this,
the number of consumers [N ] more than kept pace with it, and that with all our exertions
we were still as far as ever behind, we should be convinced, that our eﬀorts directed only in
this way would never succeed. It would appear to be setting the tortoise to catch the hare.
Finding, therefore, that from the laws of nature we could not proportion the food [Y ] to
22 Malthus (1826), book I, chapter II.
23 Senior (1836), p. 141.
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the population [N ], our next attempt should naturally be, to proportion the population to
the food. If we can persuade the hare to go to sleep, the tortoise may have some chance of
overtaking her.24
Although often portrayed as a pessimist, Malthus saw the improvement of the individual eco-
nomic situation as a very real possibility. Evidently, if population growth is restricted, the power
of population will not be fully exerted. Moreover, if and only if the power of population is em-
banked, a situation is created in which production can possibly outrun population, generating
per capita growth. Logically, apart from the positive checks, the only feasible way by which
the hare could be persuaded to go to sleep was to propose birth control and hence to check
population preventively.
It is not in the nature of things that any permanent and general improvement in the condition
of the poor can be eﬀected without an increase in the preventive check; and unless this take
place, either with or without our eﬀorts, everything that is done for the poor must be
temporary and partial. [. . . ] This is a truth so important, and so little understood, that it
can scarcely be too often insisted on.25
According to Malthus, the preventive checks include any action aﬀecting the number of births,
which reduces the maximum rate of fertility. Analogously to the case of the positive checks, he
advised employing the level of the birth rate to measure the operation of the preventive checks,
as this was the only way to exhaustively capture the preventive checks:
The preventive check is perhaps best measured by the smallness of the proportion of yearly
births to the whole population.26
Accordingly, wherever the preventive checks are strong, the birth rate will be observed to be low
and vice versa.
Applying the foregoing considerations, it ought to be the decisive argumentation of a uniﬁed
growth theory that only with the onset of the fertility decline population was increasingly pre-
vented from eating up productivity gains, hence enabling economic growth in terms of GDP per
capita. Moreover, this work intends to support the idea that the main distinction between the
two regimes can be be reduced to their contrasting modes of population control. In particu-
lar, with the onset of the fertility decline, the era of stagnation  characterized by positively
checked periodic overpopulation displayed by high death rates  is replaced with a modern
growth regime, because a potentially abundant part of the population is constantly preventively
checked, i.e. via birth control, measured by low birth rates. We may therefore answer to the
above mentioned skeptical economist: Yes it's true  we observe increasing GDP per capita and
at the same time decreasing population growth. But this does not contradict Malthus, it is part
of his story. An increase in the preventive check causes population growth to decline which is in
turn an immediate cause for the increase in productivity.
24 Malthus (1826), book IV, chapter III.
25 Malthus (1826), book IV, chapter XIII.
26 Malthus (1826), book II, chapter XI.
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4.6.2 An exogenous shock in fertility in the neoclassical model
Using a neoclassical framework, this section illustrates mathematically and graphically that sus-
tainably increasing productivity is predominantly the result of reducing too high fertility toward
a lower level. This result is broadly in line with Galor (2011), who suspects that a substitution
of child quality for child quantity backed the takeoﬀ toward a sustained path of economic devel-
opment. In particular, Ashraf et al. (2013) ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of fertility on GDP per capita
that can account for about 10% of long-run growth.27 The classical framework here outlined
argues that the historical reduction of fertility can almost completely explain economic longrun
development.
It has commonly been argued that the neoclassical growth model used in chapter three is incom-
plete as it does apparently not account for the historically observed increases in productivity.
As we have seen, this claim often overlooks the eﬀect stemming from a potential decrease in the
birth rate as was depicted in the structural equation of chapter three:
gyt,j =
γ
1− γ (ln bt−j − ln bt) (4.1)
While a higher birth rate reduces the steadystate value of productivity, we ﬁnd that an ex-
ogenous decrease of the birth rate is wellqualiﬁed for causing productivity growth during the
transition between two steady states. More explicitly, as is depicted in Figure 4.4, a continuously
decreasing birth rate from bt−j toward bt is expected to yield continuous productivity growth, as
in this case the right hand side of equation 4.1 will be positive.28 The advanced theory suggests
that economic development is, in this case, caused solely by the beneﬁcial eﬀects from the PoLD
outweighing the detrimental eﬀects of PoDR.
Figure 4.4: A population slowdown in the Solow model.
27 The perhaps most recent evaluation of this argument is provided by Chatterjee and Vogl (2018).
28 A result that has been conﬁrmed by a number of studies on economic development including Sachs and
Malaney (2002).
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Furthermore, from the observed stylized facts it can be derived that population growth formerly
seemed to outperform growth in production, causing stagnation, whereas in more recent times
population growth is observed to have slowed down, oﬀering the potential for economic devel-
opment. Obviously, our neoclassical model ﬁts perfectly into this framework, as it provides a
wellestablished theory by which a decreasing birth rate is essential to allow productivity to in-
crease. Consequently, the negative causal relationship from birth rate to productivity exhibited
by the interrelation between PoDR and PoDL continues to operate over the whole time span
under consideration and may provide the missing link between Galor's second and third stylized
facts. To account for a more precise timing and magnitude of the relation between birth rate
and GDP per capita growth, the parameters γ and j will be empirically estimated in chapter
seven.
4.6.3 Simulation of a fertility decline
Recapitulating the above ﬁndings, the impact of a simple exogenous fertility decline on produc-
tion and population can be simulated by introducing a negative trend lt into the population
equation of our simpliﬁed model of stagnation as follows:
gyt = α1bt−15 − α2bt + gy15
bt = α3bt−1 + α4gyt−1 + α0glt
dt = α5dt−1
(4.2)
Table 4.1: Calibration of the system of 4.2
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α0 b0 d0 gy0 gy15 l
see Table 3.1 0.4 see Table 3.1 0.020-0.001t
As is illustrated in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, an exogenously modeled decline in the birth rate
raises growth in production per capita by reducing population growth, due to  not inspite of
 the continued operation of the three classical principles. Although productivity reacts with
an exponential increase, the impact of the birth rate is not strong enough to account for the
observed British sixteenfold increase in GDP per capita, which is partly owed to the usage of
the level of the birth rate instead of the logarithmized birth rate. Nevertheless, since we have
so far neglected the eﬀect of a decreasing death rate on population by holding mortality on a
constant high level, the parallel decrease in production and population during the ﬁnal periods
of the simulation is not in line with the stylized facts. We will therefore deal with the mortality
decline in the next chapter.
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Figure 4.5: A simulation of an exogenous fertility decline in growth rates (birth rate (blue), death rate (red),
GDP per capita growth rate (light green)).
Figure 4.6: A simulation of an exogenous fertility decline in level variables (population (orange), production
(blue) and GDP per capita (green)).
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4.7 Fallacy 3: The Conventional Wisdom that Development
Causes Fertility to Decline
So far, we have concluded that the fertility decline triggered the breakout from stagnation.
Consequently, to understand the cause for this breakout we will have to answer the question of
what induced fertility to decrease. Although we have thus shown that the fertility decline was
more a cause for than a response to the increase in productivity, it is still very often unjustly
reversely argued that the breakout from stagnation induced the birth rate to decline. This idea
led to the notion that development is the best contraceptive instead of rightfully concluding
that contraception is the best development. Since we have modeled fertility to depend on
productivity growth only in our simulation, this idea should at least be considered, as is done in
this section.
4.7.1 An endogenous shock in fertility?
Based on the observed negative correlation between productivity and birth rate during the process
of development, economic authors of the twentieth century began to believe that a rising living
standard generally prompt individuals to lower their fertility  a currently quite popular idea
that is widely known as the demographic economic paradox.29 A. Marshall30 (1890) may
already have prepared the way to mislead other economists by carelessly stating that
on the whole it seems proved that the birthrate is generally lower among the welltodo
than among those who make little expensive provision for the future of themselves and their
families, and who live an active life: and that fecundity is diminished by luxurious habits of
living.31
This quote might induce the reader to suspect a negative eﬀect of high productivity (i.e. living
standards) on fertility. As a consequence, nobel laureate G. Becker suggested that reaching a cer-
tain income or productivity threshold would increase the opportunity costs for having oﬀspring
and generally initiate a fertility decline.32 The popularity of an income threshold might have
partly been derived from the urge to ﬁnd an economic justiﬁcation for the Boserupian/Kremerian
view after the original Malthusian view had (unjustly) been rejected, as Mokyr and Voth sug-
gested that
to avoid [population] showing explosive behavior [during the breakout from stagnation], a
[fertility decline] is necessary, so that fertility responds negatively to higher incomes above
some threshold level.33
There are, however, numerous arguments rejecting a potential negative impact of productivity
on fertility. We will merely state four arguments here and return to this issue from an empirical
29 See, for example, Becker and Lewis (1973).
30 Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), British professor of political economy at Cambridge University, member of the
Royal Commission in 1891, one of the founders of neoclassical economics.
31 Marshall (1890) book IV, chapter IV.
32 Becker (1981).
33 Mokyr and Voth (2010), p. 9.
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point of view in section 8.4. Firstly, since Becker's pioneering work, the existence of an income
threshold could not be proven in spite of readily available data. Secondly, such a theory would
imply that the formerly positive impact of productivity growth on fertility had not only mitigated
but turned at once into a negative one. As Alter and Clark remarked,
[e]conomic models of fertility face a fundamental challenge. All plausible models of popu-
lation regulation for the preindustrial world depend on a positive association between net
fertility and income. This positive correlation of fertility and income became negative in Eu-
rope [during the nineteenth century], and there seems to be no association between income
and fertility in highincomelowfertility societies today.34
Thirdly, such a negative eﬀect is the exact opposite and therefore incompatible with the evolu-
tionaryproven principle of population. When looking at Sub-Sahara economies over the past
sixty years, it seems more probable that this idea induced development policies unintentionally
favoring population growth instead of what they were originally designed for, growth in pro-
ductivity.35 The general idea that over feeding checks increase had already been criticized by
Spencer (1852) from an evolutionary viewpoint as follows:
The theory which Mr. Doubleday [see also G. Becker] seeks to establish is, that throughout
both the animal and vegetable  Over feeding checks increase; whilst, on the other hand,
a limited or deﬁcient nutriment stimulates and adds to it. Or, as he elsewhere says,  Be
the range of the natural power to increase in any species what it may, the plethoric state
invariably checks it, and the deplethoric state invariably develops it. [...] But how, under
the alleged law, can a comparatively plethoric state ever be attained to? If the present
production of necessaries of life is insuﬃcient for the normal nutrition of the race, and if the
resulting deplethoric state involves that the next generation will greatly exceed the present
in numbers, then, for anything that appears to the contrary, the next generation will be in a
more deplethoric state still. Unless Mr. Doubleday can show that the means of subsistence
will increase more rapidly than the unduly fertile people, he cannot prove the existence of any
remedial process. Nay, indeed, he must show that his law involves, under such circumstances,
a greater increase of food than of people. Now he neither does nor can show this; and thus
the alleged law lacks that very property of self-adjustment, which he rightly regards as the
test of the real law.36
In other words, since it was shown in the last chapter that growth in production cannot out-
perform an unrestricted increase in population, the latter would create a generation even less
productive, leading to a vicious cycle of higher fertility and lower productivity. Hence, the notion
that producitivity growth would negatively aﬀect fertility could never display an equilibrium as
fertility would, in the long run, diverge to its maximum or minimum value. Fourthly, from an
individual point of view, as will be described in chapter ﬁve, the existence of evolution by means
of sexual selection proves that the choice of a partner strongly relies on its social rank, which is
in turn in most cases determined by the level of income. Vice versa, the relationship oﬀered here
appears to contradict every model on fertility behavior, suggesting that sexual selection should
34 Alter and Clark (2010), p. 63.
35 Easterly (2001).
36 Spencer (1852), Introduction.
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fall on those potential partners exhibiting the greatest possible economic misery. In this case,
idleness would be a permanently higher rated sign of sexual attraction than economic success,
which is more than implausible from every point of view.
4.7.2 Human capital accumulation as preventive check?
More recently, Becker stated in his 1988 presidential address that economists should attempt to
model the neoclassical growth model in one endogenous framework together with the Malthusian
growth model to account for the escape from the Malthusian trap. Being closely related to an
income threshold, he advanced a human capital view of fertility behaviour which will subsequently
be brieﬂy summarized, as it seems to represent the contemporary state of the art and to attract
current research attention among uniﬁed growth authors  although this digression does not seem
necessary for future investigations on the breakout from stagnation. Mokyr and Voth described
the argument as follows.
In many models of longterm growth, the fertility transition plays a crucial role, and the tim-
ing of fertility decline is central to many theories explaining the transition to selfsustaining
growth. The decline is normally modelled as a response to changing economic incentives.
Leading interpretations by Becker and Barro (1988) and Lucas (2002) emphasize the quan-
tityquality tradeoﬀ facing parents in a context of faster technological change and higher
returns to human capital.37
Galor and Weil (2000), for instance, attribute an adapted fertility behavior to a sudden spurt in
technology, raising the stock of knowledge.
Eventually, parents invest more in the human capital of their oﬀspring. This in turn ac-
celerates the growth of knowledge. Higher incomes make it easier for parents to have more
children. At the same time, a growing value of human capital produces incentives to increase
the quality of one's oﬀspring, reducing quantity. Initially, after the start of modern growth,
the income eﬀect dominated, leading to more births; later, the substitution eﬀect became
more important and fertility declined.38
However, Galor is mistaken in his belief that the increase in human capital as well as the increase
in productivity preceded the decline in fertility, which is a logical conclusion given that he
erroneously locates the beginning of the British fertility decline at the end of  instead of the
beginning of  the nineteenth century.
Clark criticized both the theory of an income threshold as well as the theory of human capital
accumulation by indirectly suggesting that the principle of population remained active after the
breakout from stagnation:
the evidence [...] is that those with the highest incomes and the greatest investments in the
human capital of their children also had the largest numbers of surviving children.39
37 Mokyr and Voth (2010), p. 10.
38 ibid., p. 10.
39 Alter and Clark (2010), p. 48.
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Consequently, in this work human capital  as well as technology  is continued to be treated as
a (endogenous) function of demographic variables, embodied by the principle of labor division,
and is therefore omitted from consideration in our demographic uniﬁed growth theory.40
4.7.3 Other conventional factors as preventive checks
Lastly, LiviBacci (2012) lists a number of factors that have been suspected to have caused the
fertility decline, including oldage insurance, culture, opportunity costs, emancipation, schooling,
institutions, health and prohibition of child labor, most of which were certainly directly positively
aﬀected by concomitantly increasing productivity.41 Nevertheless, this large variety of potential
causes might conﬁrm the rule that a long list of hypotheses merely reﬂects the helplessness of
the scientiﬁc ﬁeld involved. Hence, Mokyr and Voth concluded that
ﬁnding an economic reason for fertility decline has not been easy, and there is currently no
consensus on the principal contributing factors.42
40 While technology tends to advance with the size of population, human capital tends to increase with
longevity.
41 LiviBacci (2012), p. 178.
42 Mokyr and Voth (2010), p. 19.
Chapter 5
A Classical Growth Theory of
Development
5.1 The Classical Theory of Population Part II: The Principle of
Generation
Since our theory of production cannot explain the population slowdown endogenously, we will
now return to the theory of population to examine the causes for the fertility decline. As they are
crucial in elucidating modern economic development, this chapter again intends to resuscitate
and to clarify the vaguer intuitions of the classical economists on the breakout from economic
stagnation by providing the full classical version of the theory of population. Thus, this section
suggests an explanation for the mechanism by which fertility was assumed to be regulated and
by which the Malthusian trap can be avoided. Since we have seen that the observed increase in
productivity does not appear to be able to explain the decline in fertility, we will now turn to
the death rate as the remaining explanatory variable. As it constitutes the most abstract part of
the theory, the great preventive check  the remedy to escape the Malthusian trap as suggested
by the classical economists  deserves another elaborate treatment. Firstly, we will summarize
the observed stylized facts regarding the death rate in relation to the birth rate before brieﬂy
exploring the existing theories by shortly reviewing the most recent literature. After having
shown that this literature is still (or again) in its infancy, we will return to the classical authors
and model their ﬁnal proposition in accordance with the stylized facts.
5.1.1 The demographic transition
It has been shown that the population slowdown was the decivise factor in raising productivity.
To analyze this population slowdown in detail, demographers usually decompose its evolution
into a reduction of death rates, representing mortality, and a decrease in birth rates, representing
fertility. The evolution of these vital rates over the past centuries is commonly conjointly stylized
on a national level, illustrating a fourphase model termed as the demographic transition (see
Figure 5.1). The model of the demographic transition in the right graph is crudely based on
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the British experience over the period 18002000 as is displayed in the left graph. In phase one,
birth rates and death rates display relatively high values. At the beginning of phase two, the
death rate declines due to the socalled epidemiological transition, inducing as a byproduct a
population explosion, urbanization and sometimes an industrial revolution. In phase three, the
birth rate starts to succeed the decreasing death rate, slowing down population growth, until
they both settle on an approximately equal low level in phase four.
Figure 5.1: Left graph: British demographic transition: Birth rate (blue) and death rate (red) 18002016.
Right graph: Stylized fact demographic transition.
Sources: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for 18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 1871-2010.
Following the national accounts on the demographic transition, it must stare the neutral observer
in the face that death rates and birth rates display some inherent connection. When comparing
international data on vital rates, no economy can be found in which a sustained decline in
birth rates has been realized without a preceding decline in death rates (see Figure 5.1 for
Britain and again for numerous examples Appendix 11.2). For this reason, it is impossible not
to become impressed with the idea that it appears to be a statistical law that the mortality
reduction generally predates the fertility decline. Therefore, demographers have  in contrast
to economists  ever since suspected a positive causal eﬀect of changes in mortality on changes
in fertility.1 Although fertility seems to universally react belatedly to mortality, this lag varies
strongly across economies, ranging from a few years to more than a century, which led many
economists to wrongly shift their attention to the industrial revolution as main trigger for the
fertility decline. Nonetheless, several economists also came to the conclusion that diminishing
mortality must be causal for the fertility decline and the concomitant increase in GDP per capita.
The currently most cited economic explanation for a positive eﬀect of mortality on fertility relies
on the fact that decreasing mortality implies increasing life expectancy. Increased longevity
may, for example, again foster human capital accumulation or decrease the time preference rate
of individuals. Similar to the model by Galor (2011), where human capital accumulation was
induced by technological progress, increasing life expectancy may be assumed to raise the demand
for human capital and for child quality at the cost of child quantity.
1 For a discussion see Kirk (1996).
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Cervellati and Sunde (2005) as well as de la Croix (2008) alter this [Galor's] setup by arguing
that life expectancy rose quickly with productivity. This in turn encouraged investment in
human capital, as payback horizons lengthened. Even if technological change is only slightly
skillbiased, a selfreinforcing cycle of better technology, greater life expectancy, and higher
investment in human capital can get started.2
Such models have been explored more recently by Ludwig and Vogel (2009), Herzer et al. (2012)
or Cervellati and Sunde (2017b). As an additional benchmark, Cervellati and Sunde (2011) ﬁnd a
particularly strong positive correlation between mortality and fertility in those economies where
life expectancy exceeds ﬁfty years, suggesting a corresponding death rate threshold of about
0.02. The advantage of this group of models lies in their explicit integration of the demographic
transition into a uniﬁed growth theory. However, as Mokyr and Voth criticize,
models in the Lucas and Becker tradition emphasize the increasing demand for and returns
to human capital, when we ﬁnd little evidence of this [adding that] returns to human capital,
conventionally measured, probably did not increase signiﬁcantly before 1870.3
While the above association between mortality and fertility through the channel of human cap-
ital may be viewed as an indirect eﬀect, there is growing agreement favouring a direct eﬀect
of mortality on fertility. A popular view of a direct mechanism emphasizes parental birth re-
placement behaviour when facing high child mortality. In addition to the wellknown theory of
infant replacement behaviour  to compensate for high infant mortality  the physiological eﬀect
of more rapid conception after early (infantile) deaths and the hoarding eﬀect as an insurance
against future high mortality when facing frequent subsistence crises are further direct eﬀects
on fertility.4 Moreover, Clark even argues in favor of a rather automatic direct eﬀect on the
fertility decline due to a selfadjusting social environment as being the more promising approach:
fertility limitation in northwestern Europe had little to do with rational individual calculation
and much more to do with social customs. [...] Part of the evidence against conscious
contraceptive practices is the lack of patterns in fertility that might be found where there
was conscious control of fertility.5
As a result, direct eﬀects of mortality might exist which do not rely on parents' conscious deci-
sions. Social or religious habits such as the custom of late marriage may be capable of suppressing
the potential number of children without conscious parental intervention, whereas a practice of
divorces in liberal societies will tend to tear couples apart and impede excessive reproduction.
Perhaps the hitherto best modern account of a potential mortalityfertility causation has been
given by Hajnal (1965):
If men had to wait till land became available, presumably a delay in the death of the holders
of land resulting from declining death rates would tend to raise the age of marriage [and
correspondingly diminish fertility] [...]; this is certainly a hypothesis that merits study.6
2 Mokyr and Voth (2010), p. 11.
3 Mokyr and Voth (2010), p. 41.
4 See Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Weil (2010) and Angeles (2010).
5 Alter and Clark (2010). p. 47.
6 Hajnal (1965), p. 133.
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Being the authors main subject of research, it will subsequently be attempted to clarify the
classical view on the great preventive check and to show that its operation has increased without
our eﬀorts as a response to the mortality decline.
5.1.2 The principle of generation as great preventive check
At ﬁrst sight it may appear that in any state of [a free] society [. . . ] all the usual restraints
to early marriage as they now exist would be removed, and that a rate of increase of the
population unexampled in any previous era would be the result, leading in a few generations
to a diﬃculty in obtaining subsistence, which Malthus has shown to be the inevitable result of
the normal rate of increase of mankind when all the positive as well as the preventive checks
are removed. As the positive checks  which may be brieﬂy summarised as war, pestilence and
famine  are supposed to be nonexistent, what, it may be asked, are the preventive checks
which are suggested as being capable of reducing the rate of increase within manageable
limits?7
Problematically, Malthus (1803) seems to have inconsistently distinguished between the preven-
tive checks, the preventive check and the great preventive check. He used the ﬁrst two terms
to deﬁne the usual restraints that were comprehensibly displayed by cultural traditions in most
human societies. These traditions encompass those cultural customs explicitly and implicitly
imposed such as a one-child policy, contraception, abortion, or linking the concession for legiti-
mate marriage to the capacity to provide subsistence for a family. In contrast, the notion of the
great preventive check, which was betimes also abbreviated to the preventive check, referred
to a state of aﬀairs in which these traditions were abandoned and individuals were left to their
natural and reasonable decisions as a tool to restrict their fertility.8 Although he argued that
the great preventive check was crucial in preventing the population from growing exponentially,
many classical economists were not able to follow his intuition and there seems to have been no
deﬁnite agreement on the precise mechanism and deﬁnition of the great preventive check in
classical economics.
Although Darwin (1859) had stated that high fertility was a dominant evolutionary strategy,
Spencer (1874) suggested that the process of natural selection had in many species created a
multitude of positive and preventive checks to avoid a permanent state of overpopulation. When
looking at nature, it appears obvious that each species that has endured for millions of generations
must, as soon as the available territory had been fully stocked and with the pace of specialization
advancing very slowly, have exhibited a relatively stable population over this timespan. This,
in turn, requires birth rates and death rates to be in equilibrium over the long run. Spencer
proposed that the power of the positive checks was connected to the power of the preventive
checks, writing that
7 Wallace (1890).
8 Malthus also employed the expressions prudential restraint from marriage and moral restraint from mar-
riage, since marriage was regarded to precede birth. Senior remarked on the use of the expression marriage:
Our readers are of course aware that, by the word marriage, we mean to express not the peculiar and per-
manent connection which alone, in a Christian Country, is entitled to that name, but any agreement between
a man and woman to cohabit under circumstances likely to occasion the birth of progeny. Senior (1836),
p. 143.
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proportioning of reproduction to mortality is requisite for mankind as for every other kind9,
which he deﬁned as
the law of maintenance of all races; seeing that when they cease to conform to it they cease
to be. [. . . ] Individuation and reproduction are antagonistic.10
Indeed, fertility and mortality will be found to mutually balance each other. If fertility suddenly
increased, a species must gradually become more numerous, until from lack of resources mortality
would adjust to the level of fertility via the operation of the positive checks. If, conversely,
mortality increased, then the species must diminish, until as a result of resources becoming
relatively more abundant, fertility would rise to the level of mortality, as otherwise the species
would become extinct. Also, it appears intelligible that a reduction of fertility eased the pressure
on the means of subsistence and consequently might decrease mortality. However, the causal
eﬀects inducing fertility to adapt to diminished mortality, i.e. the preventive checks induced by
decreasing mortality, are less clearly exposed. The mechanism of these most natural preventive
checks will be illuminated in the following.
In an unchecked economy, unrestricted reproduction could be practiced by each individual as long
as it was able to acquire the necessary resources. In this case, it has been argued that an excess
of fertility had the tendency to ultimately force abundant individuals of the same generation into
competition  a tendency that might generally be denoted as intragenerational competition for
niches. However, as has already been mentioned in chapter two, an excess of individuals and
the concomitant pressure of population might, according to equation 3.8, alternatively emerge
from a reduction in the death rate, diminishing the positive checks and mortality, increasing
life expectancy and therefore raising the population share of older individuals. In this case,
if two subsequent generations of individuals existed at the same time, a universally prolonged
longevity would raise conﬂicts between the old, established and the young, emerging generation
and correspondingly intensify intergenerational competition for niches. The latter will be found
to decisively cause the operation of the great preventive check by suppressing the fertility of the
younger cohort.
5.1.3 The principle of generation in the animal economy: The struggle for
territory and sexual selection
To inquire into the universal underlying causes that are responsible for a conﬂict of generations,
we may again ﬁrst turn to the non-human economies. The strongest degree of intergenerational
competition must be borne in the plant economy, where the possession of a natural niche almost
exclusively relies on the availability of a ﬁxed amount of territory. We may thus return to the
initial statement that in a forest that is fully covered by beeches, it is impossible for seeds to
start growing until an existing tree has died oﬀ. In this case, the conﬂict between subsequent
generations itself constitutes the great preventive check in its most fundamental form, which
9 Spencer (1874), 272.
10 Spencer (1852), 2, 4.
Chapter 5. A Classical Growth Theory of Development 75
we may name the principle of generation (in the following PoG). Among many bird and
mammal species, where regular individual competition for territory is observed, procreation
is likewise limited by the prevalence of an adult generation. In these instances, a relatively
higher share of mature individuals established on a given amount of land tends to diminish the
emerging generations' resources and timespan usually reserved for propagation and consequently
the potential number of their oﬀspring. This is most readily seen by observing the contrary fact
that, if a mortality crisis induced the death of a large share of old, established individuals, a
pool of newcomers would be readily available to take possession of the abandoned territory and
strive to increase in numbers. As a result, intergenerational competition is raised by a decreasing
death rate and relaxed by an increasing death rate.
What is more, in advanced species the great preventive check is quite considerably complicated by
the existence of sexual reproduction. It is an important biological ﬁnding that among territorial
species exhibiting diﬀerent sexes, too high a fertility can be suppressed by a mechanism Darwin
(1871) called sexual selection. In cases where one sex is relatively abundant (in most species
the males), the other sex can exert some choice over their potential partners. Among territorial
species, possession of a territorial niche serves, beyond merely providing means of subsistence,
as the decisive criterion of sexual attraction. Since, therefore, the possession of territory is
an important condition for propagation, its occupation has evolved as the primary instinct of
individuals of the abundant sex. The latter argumentation is based on observations made by J.
S. Huxley11:
Territory in some form or other is of prime biological importance in the life of birds (and
probably of other groups as well). The ﬁrst sign of sexual activity  the ﬁrst eﬀect, presum-
ably, of the vernal change in the sexual organs  is in most species seen in the instinct of
the males, not, as has usually been assumed to seek out the females, but to ﬁnd, occupy,
and defend a territory. So far as there is choice of mates in monogamous species, it is by the
females, who seek out the males; but they only compete for those males who are in possession
of territory.12
Given this form of sexual selection and that established individuals will already have acquired
territory complementary attracting the other sex, nicheless individuals  in most cases young
males  are regarded as unattractive and are therefore not considered for pairing, lowering the
birth rate of the species. The operation of the preventive eﬀect of sexual selection is more strongly
exposed by restricting our attention, following Huxley, to monogamous species, where the at-
traction of one partner excludes the attraction of other potential candidates. Under this state
of aﬀairs, nicheless individuals  in most cases young females  are commonly not considered for
reproduction and interbreeding is restricted to old, established pairs, further naturally reducing
the reproductive capacity of the whole species.
Consequently, among monogamous territorial species, the great preventive check is, in addition
to the usual degree of intergenerational competition, proportionally ampliﬁed by the degree of
sexual selection. Under circumstances that concede low mortality, free choice of mating will
11 Sir Julian Sorell Huxley (18871975), British naturalist, biologist, ﬁrst Director of UNESCO, founding member
of the WWF, ﬁrst President of the British Humanist Association, fellow of the Royal Society.
12 Huxley (1926), p. 148.
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deny juvenescent male and female individuals the possibility to reproduce. This great preventive
check is, as will be shown shortly, operating even more actively among the human species.
5.1.4 The principle of generation in the human economy: The struggle for a
social rank, sexual selection and menopause
But whence comes it, that the country where [. . . ] the mean life, in whatever way the
calculation is made, is higher than in any other, should be precisely that in which the
fecundity is the smallest?13
One might be tempted to extend the fertility-preventing combined eﬀect of intergenerational
competition and sexual selection to the human case by returning to Malthus' view of a fully
peopled pure pasture economy:
Under such circumstances, how would it be possible for the young men who had reached the
age of puberty, to leave their fathers' houses and marry, till an employment of herdsman,
dairyman, or something of the kind, became vacant by death?14
Moreover, apart from the possession of a niche required for subsistence and sexual attraction,
the decisive component leading to a drastic increase in the preventive eﬀect in a regime of low
mortality is due to the fact that human fertility is, particularly within monogamous couples,
limited by age, preventively checking the potential fertility of old  in most cases female 
individuals.15 Malthus concluded that a strong degree of intergenerational competition would
force an emerging generation to postpone reproduction until it will often be completely impeded
by old age.
The sons of farmers are exhorted not to marry, and generally ﬁnd it necessary to comply
with this advice, till they are settled in some business or farm, which may enable them to
support a family. These events may not perhaps occur till they are far advanced in life. [...]
Marriages would be among persons so far advanced in life, that most of the women would
have ceased to bear children.16
In the following argumentation we will thus presume the existence of monogamy and a fertility
interval limited by age in a human economy.17
The mindful reader will object that the suggested analogy projected from the bird economy to
the human territorial economy masks an important Smithian characteristic of human societies,
namely the existence of a social structure arising from regular exchange between individuals.18
Since in human hunter and gatherer societies territory is in many cases not owned by single
13 M. Muret in Malthus (1826), book II, chapter V.
14 Malthus (1826), book II, chapter V.
15 This is again a simpliﬁcation. It should be noted that menopause is not a purely human characteristic; see,
for example, Ward et al. (2009).
16 Malthus (1826), book II, chapter VIII.
17 It should be noted that the change from the domestic institution polygamy to that of monogamy as well as the
change from patriarchy to matriarchy are quite common and regularly observed phenomena among human as
well as animal populations. See, for example, Spencer (1874).
18 It is obvious that the existence of a social structure is not solely restricted to the human species.
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individuals, but by a community, scarcity of territory ceases to be the point of contention causing
intergenerational conﬂicts. Correspondingly, sexual selection must in addition be exerted on
other grounds than territorial ones. Nonetheless, it seems most plausible to assume that choice
of mating will still tend to fall on those individuals that are assessed to be able to best provide
subsistence for progeny. Indeed, in social economies, an individual's free choice appears to
frequently center their attention on the social status, or as the classical economists called it,
the social rank a potential partner appears to represent, which is quite reliably displayed by a
corresponding social niche, or in other words, a profession.19 It is, hence, reasonable to replace
the preventive eﬀect resulting from the possession of a territorial niche with that resulting from
the occupation of a social niche as a sign of attraction in human (social) economies.
Being thus confronted with a further criterion of sexual selection, the pursuit of territory must
 from an evolutionary point of view  have been gradually complemented by a pursuit of so-
cial eminence as a drive of prime biological importance. More explicitly, the average young
individual must, under a strong degree of intergenerational competition, constantly strive to at-
tain the former generation's social rank and consequently develop an instinct for social success,
which is probably based on the experience of the parental success. Malthus, Senior and McCul-
loch suggested that the universal fear of losing a social rank would account for this additional
instinct:
Men will not be industrious without a motive; and the desire of bettering our condition,
though powerful, is less so than the pressure of want, or the fear of falling to an inferior
station. [...] With the lower classes the existence of present, and with the middle and upper
classes the fear of future want, are the principal motives that stimulate intelligence and
activity. The desire to maintain a family in respectability and comfort, or to advance their
interests, makes the spring and summer of life be spent, even by the moderately wealthy, in
laborious enterprises.20
Accordingly, while the pressure of want forced an individual of low rank to merely occupy some
social niche, the fear of losing a social rank induced individuals exhibiting a higher social status
to pursue those professions that retained their social position to impress the other sex with what
Senior had called decencies.
The great preventive check is the fear of losing decencies, or, what is nearly the same, the
hope to acquire, by the accumulation of longer celibacy, the means of purchasing the decencies
which give a higher social rank.21
To illustrate the operation of the great preventive check, let us suppose a high-mortality-economy
with a stationary population. Assuming the death rate to be 20 per thousand would correspond
to a life expectancy of 50 years. Furthermore, suppose an inhabitant of this economy at the age
of 25 whose parents - former physicians - have recently died at the age of 50, bequeathing their
19 This positive relationship between income and marriage is in fact nothing but the microeconomic foundation
of the principle of population, implying that pairing behavior in human and animal populations does not
crucially diﬀer.
20 McCulloch (1863), part I, chapter VIII.
21 Senior (1836), p. 144.
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business to their child. Having acquired the parental social niche and consequently displaying
the corresponding social status, the new physician will not hesitate to start a family. Now
suppose mortality would fall over the next 25 years, such that the death rate was reduced to
12.5 per thousand, i.e. life expectancy would increase toward 80 years. In this case, the new
physician's progeny is, at the age of 25, confronted with a new situation. Since their parents are
well and alive, intergenerational competition arises, in most instances favouring the established
generation. From the resulting inferior position, fearing the loss of the decencies they were used
to growing up, the progeny will realize that they have to study medicine or experience additional
medical on-the-job-training to be able to compete with the former generation to ultimately retain
their social rank, until ﬁnally either the parental productivity has been achieved, or, as is much
more common, the parents have retired or died. During the period of extended education, the
oﬀspring will generally neither commit to a partner, nor will they attract a potential partner
of a corresponding social rank, thereby aggravating the ﬁndingtogether of the sexes. Once the
third generation has inherited the business and the social niche has been secured, it will again
tend to propagate. However, assuming e.g. the parental retirement age to be 65 years, the newly
established couple is most arguably too far advanced in life to produce their desired number of
oﬀspring, such that their potential fertility is correspondingly reduced.
Summarizing the operation of the great preventive check in the human economy, it might be
stated that it is triggered by decreasing mortality and concomitantly intensiﬁed intergenerational
competition for professions, preventing a young individual from occupying a social niche. The
great preventive check comprises those actions stemming from the fear of losing a social rank
that result in a postponement of reproduction until a later point in life. Accordingly, it must be
remarked that its eﬀect would be almost imperceptible if human fertility was not limited by age
and is greatly reinforced by the prevalence of the domestic institutions monogamy and free choice
of marriage. That the foregoing considerations with regard to the fourth classical principle, the
principle of generation, are in accordance with Malthus' understanding of the great preventive
check is highlighted by his most fundamental policy advice:
I have stated expressly, that a decrease of mortality at all ages is what we ought chieﬂy to
aim at. [...] It will be generally found true, that the increasing healthiness of a country will
not only diminish the proportions of deaths, but the proportions of births and marriages.22
5.1.5 Direct and indirect eﬀects of mortality on fertility
Following our above analysis, the last classical principle to be modeled refers to the great pre-
ventive check the principle of generation, by which the power of population is repressed from
peopling a country fully up to the limits of subsistence. Even Marshall apparently understood
that the birth rate depended strongly on the availability of niches, writing that
country life was, [. . . ] rigid in its habits; young people found it diﬃcult to establish them-
selves until some other married pair had passed from the scene and made a vacancy in their
22 Malthus (1826), book V, chapter I and Malthus (1826), book III, chapter II.
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own parish. [. . . ] Consequently whenever plague or war or famine thinned the population,
there were always many waiting to be married, who ﬁlled the vacant places.23
Accordingly, every individual faces the choice between reproduction and the preservation of its
social rank during the early stages of its life. Further inquiries have shown that reproduction is
in most cases not accomplished until a certain social rank has been achieved.24 However, after
a general increase in life expectancy (corresponding to the decline in mortality) and with the
existence of a parent generation, a higher social rank cannot be achieved until the later part of
life, postponing reproduction until the individual's average biological fertility interval has often
been exceeded.
Nonetheless, a more precise mathematical formulation of the classical theory of population re-
quires the principle of generation to be further analyzed to clearly distinguish between the par-
ticular eﬀects of mortality on fertility. For, on the one hand, there exist mortality eﬀects that
directly act on fertility, notably an inheritance eﬀect and an infant mortality eﬀect, while
on the other hand, mortality eﬀects operate indirectly through the income channel, weakening
the eﬀect of the principle of population. The latter will in this work be named average income
eﬀect and selection eﬀect.
To trace the origin of these eﬀects, Figure 5.2 represents the stylized population structures for
the years 1830 and 2010 respectively. For ease of illustration, populations are assumed to be
stationary and stable, i.e. the birth rate equals the death rate and its relative age distribution
does not change over time. The resulting cylindrical rather than pyramid form implies that
every individual dies at the age of its life expectancy.25 Average life expectancy can be recovered
from the inverted death rate, which was roughly 2% in 1830 and 1.25% in 2010, excluding infant
mortality.
Figure 5.2: Stylized population structure of England in 1830 (left) and 2010 (right). Displayed are working
cohorts (blue shaded), cohorts in education (orange shaded), fertility intervals (red lines), average age of interitance
(black lines) and average relative income (green lines) of a cohort.
Sources: Burnette (2006), U.S. Census Bureau (2011) for income statistics.
23 Marshall (1890), book IV, chapter IV.
24 See, for example, McCulloch (1863).
25 The eﬀect of early mortality is dealt with as part of the infant mortality eﬀect.
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To begin with the stylized population structure in 1830, individuals lived for ﬁfty years on
average, with the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years spent on education. The fertility interval is taken to be
constant, ranging from 1545 years. As a result, 86% of the working population (beneﬁting from
increases in income) in 1830 was fertile, whereas in 2010, when life expectancy was roughly 80
years, only 42% of the working couples were capable of reproduction (see blue shaded area).
Accordingly, positive GDP per capita growth was in the latter situation increasingly distributed
to infertile individuals of high age, who were not even physically able to convert the additional
income into children. It is obvious that, if wealth is mainly distributed to an infertile population,
Malthus' notion that population invariably increases where the means of subsistence increase
largely ceases to be observable. This shift in social fertility is the ﬁrst eﬀect that can account
for a breakout from the cycle of misery, the average income eﬀect.
Furthermore, it can be observed that the life period during which the average individual earned
its maximum income (green line) shifted from the young age of 2035 years in 1830 to the old
age of 4560 years in 2010. As it is well known that individuals' choices of their partners are in
a high degree positively aﬀected by the latter's social rank, and as the individuals' social rank
is quite reliably reﬂected by its relative level of income, it is a logical inference to presume a
postponement of marriages between 1830 and 2010, resulting in an increasingly delayed fertility
decision (selection eﬀect).
Thirdly, the birth rate is directly aﬀected by the death rate of those individuals who possess
a part of the economy's wealth. With the death of such an individual, its property is usually
bequeathed to the succeeding generation. Since the age of women at their ﬁrst birth was approx-
imately 25 years in 1830 and has not changed drastically over the last two hundred years and
since their husbands are currently, quite similar to 1830, on average merely three years older, in-
heritance is quite universally passed to the oﬀspring some 2530 years before their own deaths.26
Consequently, average age of inheritance was approximately 2025 years in 1830 and around
5055 years in 2010 (see black bar). Since early inheritance formerly allowed individuals to take
over and make use of their parents' capital, often in form of a business, it tended to greatly
increase their income and social rank, favoring early marriage and subsequently conversion of
wealth into progeny. Until 2010 however, the channel for translating inherited wealth into a
higher number of oﬀspring was increasingly closed down, as the heir will, with a high probability,
have arrived at an infertile age.
Complementing the above impact of the death of an old individual on fertility, the reduction of
early deaths of individuals at a very young age completes the generation conﬂict by providing
another wellknown direct reason for low birth rates. When using a broader deﬁnition of the
generation conﬂict, it also includes birth replacement behaviour. The diminution of infant and
child mortality in the aftermath of the epidemiological transition seems to have induced parents
to dispose of some formerly necessary replacement births.27 Over time, this eﬀect eased the
social pressure on individuals to marry early, further postponing reproduction. For simplicity,
the diminution of infant and child mortality will not be separately considered in this work, as
26 See again Hajnal (1965) or Clark (2007) for historical marriage pattern.
27 See, for example, Haines (1998).
Chapter 5. A Classical Growth Theory of Development 81
the eﬀects of the eventual abolition of child replacements seem to be in line with the eﬀect of
the principle of generation as outlined above.
Summing up the outcome of these four eﬀects of mortality on fertility, it might be stated that if
two succeeding generations exist at the same time, a further rising life expectancy will progres-
sively cause a generation conﬂict, forcing young individuals to preventively check their fertility.
As a consequence, our mathematical framework will make use of the proposition that the birth
rate is positively aﬀected by the death rate. The operation of the principle of generation will be
modeled by ∂bt∂dt−x > 0, again delayed by the cumulative lag of pregnancy and fertility decision.
Moreover, we will ﬁnd that, as in any animal economy, a reduction of the death rate below a
critical threshold  in the human case 2%  will tend to be followed by an even stronger reduction
of the birth rate. The corresponding human takeoﬀ life expectancy of about 50 years might
be justiﬁed as being the starting value of a generational conﬂict, if it is deﬁned as double the age
of the average woman when having the ﬁrst child, who will succeed in reproduction when adult.
Social morals and customs are almost instantly readjusted to this conﬂict.
5.2 An Exogenous Trend in Mortality
Of course, if historically decreasing mortality was causal in reducing fertility, this begs the ques-
tion of what triggered the death rate to decline. As has been hinted at, we ﬁnd a general pattern
of declining death rates among every developed economy often called the epidemiological tran-
sition.28 As is illustrated for the representative case of the British data displayed in Figure 5.3
over the period 16602010, the death rates seem to follow a continuous negative trend with ini-
tially high volatility abating over time. Next, we will shortly pinpoint the probable determinants
of this mortality decline, i.e. the causes for the epidemiological transition.
Figure 5.3: Left graph: British epidemiological transition: Death rate (red) 16602016. Right graph: Stylized
fact epidemiological transition.
Sources: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for 16601871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010.
28 See, for example, McKeown (2009).
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Research suggests the following two main factors as being responsible for the British mortality
decline: The disappearance of the plague and the eradication of smallpox.29 Although it seems
diﬃcult to ﬁnd reliable British accounts of individual epidemics, the upward spikes during the
early period are most arguably owed to regional plague epidemics, since no other cause of death
could have claimed a comparably high number of victims and lists of plague epidemics in other
European countries provide a similar pattern.30 With the end of these epidemics, the spikes
disappear, whereas the level of the death rate remained relatively unchanged between 1745 and
1800 until smallpox vaccination was introduced in the year 1798.31
The wide swings in population size and real wages in Europe between the twelfth and the
nineteenth centuries were primarily caused by external shocks, like the plague epidemics
that reached Europe from Asia between 1240 and 1720. [...] After 1720 mortality fell as ﬁrst
plague was defeated and then smallpox, the latter through vaccination. [...] Consequently
populations all across Europe expanded rapidly. [...] Vaccination campaigns dramatically
reduced the incidence of smallpox after 1800.32
The latter allowed for a decrease in the level of the death rate over the subsequent thirty years,
whereafter another 50 years of relative stability followed. It was only after 1875 that modern
medicine emerged and seems to have enabled a further diminution of infectious diseases as well
as a drastic reduction in infant mortality, which was largely completed by 1920.33 Summarizing
these observations, the British mortality decline until 1875 appears to be exclusively owed to the
disappearance of plague and smallpox epidemics, hence the name of this shift, epidemiological
transition. While smallpox vaccination might be identiﬁed to have emerged from a lucky
medical coincidence, the end of plague epidemics has not been fully explained yet.34 Naturally,
economists have tended to ascribe the decrease in mortality to improvements in living standards
in the form of better nutrition, ameliorating resistance to infectious diseases. If this was true,
the demographic transition had to be modeled as a consequence of the rise in GDP per capita in
form of better nutrition, opposing the demographic approach of this work. However, returning
to LiviBacci's assessment,
[o]ther, indirect, considerations also cast doubt on the nutritional hypothesis. For one, real
wages in general declined throughout Europe during the eighteenth century and into the
ﬁrst decades of the nineteenth. [. . . ] Another indication is variation in average height,
which seems in this same period to have declined in England, in the Hapsburg Empire,
and in Sweden. Height is fairly sensitive to changes in nutritional levels, and its decline or
stagnation is certainly not a sign of nutritional improvement.35
29 For the former see Cipolla (1971), for the latter see Davenport et al. (2011)
30 No one would deny that the disappearance of plague in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
rid the Europeans of their most mortal enemy, and so reacted favorably on the development of population.
Langer (1963), p. 4.
31 Thereafter, the European history of epidemics  and indirectly also its population history  must be seen in
a very diﬀerent light. The subsequent demographic revolution would have been impossible in an environment
that had been struck by the plague ten to ﬁfteen times in every century. Cipolla (1971), p. 62 (translation
by the author TL).
32 Alter and Clark (2010) p. 42, p. 56.
33 See Hays (2005) for a general overview on the history of epidemics.
34 The ﬁrst intentional use of smallpox vaccination has most often been ascribed to Edward Jenner's method of
inoculation of cowpox.
35 LiviBacci (2012), p. 72.
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Instead, as Clark notes,
[a] wide variety of explanations has been oﬀered for the disappearance of plague, including
viral mutations, competition between rat species, and new building materials.36
Furthermore, the traditional view that technological advances in medicine, for example in the
form of hygiene or even quarantine triggered the epidemiological transition must be rejected as
well:
To answer this question [of the mortaliy decline] we must turn once again to evidence from
the nineteenth century, when a decline in mortality was brought about by a reduction in
the incidence of infectious disease, and was almost wholly independent of speciﬁc therapy.
(The only medical procedure which can be accepted as having made a substantial contribu-
tion earlier than the twentieth century was vaccination, and its inﬂuence was limited to a
single disease.) As stated previously, Griﬃth and others who considered this matter were
completely mistaken in attaching great signiﬁcance to growth of hospitals and other medical
institutions.37
Consequently, in this preliminary, simple version of a classical growth model, the eﬀects of higher
productivity on the death rate will be put back, as wealth eﬀects and technological advances seem
to have played a minor role in the mortality decline.38 Without dwelling too much on the nature
of the decline and to not get lost in a long chain of causality, this work treats the disappearance
of infectious diseases as an exogenous source for the epidemiological transition, unaﬀected by
economic development and fertility. We may therefore adjust the third equation of our classical
system by including a negative trend h:
dt = α5dt−1 − h
5.3 Simulation of Direct Mortality Eﬀects on Fertility
As should have become clear from this chapter, in classical theory the great preventive check, the
principle of generation, accounts for the missing link between the regime of stagnation and the
regime of development and was formulated by Malthus to trigger the escape from the population
trap. We will now again simulate the stylized facts on the breakout of stagnation. Firstly, in
addition to the last simulation, we introduced a negative trend into the death rate equation.
Secondly, to model the direct eﬀects inheritance and infant mortality on fertility, the death
rate will become part of the population equation. We know from our law of population accu-
mulation that gN = b − d. In a fully stocked territory, where the population is not capable of
improving its labor division and therefore gY = 0, longrun population growth is also zero, i.e.
b = d, or written in growth rates
36 Alter and Clark (2010), p. 57.
37 McKeown (1965), p. 301.
38 We will brieﬂy return to this issue in chapter seven.




) ≈ gdt ⇔ ln bt ≈ ln bt−1 + gdt
By assuming that the birth rate is positively aﬀected by changes in the death rate and with a
delay (to account for the fertility decision), we add this eﬀect stemming from the principle of
generation to the eﬀect of the principle of population depicted in the population equation. To put
it diﬀerently, the growth rate of an exogenous trend in the birth rate simulated in chapter four
is merely exchanged with the growth rate of an exogenous trend in the death rate as follows.39
gyt = α1bt−15 − α2bt + gy15
bt = α3bt−1 + α6dt−1 − α6dt−2 + α4gyt−1
dt = α5dt−1 − h
(5.1)
Table 5.1: Calibration of the system of 5.1
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α0 b0 d0 gy0 gy15 h
see Table 3.1 α0 · 1dt−1 0.4 see Table 3.1 0.0005
The calibration used for the following simulation is given by Table 5.1. As can be seen from
the Table, the coeﬃcient α6 ﬂuctuates with the death rate and might therefore be considered
as timevarying. For a better illustration, the logarithm of the birth rate is further omitted
from this system of equations. As can be seen from Figure 5.4, due to the exact substitution of
the linear exogenous trend in the birth rate with an exogenously diminishing death rate, birth
rate and productivity stay unchanged when compared to the former simulation of chapter four.
However, with the reduction of mortality, the simulation of the death rate is now in line with
the stylized fact of the demographic transition, as can be seen from Figure 5.5. Nonetheless,
population now appears to grow a little too fast compared with our real data series.




dt−1 (dt−1 − dt−2) = α6(dt−1 − dt−2).
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Figure 5.4: A simulation of an exogenous mortality decline in growth rates (birth rate (blue), death rate (red),
GDP per capita growth rate (light green)).
Figure 5.5: A simulation of an exogenous mortality decline in level variables (population (orange), production
(blue) and GDP per capita (green)).
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5.4 Simulation of Indirect Mortality Eﬀects on Fertility
Finally, we have argued that mortality aﬀects fertility indirectly through the income channels
average income eﬀect and sexual selection eﬀect. In this framework, these two eﬀects are
modeled to weaken the operation of the principle of population. If the principle of population had
kept the birth rate on a high level for centuries and was responsible for stagnation, it must have
been outweighed (see last section) or suppressed by some other principle during the nineteenth
and twenthieth centuries. In analogy to the modeling of the direct eﬀects, the coeﬃcient α4 will
be tied to the death rate, reﬂecting the indirect eﬀects, and might as well be considered to be
timevarying. In this case, however, the coeﬃcient will be assumed to shrink as long as the
death rate decreases. Consequently, the introduction of an exogenous trend in the death rate
leads over time to an increase in the eﬀect of the principle of generation and a decrease in the






bt = α3bt−1 +
PoG︷ ︸︸ ︷
α6dt−1 − α6dt−2 + α4
PoP︷ ︸︸ ︷
gyt−1
dt = α5dt−1 − h
(5.2)
Table 5.2: Calibration of the system of 5.2
α1 α2 α3 α5 α6 α4 b0 d0 gy0 gy15 h
see Table 5.1 50 · dt−1 see Table 5.1
With the exception of the coeﬃcient α4, the calibration of the former system of equations re-
mains unchanged (see Table 5.2). The simulation of the complete mechanism of development
is displayed in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. First of all, the general tendency of all series is well in
accordance with the observed stylized facts on economic development. Birth rate and death rate
decrease continuously, production and population display a parallel increase and at the same
time divergence and productivity growth increase, resulting in an exponential increase in pro-
ductivity. Moreover, we will in the next chapter observe that the simulated declining volatility
of growth in productivity is also in line with the empirical data. Consequently, our simulation
of the direct and indirect eﬀects of the great preventive check principle of generation appears
empirically plausible and can account for the escape from the Malthusian trap. Whether the
average real economy is indeed governed by these four classical economic principles will be more
precisely evaluated within the econometric framework of chapter seven and chapter eight. An
overview of the theoretical achievements of Part II of this work is provided by Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.6: An extended simulation of an exogenous mortality decline in growth rates (birth rate (blue), death
rate (red), GDP per capita growth rate (light green)).
Figure 5.7: An extended simulation of an exogenous mortality decline in level variables (population (orange),
production (blue) and GDP per capita (green)).
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Figure 5.8: Theoretical ﬁndings of Part II.
Part III




A Classical Uniﬁed Growth Theory
No plan for social improvement can be complete unless it embrace the means both of in-
creasing the production of wealth and of preventing population from making a proportionate
advance.1
6.1 Two Regimes of Stagnation and Development: The Stylized
Facts Summarized
This chapter intends to unify the regime of economic stagnation and the regime of economic
development in one economic growth model. From our descriptive analysis of economic and
demographic variables from chapter two to chapter ﬁve, the subsequent set of stylized facts is
viewed to be sustained by the British data displayed in the Figures 4.1 and 6.1, representing a
universal global pattern of development.
1. The cycle of misery: During the regime of economic stagnation, population grows propor-
tionally with production (see chapters two and three).
2. The population slowdown: During the regime of economic development, population growth
slows down and becomes inferior to growth in production. This slowdown is fully owed to
a decreasing birth rate (see chapter four).
3. The cross of wealth: During the regime of development, there is some evidence of birth
rates being negatively correlated with productivity: There is no modern economy in which
productivity increased sustainably that has not gone through a demographic slowdown (see
chapter four).
4. The demographic transition: During the transition to growth, there is some evidence of
death rates being positively correlated with birth rates: There is no modern economy in
which a decrease in the birth rate preceded a decrease in the death rate (see chapter ﬁve).
1 Senior (1836), p. 146.
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5. The epidemiological transition: The mortality decline was not initiated by a change in
productivity, but  from an economic point of view  instead exogenously determined
(see chapter ﬁve).
As is depicted in Figure 6.1, we conclude that the three growth variables birth rate, death
rate and productivity growth follow this universal pattern of development. A decrease in death
rates is categorically succeeded by a decrease in birth rates, causing the demographic slowdown,
and a simultaneous rise in productivity growth. Once again, Appendix 11.2 provides numerous
international examples in accordance with these stylized facts.
Figure 6.1: Left graph: British transition to growth: Birth rate (blue), death rate (red) and GDP per capita
(green) 18022007. Right graph: Stylized fact transition to growth.
Sources: GDP: Clark (2009) for 18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010, Vital Rates: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for
18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010.
To summarize the theoretical ﬁndings on the stylized facts, the following causal relationships
are intended to constitute the cornerstones of a uniﬁed growth theory: Firstly, an unrestricted
increase in population (due to a high birth rate) caused economic stagnation. Secondly, a popula-
tion slowdown (due to a decreasing birth rate) was the crucial determinant to allow for a breakout
from economic stagnation, i.e. economic development. Thirdly, the fertility decline is assumed
to have been caused by the mortality decline. Finally, the process of economic development was
ultimately triggered by the epidemiological transition.
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6.2 Simulation of the Classical Uniﬁed Growth Theory:
When Senior (1836) published his treatise An Outline of the Science of Political Economy,
he endeavored to summarize the collected scholarly principles of the time, or, in other words,
the prevailing mainstream theory on economic growth. According to him, there existed common
agreement among classical economists with regard to four elementary principles.2 The deﬁnitions
of the principles described in this work have been based on Senior's classiﬁcation and have been
named the principle of diminishing returns (PoDR), the principle of labor division (PoLD), the
principle of population (PoP) and the principle of generation (PoG). These four principles have
been integrated into an endogenous framework consisting of a theory of production and a theory
of population.
The theory of production has been modeled by the ﬁrst equation of the system in 6.1 displaying
the eﬀects of the birth rate on productivity growth via the PoLD and the PoDR. The theory of
population has been modeled by the second equation of the system and exhibits the eﬀects of
both productivity growth and the death rate on the birth rate, representing the PoP and the PoG
respectively. The last equation can be considered as link between an early regime of economic
stagnation and a late regime of economic development and accounts for a uniﬁed growth theory.
While an initially constantly high death rate allowed for the operation of the Malthusian trap
mechanism, the switch toward a declining death rate induces the escape from the Malthusian trap
as suggested by the classical economists. We may therefore properly term the theory advanced






bt = α3bt−1 +
PoG︷ ︸︸ ︷
α6dt−1 − α6dt−2 + α4
PoP︷ ︸︸ ︷
gyt−1
dt = α5dt−1 − hI
(6.1)
with I = 0 for t = 1, ..., 250 and I = 1 for t = 251, ...350
2 [Presuming] that every man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacriﬁce as possible:
1. That agricultural skill remaining the same, additional labour employed on the land within a given
district produces in general a less proportionate return, or, in other words, that though, with every
increase of the labour bestowed, the aggregate return is increased, the increase of the return is not in
proportion to the increase of the labour. [PoDR]
2. That the powers of labour, and of the other instruments which produce wealth, may be indeﬁnitely
increased by using their products as the means of further production. [PoLD]
3. That the population of the world, or, in other words, the number of persons inhabiting it, is limited
only by moral or physical evil, [PoP]
4. or by fear of a deﬁciency of those articles of wealth which the habits of the individuals of each class of
its inhabitants lead them to require. [PoG]
Senior (1836), p. 139.
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Table 6.1: Calibration of the system of 3.13
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 b0 d0 gy0 gy15 h
1 1 1 50 · dt−1 1 0.4 · 1dt−1 0.035 0.020 0.000 0.025 0.0005
For calibration, coeﬃcients and initial values from the former section are retained and the third
equation is supplemented by an indicator function. The results from the simulation are displayed
in Figure 6.2. The ﬁrst 250 periods of the simulation correspond to the evolution of the regime of
stagnation as it was modeled in form of the Malthusian trap, following a shock in gy15 . The second
part of the simulation ranging over the last 100 periods accounts for the regime of development
and is triggered by the decline in death rates. This decline decisively induces the progressive
operation of the PoG according to the second equation of 6.1. Owing to the direct mortality
eﬀects, the birth rate eventually declines even more rapidly than the death rate. In the case
of the indirect eﬀects, the shortrun conversion of productivity into births owing to the PoP
decreases in magnitude. The potential for economic growth is triggered by the fact that birth
cohort size decreases over time. If the term α2bt was larger than α1bt−15, the negative eﬀect
of the PoDR due to an evergrowing population outweighed the positive longrun eﬀect owed
to the PoLD. However, as long as the ratio α1bt−15 > α2bt , i.e. the birth rate declines over
the course of one generation as is observed in Figure 6.2 after period 250, the ratio between
unproductive and productive individuals abates as well. In this case, the productivity gains
from labor division outperform the losses from diminishing returns. This simulation aﬀords a
conﬁrmation of the suspected regimes of stagnation and development matching the stylized facts,
furnishing the classical (uniﬁed) growth theory with a consistent mathematical framework. In
the following two chapters, we will evaluate in how far this system of equations is conﬁrmed
empirically. To this end, we will estimate the shortrun relationships suggested by the theory of
population using a vectorautoregression on the complete system 6.1 in chapter seven. Eventually,
the longrun relationship between production growth and birth rate will be estimated in chapter
eight by employing simple OLSregressions to the ﬁrst equation of system 6.1 only.
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Figure 6.2: A simulation of classical uniﬁed growth theory in growth rates (birth rate (blue), death rate (red),
GDP per capita growth rate (light green)).
Figure 6.3: A simulation of classical uniﬁed growth theory in level variables (population (orange), production
(blue) and GDP per capita (green)).
Chapter 7




Since the emergence of classical political economy, economists have tried to make sense of the
apparent link between demographic and economic variables observed in the stylized facts. In
attempting to verify the four classical principles empirically, statisticans face the diﬃculties
of deﬁcient preindustrial data and endogeneity between demographic and economic variables.
Regarding the data, with the construction of Wrigley and Schoﬁeld's (1981) preindustrial time
series on birth rates and death rates, quantitative studies were able to yield evidence of falsiﬁable
hypotheses for the British case, although Clark's data used here on preindustrial GDP per capita
are  as we have seen  still debated. Moreover, in search of an overarching uniﬁed growth
theory formed by universal principles, it is essential to compare the existence of the principles
internationally. Mitchell's international historical statistics arguably provide the longest and
most comprehensive oﬃcial national series on vital rates and GDP per capita.1 This historical
database, partly corrected by the author to eliminate some obvious typing errors, will be made
use of in this chapter.2
7.1.2 Vectorautoregression
For dealing with endogeneity, the author regards time series analysis as being the most appro-
priate tool. Lee (1981) was the ﬁrst author to evaluate the relationship between vital rates and
economic variables by employing distributed lag regressions on Wrigley and Schoﬁeld's dataset.
Eckstein et al. (1986) were one the ﬁrst to test economic hypotheses using a VAR model. Using
1 Since population is an internationally relatively immobile factor of production, an estimation on the country
level is expected to yield signiﬁcant results.
2 The adjusted data can be found on the attached data media.
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a Vectorautoregressive (VAR) model allows for solving the problem of endogeneity by treat-
ing all variables as endogenous.3 However, a VAR model must be applied with care, as its form
strongly depends on the underlying theoretical foundation. Nicolini (2007) reﬁned Lee's approach
by using a VAR model and illustrating impulse response functions that allowed assessment of
the qualitative relationships between the three variables. Building on the VAR and developing
a more complex methodology, Herzer et al. (2012) employed a Vector error correction (VEC)
model to account for possible cointegration between the variables, while Rathke and Sarferaz
(2014) introduced time-varying coeﬃcients.
This paper will retain the traditional VAR approach, since it is most arguably the easiest and
most transparent estimation, as it mainly requires the knowledge of simple OLS estimation.
The idea of the VAR approach is to recover the relevant coeﬃcients from an OLS regression
of contemporary values on lagged values of the variables and to use the recorded parameters to
project the average impact of an exogenous shock in one of the variables over time. The obtained
impulse response functions are expected to conform to the classical principles as formulated in
chapter three. However, for the linear system to qualify as a VAR representation, some further
reservations will be made in the following. To evaluate the principles in question, the system
































To apply the VAR approach consistently, the presumed real relationships are expected to be
linear. While the estimations of Lee, Nicolini, Herzer et al. and Rathke and Sarferaz were
usually based on the usage of a level variable of real wages or real GDP per capita, they will
in this case be replaced with growth rates of real GDP per capita, since the major part of
the true relationships between the variables of our system becomes linear only when employing
growth rates as has been justiﬁed in the theoretical parts of his work. Moreover, as growth rates
display the same internationally valid unit of measurement, the principles may be simultaneously
estimated across countries. Thirdly, instead of level variables, growth rates are most arguably
stationary, which is required to avoid spurious autoregressions when not speciﬁcally accounting
for cointegration.
7.1.3 Stationarity of the variables
An OLS estimation over time requires at least some of the data series to be stationary, as
integrated or trended variables will almost certainly give spurious results. Since the British data
provide the longest national time series available, ranging from the year 1541 to 2010, tests on
the order of integration as well as the tests for lag selection will be representatively conducted
on this sample. The annual data on which the VAR model will be based are displayed in Figure
7.2.4
3 See, for example, Lee and Anderson (2002) and Crafts and Mills (2009).
4 GDP per capita growth is divided by ten for better visualization.
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Figure 7.1: Britain: Time series on birth rate, death rate, GDP per capita growth 15412010. Sources: Clark
(2009), Mitchell (2013), Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981).
Sources: GDP: Clark (2009) for 15411871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010, Vital Rates: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for
15411871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010.
In the case of GDP per capita growth, the results from running Augmented DickeyFuller tests
on nonstationarity seem to unequivocally indicate stationarity of the variable (see Table 7.1),
while the application of the same test to death rate and particularly to birth rate does not always
reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity on a 1% level (see Table 7.1). Indeed, the pattern
of birth rate and death rate has led to a debate on their order of integration.
Table 7.1: Unit root tests on the relevant variables.
Augmented DickeyFuller test for unit root Number of obs = 468
1% Crit. Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat.
model Value GDP pc gr Birth Rate Death Rate Pop growth
2 lags, no constant -2.580 -16.737*** -1.235 -1.451 -3.747***
2 lags, constant -3.443 -17.460*** -0.941 -3.539*** -6.303***
2 lags, linear trend -3.981 -17.620*** -1.682 -5.925*** -6.304***
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level
Firstly, following Nicolini (2007), vital rates could be treated as stationary variables, as their
values represent (population) growth rates and are by deﬁnition restricted to lie within the range
(0,1). Besides, despite vital rates displaying high persistence, it seems implausible to believe that
they have ever exceeded a certain maximum value, say ten percent, or that they have fallen below
a minimum value, say zero, in the long run. Accordingly, they cannot in reality follow a random
walk or a trend and the assumption 0 < α1, α3 < 1 should hold. Nevertheless, stationarity
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of these two variables might be questioned by having found evidence of the variable natural
population growth rate being stationary on a one percent level. As the latter is by deﬁnition
a linear combination of birth rate and death rate, there is strong indication for the vital rates
being cointegrated.5 However, as was pointed out by Fanchon and Wendel,
VAR models can be estimated with data on stationary and non-stationary variables
if the non-stationary data is also cointegrated because recent theoretical work proves that
estimation with such data will yield consistent parameter estimates.6
Thirdly, as was suggested by Sims (1980), if we are more interested in the nature of relationships
between variables with the end purpose being estimation of the impulse response functions to
capture the dynamic responses and less interested in point estimates, estimating a VAR with
non-stationary variables can give us important insights into their relationships. Accordingly, the
question of the order of integration of the vital rates does not pose problems with regard to a
consistent estimation of a VAR model.
7.1.4 Lag order selection
In the foregoing simulation, the beneﬁts from the division of labor were strongly simpliﬁed.
However, there are at least two important reasons complicating their measurement in empirical
analyses. Firstly, since we will employ national data without accounting for an international
labor division, the eﬀects of foreign population growth on domestic output are not captured
in the regression. Since external trade shocks might be suspected to cause a major part of
the strong ﬂuctuations of GDP per capita data as shown in Figure 7.1, this eﬀect should not
be underestimated. Secondly, to roughly illustrate the positive delayed eﬀect of births on the
extent of the division of labor, a lag of ﬁfteen years was employed in the simulation. For all
real applications, the exact timing of an average individual entering the division of labor cannot
be suﬃciently determined, much less the resulting beneﬁts, which are arguably spread over the
subsequent lifetime. It is assumed that a VAR model is too costly in terms of parameters
to be able to properly estimate the eﬀect of the PoLD, which is why the ﬁfteenth lag will be
eliminated from estimation. This issue will be dealt with in chapter eight. Vice versa, omission
of the ﬁfteenth lag greatly increases the number of degrees of freedom, which is particularly
valuable when using small sample sizes.
Nevertheless, it is advisable to include a third lag by which the additional information stemming
from the PoLD, stored in the remaining error terms, might be captured. The use of a VAR(3)
model is supported by running a series of lagselection tests on the British data, as the most
parsimonious model is suggested by the SchwarzBayesian information criterion to use three lags
(see Table C1 in Appendix 11.3). With regard to a delayed fertility decision when accounting for
the PoG and the PoP, a lag of three years appears plausible as well, whereas every additional lag
5 Using a VEC model speciﬁcation similar to that of Herzer et al. (2012), explicitly accounting for the cointe-
grated variables birth rate and death rate, or estimating a restricted structural VAR model do not yield very
diﬀerent results.
6 Fanchon and Wendel (1992).
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may unnecessarily increase the number of parameters to estimate. Replacement of the ﬁfteenth
















where the trend h employed in the simulation has been excluded, since it is supposed to be
empirically captured by Φ1.
7.1.5 Ordering of the variables
The estimation of an unrestricted VAR model of the above system of equations is complicated
by its inclusion of contemporaneous eﬀects required to measure the PoDR and other possible
immediate eﬀects. To analyze the interactions between annual demographic and economic vari-





where the vector Yt contains the contemporary values of the endogenous variables, each of which
depends on its own lagged values and on contemporaneous and lagged values of the other vari-
ables. Aj are the coeﬃcient matrices of the lagged values. The components of the residuals ut
are supposed to be uncorrelated, i.e. clean of those contemporaneous eﬀects that are already
included in the coeﬃcient matrix A0 (orthogonalized residuals). Multiplying both sides by A
−1
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 I if t = τ0 otherwise






 Σ if t = τ0 otherwise
where consistent estimators of Σ and the Φj 's are easily obtained by running OLS regressions
equation by equation.
Additionally, estimation of A−10 is necessary to recover the contemporaneous response of the
variables to orthogonalized shocks. However, as this requires estimation of an additional number
of parameters, the system is not identiﬁed. A suﬃcient condition to reduce the amount of
parameters is to restrict the VAR model by imposing lower triangularity of the matrix A−10
from using a Cholesky decomposition Σ = A−10 A
−1′
0 . Multiplying the residuals by a lower
triangular matrix implies that, given a particular ordering inside the vector Yt, each variable is
allowed to react within the current period to a shock in any of the variables of a higher ordering,
while it is completely unresponsive to shocks in variables that are lower in the ordering. In this
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context, yearly demographic variables seem to ﬁt the framework almost ideally as it can be clearly
distinguished between contemporaneous and lagged eﬀects. In the last chapters it was argued
that childbirth rarely takes place in the same year as the fertility decision, in particular due to a
pregnancy lag. Since this natural lag prevents it from being contemporaneously eﬀected by death
rate and GDP per capita, birth rate is the only plausible candidate to be the ﬁrst variable in the
vector Yt. Furthermore, the death rate is placed as second variable to preserve the possibility of
contemporaneous eﬀects of GDP per capita growth on moratlity by an extended operation of the
PoDR and the PoLD, which have so far been assumed to merely operate through the birth rate
only. Finally, it is assumed that a change in GDP per capita does not aﬀect the death rate in
the same year, while a delayed negative eﬀect retains the possibility of an endogenized mortality,



















7.1.6 Impulse response analysis
To ﬁnd evidence for the classical growth model, the suggested linear relations should be approx-
imately recovered by applying impulse response analysis to the above restricted VAR(3) model.
To this end, nine orthogonalized impulse response functions are computed by shocking the error
terms of each variable's equation by one standard deviation. The initial shock instantly aﬀects
the assigned contemporaneous variables and subsequently propagates through the system. Since
childbirth is, as a response to shocks in death rate and GDP per capita growth, most arguably
spread over a number of years, it is reasonable to expect accumulated orthogonalized impulse
response functions to yield more pronounced and signiﬁcant eﬀects. On the other hand, as the
period in question should not exceed the short term, a time horizon of more than ﬁve years
seems inappropriate, granting that the fertility decision is usually made after four periods and
that a longer horizon will not provide additional information. To test for signiﬁcant eﬀects, two
hundred bootstrap replications are used to generate 95% conﬁdence intervals. The size of the
shocks will be given by the standard deviation of the corresponding variables.
If the considerations made in chapter three are correct, the causal relationships given by the
estimated cumulative orthogonalized impulse response functions (coirfs) following a shock in the
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where (+)1 is expected to display the positive average eﬀect of the PoG and (+)2 to capture
the positive average eﬀects of the PoP. (−)3 is supposed to reﬂect the negative eﬀect of the
PoDR. This relation exists by deﬁnition and the eﬀect will be observed as long as it is not
outweighed by the impact of the PoLD. As was mentioned, (+)4 will not be captured suﬃciently
well to account for the positive eﬀect of the PoLD and its presence even poses a threat to a clear
identiﬁcation of the PoDR. Consequently, since PoDR and PoLD may not be clearly identiﬁable
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within the VAR(3) framework, their existence can certainly not be falsiﬁed in this framework.
Therefore, the subsequent investigation will focus on the evaluation of the hypotheses of the
PoG and the PoP, the classical theory of population. The existence of the PoLD and the PoDR
will be conjointly estimated in the next chapter by applying on OLS estimation to equation 3.6
Persistence eﬀects are expected to be measured for the variables birth rate and death rate, much
less for GDP per capita growth. The remaining three impulse response functions denoted (x)
will also be estimated to capture further potential eﬀects by which the classical model might be
extended ex post. The resulting impulse responses should be interpreted with care, as the eﬀects
of the PoG and the PoP are supposed to be timevarying, whereas the estimation can merely
give average results over the whole period in question.
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7.2 Estimation Results
7.2.1 Estimation of the simulation
As a very useful reference point, it is advisable to ﬁrst run a VAR(3) estimation on the above
simulation given by Figure 6.2, i.e. on the system 6.1 using the corresponding calibration.7
The coirfs resulting from this estimation are expected to deliver a benchmark against which the
ensuing real samples might be compared. The universal average eﬀect of the PoG seems well
exposed in the upper central graph of Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Simulating the classical growth model: Coirf matrix based on a VAR(3) model.
Likewise, the average eﬀect of the PoP appears quite nicely depicted in the upper right graph.
Both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant, with the PoG on a ﬁve percent level and the PoP on a
one percent level. As suggested, the positive lagged eﬀect of the PoLD of birth rate on GDP
per capita growth after one generation cannot be captured in the bottom left graph, when
using a maximum lag length of three. Instead, the contemporaneus annual eﬀect of the PoDR is
signiﬁcantly displayed in the same graph at period zero, since it is not distorted in this simulation
by a permanently operating eﬀect of the PoLD.
7 To provide some additional variation on the variable death rate, the right hand side of the second diﬀerence
equation of eq. (4) is supplemented by adding an annual shock t ∼ U(−0.005, 0.005).
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7.2.2 Britain 15412010
The computed coirfs from running the VAR(3) model on the British data are displayed in Figure
7.3. The eﬀect stemming from the PoP is roughly in line with that of the simulated model. The
reaction of birth rate to a shock in GDP per capita growth is already positive and signiﬁcant on
a one percent level in the ﬁrst period, indicating a quick fertility adjustment, and accumulates
in magnitude over the subsequent periods. With regard to the PoG, a death rate shock does not
induce birth rate to react after one period. After four years, however, the positive eﬀect becomes
statistically signiﬁcant on a ﬁve percent level, providing evidence of a positive causal relationship
and pointing to a lagged fertility decision.8
Figure 7.3: Britain 15412010: Coirf matrix based on a VAR(3) model.
Although the eﬀect of the PoDR is signiﬁcantly measured in year zero after a shock in birth
rate, the subsequently displayed response until year ﬁve might have been distorted by the PoLD.
While in the simulated impulse response the negative contemporaneous eﬀect of the PoDR seems
to have accumulated over the subsequent periods, this accumulation is neutralized in the British
sample, suggesting that a positive (potentially long-run) eﬀect of birth rate on GDP per capita
growth has been captured by additional residual correlation.
8 In the simulation of chapter three, a lag of one year was used. However, this assumption can be easily relaxed
by assuming a fertility lag of up to four years.
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7.2.3 Stacked model using international data
Mitchell's international historical statistics oﬀer data on vital rates and GDP per capita for
94 economies. Out of these, 55 economies exhibit simultaneous data on the three variables
over at least three consecutive years. However, with an average number of approximately 70
observations, the impulse responses of most of these 55 eligible countries can, when individually
tested, not be expected to give suﬃciently reliable evidence of the classical model. On the other
hand, if they could be estimated collectively, the number of observations would rise to 3,911. For
that purpose, the individual countrylevel data are stacked into one sample, leaving space for
three missing values between subsamples such that the last observation of the preceding and
the ﬁrst observation of the succeeding country are not related to each other.
Figure 7.4: 55 economies 18152010: Coirf matrix based on a VAR(3) model.
The resulting coirfs displayed in Figure 7.4 match those of Figure 7.3 relatively well. However, as
the stacked sample includes observations between the years 1815 and 2010 only, while the English
sample ranges from the year 1541 to 2010, the former is suspected to mainly include information
on the regime of economic developement. It is therefore not surprising that the eﬀect of the
PoG is remarkably pronounced compared to the British model, while that of the PoP is smaller
in magnitude, suggesting time-varying eﬀects. Moreover, the higher persistence in the variable
GDP per capita growth rate is in line with the suggestion that its mean was close to zero during
the regime of stagnation and increased sustainably during the regime of development. However,
as in the British sample, it remains puzzling why the fertility decision seems to be lagged by an
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additional year in the case of the PoG as compared to the eﬀect of the PoP. Finally, in contrast to
the simulation where we have merely employed the eﬀect of one cohort on the subsequent GDP
per capita growth, the eﬀect of the PoDR seems to have been neutralized by the PoLD such that
no signiﬁcant eﬀects can be observed. In any case, both analyses of the British historical data
as well as of the more recent international data record qualitative and quantitative evidence of
a universal pattern of birth rates, death rates and GDP per capita growth and strong support
for the universality of the PoG and the PoP.
7.3 Robustness Checks
7.3.1 Alternative British dataset
In the following, robustness checks are conducted with respect to alternative data, logged vari-
ables, alternative orderings of the variables, countryspeciﬁc estimations and the hypothesis of
timevarying coeﬃcients. Firstly, since Clark's macroeconomic aggregates for Britain have not
been fully accepted by many economic historians, the VAR(3) model will also be applied to the
Broadberry et al. dataset of GDP per capita. The resulting coirfmatrix displayed in Appendix
11.3 yields a very similar pattern to the matrix using the Clark dataset. Likewise, the eﬀects of
the PoG and the PoP are signiﬁcant after four periods, while the immediate eﬀect of the PoDR
and the lagged eﬀect of the PoLD cannot be identiﬁed. Although, therefore, the Broadberry et
al. data suggest no stagnation during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, they conﬁrm the
observability of the classical (Malthusian) theory of population as well.
7.3.2 Using logged birth rates
Furthermore, in the theory of production it has been argued that there exists an exponential
relationship  instead of the linear relationship employed in our simulations  between birth rate
and GDP per capita growth. This feature can be accounted for by replacing the absolute value
of the birth rate with the logged birth rate and estimate the VAR(3) model on the British data
as well as on the international stacked data again, based on this new variable. As is shown in
Appendix 11.3, this reestimation does not greatly change the above results, as the PoG and
PoP remain well observable even when using logged birth rates.
7.3.3 Using an alternative variable ordering
Thirdly, we evaluate the impact of a diﬀerent variable ordering on the PoG and the PoP. The
resulting coirfs are again displayed in Appendix 11.3.







), the coirfs from the corresponding autoregressions remain relatively
unchanged. Accordingly, it does not play a large role, whether GDP per capita growth is allowed
to aﬀect the birth rate in the same year, since the correlation (the contemporaneous eﬀect)
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between the two variables is in any case very small. However, when making use of the possibility
that the death rate is allowed to aﬀect the birth rate contemporaneously, as is shown in the graphs









), the eﬀect of the PoG can no longer
be identiﬁed. Although the eﬀect of the PoP is well in place, a strong negative (contemporaneous)
correlation between birth rate and death rate outweighs the PoG. Consequently, we argue that
the original ordering with the birth rate as ﬁrst variable and the death rate as second variable is
valid and crucial in measuring the PoG.
7.3.4 Estimation on a Country-level
Fourthly, the robustness of the PoG and the PoP will be checked on a countrylevel. Since the
number of parameters of the above VAR(3) model amounts to 36 when including a vector of
intercepts, it does not seem reasonable to evaluate economies with less than seventy observations
on death rate, birth rate and GDP per capita growth rate. For this reason, merely all available
countrylevel time series providing at least seventy observations on the three variables are em-
ployed for empirical evaluation. The remaining twenty countries, including Britain, are listed in
Appendix 11.3. Following the above estimation procedure, it should be kept in mind that the
resulting coirfs are naturally suspected to be less signiﬁcant due to the smaller sample sizes. The
correspondingly estimated coeﬃcients of the PoG and the PoP after four years are displayed in
Table 7.2, also including the two above British cases for comparison.
Astonishingly, in spite of the small sample sizes and with the exception of Denmark, each of
the 19 economies display a positive coeﬃcient in the case of the PoG as well as for the eﬀect
of the PoP in addition to the signiﬁcant ﬁndings in the British cases. What is more, 17 out of
40 tests (excluding the British data by Broadberry et al.) display signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. These
results suggest that even very small samples may be capable of providing evidence for the two
principles sustaining our conclusions from the stacked model. For a more detailed examination
of the stability of the eﬀects, the national coirfs with ﬁveyear time horizon are also displayed
in Appendix 11.3.
7.3.5 Time-varying eﬀects
Finally, when accounting for the time-varying eﬀects of the PoG and the PoP, the classical theory
of population suggests that the PoG grows stronger whereas the PoP grows weaker during the
transition to growth. Again following Nicolini (2007), a straightforward way to measure the
evolution of the corresponding eﬀects on the birth rate, which are supposed to increasingly
respond to the declining level of the death rate, is to split up the British sample into an early
period of economic stagnation and high mortality and a late period of economic growth and
low mortality and to compare the respective coirfs. As, in accordance with the stylized facts,
the growth take-oﬀ corresponds to the fertility decline, 1815 is chosen as the cutoﬀ year, as it
exhibits the maximum value and a structural break for birth rates. However, with the ﬁrst sample
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Table 7.2: Cumulative orthogonalized impulse response of b in % 4 periods after a one standard
deviation shock in d and gy. All 20 countries with more than 70 observations are displayed.
Principle of Population Great preventive Check
country gy → b(4) d→ b(4) obs
arg 0.039 0.018 97
au 0.018 0.077** 75
aus 0.035 0.115*** 133
can 0.052 0.039 100
chil 0.097 0.064 99
den -0.027 0.075*** 179
ﬁn 0.051 0.172*** 147
fra 0.076*** 0.059*** 182
ger 0.148*** 0.089*** 122
hun 0.161*** 0.038 72
ita 0.057 0.035 102
jap 0.005 0.066* 109
net 0.015 0.067** 91
nor 0.008 0.077*** 128
nz 0.013 0.024 76
rom 0.034 0.043 79
spa 0.074** 0.003 91
swe 0.053 0.108*** 146
swi 0.017 0.047** 78
ukc 0.146*** 0.060** 467
ukb 0.092*** 0.060*** 467
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.
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employing 271 observations and the second sample using 192 observations only, the outcome can
again merely be considered as indicative evidence.
Figure 7.5: Britain: The evolution of PoG, PoP, PoDR and positive checks. Upper sample 15411815. Lower
sample 18152010.
Figure 7.5 illustrates the evolution of the PoG and the PoP respectively from left to right. In the
upper row, coirfs are given for the timespan 15411815, the bottom row displaying responses for
the period 18152010. First, the eﬀect attributed to the PoG grows in size and signiﬁcance over
time, suggesting an increasing direct mortality eﬀect as is predicted from the theory. Secondly,
the impact of the PoP sharply decreases over time. While indicating a strongly positive conversion
rate of GDP per capita growth into birth rate in the early sample, the eﬀect seems to entirely
disappear in the later period. This diminishing income eﬀect is in line with the increasing
operation of indirect mortality eﬀects. However, as it seems implausible to argue that the eﬀect
of the PoP completely vanished after 1815, the extremely low values of the coirf might be owed
to distortions resulting from the small sample size. Thirdly, the relatively unchanged coirf that is
supposed to capture the constant eﬀects of the PoDR and the PoLD substantiates the theoretical
predictions and sustains the robustness of the estimation method.
7.4 A Critical Note on the Prevailing Measurement of Preventive
Checks in Cliometrics
Lastly, having found evidence of the existence of the shortrun mechanisms suggested by clas-
sical growth theory, an additional coirf will be brieﬂy interpreted, as it is regularly used in the
prevailing empirical literature. The eﬀect that might be important to consider arises from the
statistically signiﬁcant negative lagged response of death rate to changes in GDP per capita
growth as is illustrated by the respective central right coirfs of Figures 7.3 and 7.4. So far,
exogeneity of the death rate has been assumed to trigger the epidemiological transition. As
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a shortterm relation, however, GDP per capita growth seems to have aﬀected mortality even
before the epidemiological transition, since this eﬀect can be found to prevail in the early English
data sample (see Figure 7.5, upper right graph) and to wear oﬀ in the late sample (see Figure
7.5, lower right graph).
Some authors (Nicolini 2007; Crafts and Mills 2009; Pﬁster and Fertig 2010; Fernihough 2012;
Herzer et al. 2012; Moller and Sharp 2014; Rathke and Sarferaz 2014; Edvinsson 2017) have
argued in favor of complementing Malthusian eﬀects in the sense that higher productivity not
only enhances fertility, but at the same time operates towards lower mortality. These authors
regard the statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of GDP per capita growth on birth rate 
corresponding to the eﬀect of the PoP in this work  as evidence of preventive checks in
general, which are not to be confused with the PoG. Accordingly, if income was observed to
raise births on average, it is a sign that reproduction has formerly been suppressed by preventive
fertility behavior. Equally, they hold the apparent negative causal relationship between GDP
per capita and death rate to universally reﬂect positive checks. Their idea is that whenever
living standards would fall below a subsistence level, the positive checks are supposed to increase
the death rate as a general result of individuals heavily competing for the remaining resources.
This eﬀect deserves attention and could be added to the simulation to complement the mechanism
of stagnation by providing another channel of population growth. In this paper, the modeling
of the eﬀect of conventional positive checks has been disregarded for two reasons. Firstly, it
does not provide explanatory power for the mechanism of growth, since the positive checks are
thought to disappear at the same time as GDP per capita rose above subsistence level. When
modeling and evaluating the growth regime, it is regarded to be suﬃcient to focus on the steady
decline of fertility as the crucial factor contributing to the population slowdown inducing the
breakout from stagnation. Secondly and more importantly, the current conventional cliometric
interpretation of preventive and positive checks is at odds with Malthus' deﬁnition that
the preventive check is perhaps best measured by the smallness of the proportion of yearly
births to the whole population,9
i.e. by the level of the birth rate and that
the positive checks to population [. . . ] include every cause [. . . ] which in any degree con-
tributes to shorten the natural duration of life,10
which are best measured by the level of the death rate. Consequently, the preventive checks
ought not to be measured by the causal relationship running from GDP per capita to fertility,
which is reserved for the PoP. Instead, it might be very generally concluded that a low birth rate
is a sign of the operation of preventive checks, whereas a high death rate reveals the operation of
positive checks. Naturally, this implies an important Malthusian insight that has already been
hinted at  that the regime of stagnation is characterized by high mortality and the regime of
development by low fertility.
9 Malthus (1826), book II, chapter XI.
10 Malthus (1826), book I, chapter II.
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7.5 Concluding Remarks on the Empirics of the Theory of Pop-
ulation
Since it was considered insuﬃcient to construct a model that merely ﬁts the stylized historical
facts of stagnation and growth, the operation of the classical principles has in this chapter been
evaluated collectively to avoid the reasonable impression of reverse engineering in our simula-
tions. To this end, a simple VAR estimation provided a way to establish evidence of the suggested
classical shortrun relationships by employing orthogonalized cumulative impulse response func-
tions derived from two historical samples, based on approximately 4,500 observations of annual
national data on birth rate, death rate and GDP per capita growth. In those cases, in which the
principles were a priori supposed to be measurable, in particular for the PoG and the PoP, the
impulse responses yielded strong support for the theory. Additional robustness tests conducted
with regard to countryspeciﬁc eﬀects and timevarying coeﬃcients were generally in line with
the classical principles. Also, it has been suggested that recent publications might require recon-
sideration regarding the use of positive checks and preventive checks, as they seem to be at
odds with Malthus' original terminology. Notwithstanding the empirical validation of the PoG
and the PoP, an important shortcoming of this work lies in the omission of the eﬀects to be
observed from the principle of diminishing returns and the principle of labor division. Until they
can be measured, the classical uniﬁed growth model cannot be said to have been fully conﬁrmed
by the data. We will therefore now turn closer to the ﬁrst equation of system 6.1. For future
research, the most obvious extension of the classical uniﬁed growth model that has already been
hinted at, would be to endogenize mortality. Here, it might be advisable to model a linear eﬀect
of a logged variable GDP per capita growth on death rate to account for an increasing diﬃculty
to generate a higher life expectancy.
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In section 7.1 it was stated that a VAR(3) model is not able to capture the eﬀects from the
PoLD, since this principle can only be observed over a longer time frame than the suggested four
years. In our simulations we have assumed that a larger birth rate will induce the corresponding
cohort to increase GDP per capita only at one point in time  exactly ﬁfteen years after they
have entered the labor market. However, when trying to measure the operation of the PoLD in
reality, we have to take the following two problems into account. Firstly, every individual tends
to generate increasing per capita growth not only during the ﬁrst year of his working life, but over
his complete lifetime due to the accumulation of human and physical capital. This means that the
positive eﬀect of population growth on GDP per capita is spread over the lifespan of the newborn
individuals, which may even require the use of up to one hundred lags for empirical investigations.
Secondly, the PoDR operates at the same time continuously to mitigate the increase in GDP
per capita. Consequently, the eﬀects of these two principles  the positive and the negative
eﬀects of population growth on GDP per capita growth  are constantly intermingled in all our
employed data. While we have seen that diminishing returns were signiﬁcantly measured by the
corresponding coirf of the simulation (left bottom graph of Figure 7.2), this eﬀect could not be
found in the stacked data sample (see left bottom graphs of Figure 7.4). Due to the inability of
the VARapproach to estimate longrun relationships (which would require an enormous sample
size to account for an enormous amount of parameters), we will in the following employ a simple
growth regression approach to evaluate the neoclassical theory of production by measuring the
PoLD and PoDR conjointly.
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8.1 Methodology
To support the advanced theory of production, the subsequent empirical exercise will focus on










and proceed as follows. To account for an appropriate j−value, we will in the following the-
oretically justify a presumed time span between steady states. To ﬁnd evidence of a causal
relationship of birth rate on GDP per capita growth, we will recover the remaining parameter
γ by estimating the expression γ1−γ . Based on the assumption of constant returns to scale and
indicating the supposed negative longrun eﬀect of a change in the birth rate on productivity,
the estimated value of the parameter γ is expected to lie within the range (0, 1). As a reference
point, Cobb and Douglas (1928) estimated the production elasticity of capital of the (original)
labor model to be α ≈ 0.25. More recently, Mankiw et al.'s (1992) estimations suggested a
parameter value α ≈ 0.33 and most conventional calibrations assume a production elasticity of
capital within the range (0.25, 0.33). Nonetheless, when withdrawing the variable human capital
from the variable labor and adding it to the variable physical capital while treating the remaining
unskilled labor as population, Mankiw et al.'s estimator rises to α ≡ γ ≈ 0.66. Such an esti-
mator would suggest a much higher exponent γ1−γ in equation 3.6 and correspondingly a larger
leverage eﬀect of changes in the birth rate on GDP per capita. In fact, if the following estimation
conﬁrms the conjecture that γ ≈ 0.66, population growth must be considered to have a much
greater impact on economic development than is usually suspected.
Ideally, once we have estimated a consistent parameter value, we can conﬁrm or reject the time
frame presumption for j. To regress equation 3.6, we will employ the usual ordinary bivariate
least squares (OLS) method. Due to the fact that the OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased
estimator (BLUE), equation 3.6 will be linearized by taking logs of both ratios, yielding the
approximate growth of GDP per capita as explained variable and the inverted approximate
growth of birth rate as explanatory variable (see equation 8.1).1 OLS estimation is in this case
a valid approach, since the variable birth rate is viewed as the (independent) source of all value
in GDP per capita. This also implies that the additional use of an intercept or ﬁxed eﬀects to











with β = − γ
1− γ < 0. (8.1)
However, when regressing equation 8.1 it must be noted that an ideal determination of β would
only be realized under a comparison of the two steady states y∗t and y∗t−j . Since the transition
from one steady state to another might take a certain number of years after a shock in the variable
birth rate has occured, we have to account for this transitional period by using an appropriate
value for j. Although the birth rate is expected to aﬀect productivity immediately negatively
1 For an alternative methodology including a measurement of convergence see Mankiw et al. (1992).
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through bt, its positive eﬀect of labor division is realized with a lifetimedelay through bt−j . To
account for the latter eﬀect, it has been stated that a newborn cohort will raise productivity
only after it has generated the ability of unskilled labor with a maturity lag of one generation
of φ years, and it seems plausible to continue to assume a period of at least15 years. In addition,
broad capital accumulation by way of dexterity and the invention of machines will be assumed
to take place over the whole working life of a cohort, i.e. we add a maximum amount of ψ ≈ 50
years.2 Thus, since the above combined gains are probably fully achieved after j = φ+ ψ years,
we assume a maximum accumulation period of j ≈ 65 years to account for the transition between
steady states. Consequently, ideal results from an OLS estimation can only be expected if we
could employ time series of GDP per capita and birth rate over a time horizon of 2j ≈ 130
years where the birth rate stays constant for the ﬁrst j years, changing abruptly to another level
(treatment) and remaining constant on the new level for another j years, as is exempliﬁed in
Figure 8.1. After the birth rate has changed, GDP per capita is predicted to react positively
over the latter period (treatment eﬀect).
Figure 8.1: Illustration of two time series required for an ideal estimation of equation (11).
2 For a more extensive lag model, see e.g. Becker and Murphy (1992) or Liso et al. (2001).
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8.2 Estimation of γ and j
8.2.1 Estimation of γ
Firstly, to get an idea about the global empirical relationship between birth rate and GDP per
capita, available aggregate data series provided by the World Bank are displayed in Appendix
11.4. Here, we observe a relatively steady decline of the birth rate as well as a parallel rise
in GDP per capita over the period 19602014. The corresponding calculation of the aggregate
parameter yields βg = −2.0 (see column (1) of Table 8.1) and we conclude that an average birth
rate reduction by 1% is connected with an average rise of GDP per capita by about 2%. Secondly,
using country-level data, we ﬁnd that the birth rate decreased during the period 19602014 in
each of the 104 available series (see Appendix 11.4 for a list of countries studied).
Figure 8.2: Scatterplot of 104 countries comparing (negative) growth of birth rates (xaxis) and growth of GDP
per capita (yaxis) between 1960 and 2014.
Source: World Bank (2018).
Consequently, we would tend to expect a rise in GDP per capita in every country at least
until the year 2014, which we will thus use as reference year to represent the terminal steady
state y∗t . To ﬁnd evidence for the expected relationship, we ﬁrst plot the dependent variable
(productivity growth) against the independent variable (inverted growth of birth rate) over the
complete 55year period for all 104 countries with available data (see Figure 8.2) and then











for i = country 1, .., country 104 (8.2)
The results are displayed in column (2) of Table 8.1. The Rsquared of 0.698 indicates that the
greater part of the variation in GDP per capita is explained by the variation in the birth rate.
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The absolute magnitude of the coeﬃcient is somewhat smaller than the aggregate coeﬃcient in
column (1), which is certainly at least partly due to the fact that the OLS approach does not
weigh countries according to their population size.3 Nonetheless, since the coeﬃcient is highly
signiﬁcant, we have found some evidence of the true parameter β lying approximately within the
range [−2.02,−1.56] over the observed time span 19602014. However, since the above theory
maintains that a change of the birth rate aﬀects GDP per capita over the following j ≈ 65 years,
a calculation employing a time horizon of merely 55 years may underestimate the magnitude of
the aggregate coeﬃcient, suggesting a somewhat higher true value.
Consequently, in order to extend the maximum time span for j toward 65, we turn again to the
Mitchell (2013) database and estimate the corresponding coeﬃcient for a sample including all 34
countries providing data on GDP per capita and birth rate for the year 1949 as well as the year
2014 (column (3) of Table 8.1). The greater magnitude of this long-run coeﬃcient as well as
the higher R-squared seem to conﬁrm our expectation with regard to the time horizon.



























-2.02 -1.56*** -2.19*** -2.16***
(.100) (.134) (0.178)
R² 0.70 0.79 0.94
t 1960 1960 1949 1901
# i 1a 104
a
34b 10b
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sources: a=World Bank aggr. global data (2018), b=Mitchell (2013)
8.2.2 Estimation of j
To show that the true parameter j actually centers around 65 years, we will employ the World
Bank as well as the Mitchell data series conjointly and display the evolution of the coeﬃcient β
for increasing j. As is shown in Figure 8.3, the coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant for all jvalues. As
expected, by increasing the transitional time span j, the coeﬃcient tends to increase as well until
settling at a value of approximately 2.0 after 6065 years. Thereafter, the coeﬃcient remains
relatively constant at an average value of 2.0 and the 95% conﬁdence interval roughly within
the boundaries [−3.0,−1.5] for j > 60.4
On the one hand, these observations conﬁrm the predicted strong impact of birth rate changes
on GDP per capita. Since the displayed Rsquared tends to steadily increase over time and
3 If, for example, China and India were assigned a weight according to their population size, the absolute value
of the coeﬃcient would be larger.
4 Constancy is here deﬁned as a linear trend with slope parameter< |0.002| over the corresponding time span.
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displays a value of 0.94 for the longest period j = 112 (column (4) of Table 8.1), it appears that
changes in the birth rate are capable of explaining over 90% of the subsequent GDP per capita
growth. On the other hand, they provide evidence of the idea that the full eﬀect of changes in
the birth rate is achieved after approximately 65 years.
Figure 8.3: Magnitude of OLS-estimatorβ (blue) with 95% conﬁdence intervals (gray) and R² (yellow) with
increasing time span j.
As a result, using the average coeﬃcient value for j > 60 as a benchmark, the theory suggests
that a 1% decline in the birth rate causes on average a 2% increase in GDP per capita growth
over the subsequent 65 years. These values imply that a birth rate reduction from 4% to 1%
tends to raise production per capita by the factor sixteen.5 Finally, the production elasticity of
broad capital γ = β1+β can be calculated to lie approximately within the 95% conﬁdence interval
[0.6, 0.7], conﬁrming Mankiw et al.'s (1992) estimation results.
8.3 Robustness on a CountryLevel
To indicate the robustness of the above approach, we may report the countryspeciﬁc results, as
has been done in the case of the theory of population. In Table 8.2, the national parameters γi are
displayed for the 34 states exhibiting data for 1949 and 2014. As expected, all parameters display
positive values between zero and one. Except for four Latin American economies, the value of
the calculated parameters lies between 0.50 and 0.86. This range of variation seems reasonable
given that our population approach does not control for the international division of labor and
the related foreign capital movements. The average national parameter γ¯i of exactly 0.66 might
then be interpreted to account for this mobility of capital by suggesting that withdrawing capital
from one country might speed up the growth process in another one. For example, if the eﬀect of
5 The possibility of reverse causality is dealt with in section 8.4.
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Table 8.2: Calculated parameter γ for the 34 economies exhibiting data for 1949 and 2014
measuring the combined eﬀect of the PoLD and the PoDR
country γi country γi country γi
arg 0.38 gre 0.72 pan 0.80
aus 0.80 hon 0.30 phi 0.81
au 0.84 ind 0.80 por 0.59
bel 0.76 ire 0.86 spa 0.66
can 0.64 isr 0.88 sri 0.68
chil 0.53 ita 0.66 swe 0.75
col 0.55 jam 0.70 swi 0.62
cyp 0.82 jap 0.62 uk 0.75
den 0.70 mex 0.53 uru 0.70
egy 0.84 net 0.69 ven 0.22
els 0.35 nor 0.75
ﬁn 0.63 nz 0.50
birth rate on GDP per capita growth is found to be larger than 0.80, the growth process might
have been positively aﬀected by additional foreign capital inﬂows, speeding up the process of
inventing machines suggested by the PoLD, whereas the outﬂow of capital in Latin American
economies might have slowed down their rate of capital accumulation usually resulting from the
division of labor.
8.4 A Popular Objection: Reverse Causality?
As has already been discussed in section 4.4, the observed correlation between birth rate and
GDP per capita has prompted large academic circles to believe that rising productivity generally












would naturally yield an inverted signiﬁcant coeﬃcient α = 1β . As it is a quite popular objection,
the inevitable reply will, even in this work, be that the observed negative eﬀect of fertility on
productivity is merely another illustration of a statistical correlation being misread as a causal
eﬀect.6 However, this hypothesis must be empirically rejected as well for the following reason.
Firstly, due to a fertility decision lag and a pregnancy lag, a contemporaneous eﬀect of yt on bt
can barely exist. Eventually, since we stated that birth rate has a delayed eﬀect on GDP per
capita, we may also test for a delayed eﬀect (l) of GDP per capita on birth rate of the form
6 See, for example, Becker (1981).












However, although GDP per capita has steadily increased over the 20th century in developed
economies, we observe  beginning in the 1970s  a constant birth rate in those countries.7 If
GDP per capita would indeed had a negative impact on birth rate, we should instead observe a
further declining birth rate after 1970, which is obviously not the case. Further reading on the
empirical rejection of the BeckerHypothesis is provided by Galor (2011).
8.5 Concluding Remarks on the Empirics of the Theory of Pro-
duction
The above ﬁndings strongly support the validity of the employed SolowModel without tech-
nology and thus yield strong evidence of the simultaneous operation of the classical principles
of labor division and of diminishing returns provided by equation 3.6. If there exists an equally
strong negative contemporaneous eﬀect (PoDR) and a positive lagged eﬀect (PoLD) of popula-
tion growth on GDP per capita growth over the subsequent periods, a change in the population
growth rate will obviously negatively eﬀect GDP per capita growth, as has been impressively
conﬁrmed by the data as follows.
Evaluating annual data on 104 countries over a period of 55 years, 34 countries over a period
of 65 years and 10 countries over a period of 114 years, our estimations imply that a birth
rate reduction from 4% to 1%  as is often observed in developed countries  raises production
per capita by the factor sixteen. If these results are correct, the historically observed decline
in fertility can account for the largest part of the historically experienced sustainable rise in
production per capita. Moreover, our estimations suggest that the production elasticity of broad
capital lies in the range (0.60, 0.75), suggesting a production elasticity of population in the
range (0.25, 0.40), which has often erroneously been calculated to lie in the interval (0.66, 0.75).
Although employing a quite diﬀerent approach, the results are roughly in line with those of
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Ashraf et al. (2013), providing supportive evidence of the neoclassical
growth model. Further research will be required to conﬁrm the idea that an appropriate form of
the aggregate production function is approximated by Y (K,H,N) = K1/3H1/3N1/3.
A calculation of γ may alternatively be conducted by using the production exhaustion theorem
to determine the income share of population. To this end, we would have to employ average
unskilled labor wages or minimum wages with regard to the whole population (which may in
fact be termed geographical wages or population wages) and to compute their income share
(1- γ) on total GDP. This share should be found to lie in the interval (0.25, 0.40). Moreover,
while this empirical exercise provided a relatively simple approach to productivity, adhering to
Cobb and Douglas' method of attack, the model might be extended by accounting for a fourth
constant production factor  land  that is not subject to accumulation and depreciation. This
7 See footnote 5 for our empirical deﬁnition of constancy. The longest series (fourty years) displaying a constant
birth rate is given by the UKdata.
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may imply that even the density of the population is relevant in determining development and
that population growth exhibits diminishing returns in the long run. Finally, since physical
and human capital accumulation of a country are sometimes strongly encouraged by foreign
investments, future research on the topic may allow for a varying national savings rate. These
external adjustments toward an eﬃcient international division of labor may account for the
remaining unobserved variation in our regressions.
In summary, the empirical evaluations of the last two chapters reported a signiﬁcant positive
shortrun eﬀect of GDP per capita growth on the variable birth rate, a signiﬁcant positiveshort
run eﬀect of death rate on birth rate and a signiﬁcant negative longrun eﬀect of birth rate
changes on GDP per capita growth. All these results point toward the correctness of the four
principles of classical economics and support the valid use of the classical uniﬁed growth model,
which has moreover been found to be able to illustrate the stylized facts of a transition from
an economic regime of stagnation, exhibiting high rates of births and deaths, to an economic
regime of development, exhibiting steadily decreasing rates of births and deaths. Accepting these
results as suﬃciently mirroring reality, we will in the last chapter use the classical uniﬁed growth
model to summarize and discuss its implications and to speculate about the future economic
development suggested by this model.
Part IV




Speculations on a Future Regime of
Stagnation
9.1 The Recent Development
To assess the potential future economic development, we will continue the above line of thought
that an early regime of stagnation is, in every economy, followed by a regime of development as
long as mortality decreases. The left graph of Figure 9.1 extends the time horizon of Figure 6.1
by adding the most recent years of British history. Firstly, it is worth remarking that the death
rate had achieved a low sustainable level of 0.125 as far back as the 1920s and has only slightly
decreased since. Secondly, the birth rate roughly adjusted to the death rate during the 1970s
and seems to have settled on a constant low level close to, but higher than the death rate. For
better visualization, the presumed demographic transition from a weakly preventively checked
toward a strongly preventively checked economy is stylized in the right graph of Figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1: Left graph: British return to stagnation: Birth rate (blue), death rate (red) and GDP per capita
(green) 18022016. Right graph: Stylized fact return to stagnation.
Sources: GDP: Clark (2009) for 18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010, Vital Rates: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) for
18001871, Mitchell (2013) for 18712010.
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Thirdly, British real GDP per capita has slowed down to nearstagnation since the year 2007.
Projecting this development into the future decades might suggest an additional stylized fact
which remains to be evaluated, namely the return to what has lately been termed secular
stagnation, which is illustrated by the last regime late stagnation in the right graph of Figure
9.1. This idea of a new era of stagnation is sustained when extending the simulation by another
one hundred periods, supposing a constant death rate (see Figures 9.2 and 9.3). We should,
however, keep in mind that our simulation used a single labor division lag of merely ﬁfteen years,
whereas our estimations suggested a continuous labor division lag of approximately 65 years. The
next section will give a short outline of the eﬀects, the decisive operation of the great preventive
check principle of generation is supposed to have on future population growth and growth in
production according to our classical uniﬁed growth theory.
Figure 9.2: A simulation of a constant future death ratein growth rates (birth rate (blue), death rate (red),
GDP per capita growth rate (light green)).
Figure 9.3: A simulation of a constant future death rate in level variables (population (orange), production
(blue) and GDP per capita (green)).
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9.2 Prognosis
Throughout this work, we used the simplifying assumption that the death rate cannot be aﬀected
endogenously. More generally, depending on luck, it may increase or decrease, for example due
to a potential future spread of new epidemics or new discoveries extending the maximum life
expectancy. Based on the perhaps most realistic presumption of constant mortality, the classical
uniﬁed growth model would suggest the following mechanism.
In the currently prevailing situation of low mortality in many economies in which the great
preventive check operates extraordinarily strongly, the principle of generation would keep the
birth rate on a constant low level as well. It would be concluded that approximately sixty
years after the birth rate has adjusted to a lower level, an economy will enter a new regime of
stagnation, where productivity stabilizes on a higher level. However, so far it is unclear from
the data whether the birth rate will settle above, below or on the same level as the death rate,
suggesting a corresponding positive, negative or zero future population growth rate. We will now
brieﬂy investigate these three possibilities as well as their outcomes suggested by the classical
theory of population. As for the theory of production, it will also be asked how this change
in population growth is expected to aﬀect the future production and productivity of such an
economy.1
Firstly, we assume that the birth rate would fall below the death rate. In this case, the co-
hort size of the descendants is even smaller than the cohort size of the ancestors. Since young
individuals were neither threatened with being pushed out of existing niches, nor, owing to a
decreasing population, facing potential economies of scale, niches would be ultimately passed on
from ancestor to descendant without raising conﬂicts of interest. McCulloch even went a step
further, believing that in an economy where the pressure of population and (intra- as well as
intergenerational) competition would be eliminated, the corresponding motives that stimulate
intelligence and activity would vanish as well. As a result, productive eﬀorts, except for what
is required to practice the parental profession, will become useless.
If, indeed, it were possible that the stimulus arising from this principle [of population] would
be suddenly removed, it is not easy to determine what life would be except a dreary blank, or
the world except an uncultivated waste. Every exertion to which civilisation can be traced,
proceeds, directly or indirectly, from its eﬀects; either from the actual desire of having a
family, or the pressing obligation of providing for one, or from the necessity of rivalling the
eﬀorts produced by the operation of these motives in others.2
Hence, productivity would ultimately stay unchanged while production would even fall in such
an economy.
1 Here, it might be helpful to remind the reader that the Solow model suggests that the size of population does
not aﬀect productivity. Independently of whether the population size was one billion, ten billion or twenty
billion, productivity would stay unchanged over the long run, as it only reacts to changes in population growth.
One might also generally argue that with a larger population some goods would become more expensive due
to their scarcity, reﬂecting diminishing returns to population, while this loss would be neutralized by the
larger supply of other goods that could be produced more cheaply due to an increasing division of labor and
concomitant specialization.
2 McCulloch (1863), part I, chapter VIII.
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However, the principle of population also advises us to argue that the birth rate will  in the
long run  not fall below the death rate. Since every deceasing individual leaves on average a
vacant profession, the latter will tend to be occupied by an individual of an emerging cohort,
supplying in turn the means of subsistence for his progeny. Consequently, since we expect a
constant tendency of every population to at least replace itself, population growth will most
arguably not become negative over the longrun and we reject the assumption of the birth rate
falling below the death rate as being implausible. If we assume that the birth rate would remain
on the same level as the death rate, actual population growth would be close to zero in the new
regime. Since it seems obvious that a stagnating population will neither beneﬁt from additional
labor division nor lose from diminishing returns, production as well as productivity are of course
equally expected to stagnate over the long run.
Finally, we advance the idea that the birth rate will stay above the death rate over the long
run, with the principle of population sligthly outweighing the principle of generation. On the
one hand, this would, as in the other two cases, lead to the  perhaps disillusioning  deduction
that productivity would remain constant over the long run and it may even be the case that this
new regime of stagnation will endure for another millenium. On the other hand, the notion that
population pressure triggers innovations may at least give us some hope of continued techno-
logical progress. In the end, the principle of population remains the main agent that drives a
population into competition, making a division of labor and specialization ultimately inevitable,
since specialization does not emerge in the absence of population pressure. Thus, although it
was primarily perceived by many economists as a source of misery, and less as a driver of total
economic output, the impact of the principle of population on economic growth is perhaps best
summarized by the ﬁnal appraisal the principle received in classical economics:
The principle of increase, as explained by Malthus [1798], [. . . ] appeared to form an insuper-
able obstacle to all permanent improvement in the condition of society, and to condemn the
great majority of the human race to a state approaching to destitution. But farther inquiries
have shown that the inferences drawn [. . . ] from the principle [. . . ], are contradicted by the
widest experience; that the too rapid increase of population is almost always prevented by
the inﬂuence of principles which its increase brings into activity; that a vast improvement
has taken place in the condition of the people of most countries [. . . ] and that, so far from
being inimical to improvement, we are really indebted to the principle of increase for most
part of our comforts and enjoyments, and for the continued progress of arts and industry.
[. . . ] That the tendency to increase is not inconsistent with the improvement of society, is a
fact as to which there can be no dispute.3
Regardless of whether specialization and innovation are caused by want or the fear of losing a
social rank, they are the regular result of the current cohort outnumbering the former, generating
intergenerational competition and driving an abundant number of young individuals into new
niches. If in addition, inspite of population growth, the average number of abundant descendants
becomes suﬃciently small to be constantly absorbed by new forms of specialization, the demand
for which arose from the increased market size, there exists a high probability that the resulting
new professions betimes allowed for mortalityreducing innovations.




The aim of this work was to construct a uniﬁed theory of economic growth that can explain the
stylized evolution of GDP per capita over the very long run, i.e. over the complete history of
mankind, in a single coherent model. In the introductory chapter, the evolution of GDP per
capita was illustrated and the two most prominent uniﬁed growth models were presented. While
the older model by Kremer postulates one continuous process of economic development, the newer
model by Galor and others suggests that the process of economic growth can be subdivided into
two regimes  a regime of economic stagnation and a regime of economic development.
In chapter two, we found empirical support for Galor's historical regime of stagnation in GDP
per capita in Britain until around 1800 AD. Since Galor's uniﬁed growth model is chieﬂy based
on a mechanism that had already been described by the classical economist T. R. Malthus in the
year 1798, he employed the term the Malthusian trap. In chapter three, this mechanism was
traced back to Malthus' and other classical economists' original understanding, which made use
of three universal principles. On this basis, a mathematical model of the classical Malthusian
trap relying on these principles was built and its plausibility was illustrated.
In chapter four, the stylized facts of the (second) regime of economic development were analyzed
and the classical model was used to explain this process of development. Here, it was also shown
that the most popular contemporary approaches cannot explain the escape from the Malthusian
trap. As a promising alternative, this work advanced a fourth classical principle in chapter ﬁve,
by which the switch from a regime of stagnation to a regime of development could be properly
explicated. In chapter six, the mechanism of the Malthusian trap as well as the escape from the
Malthusian trap were simulated using one and the same model to account for a uniﬁed growth
theory.
In chapter seven and chapter eight, the four classical principles on which the classical uniﬁed
growth theory rests were empirically evaluated using OLS regressions. Chapter nine concluded by
speculating about future economic growth and development by using the ﬁndings from classical
uniﬁed growth theory.
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10.2 Summary of the Main Findings
To provide an overview of the most important ﬁndings in this work, this section will list the main
achievements following the structure of the chapters. Firstly, chapter two found considerable
evidence of the existence of a regime of economic stagnation in Britain until 1800 AD and as a
global phenomenon on a national level until today. Secondly, we found that the stylized fact of
a cycle of misery between population and production can be explained by advancing a classical
theory of production and a classical theory of population, consisting of the principle of labor
division, the principle of diminishing returns and the principle of population, conjointly forming
an endogenous demographic growth mechanism, the Malthusian trap. Since this mechanism is
still not universally accepted in the science of economics, chapter two and chapter three mainly
served to clarify its importance and to lay a ﬁrm ground for investigations on the regime of
economic development. The best proof of the existence of the Malthusian trap is provided by
the observed conﬁrmation of the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection.
Thirdly, with regard to the regime of economic development, it has been found that a popula-
tion slowdown must have been responsible for the breakout from stagnation. This breakout was
not caused by the industrial revolution as an agent of technological progress. Instead, it was
caused by a fertility decline, which Malthus had predicted to reﬂect the great preventive check.
Fourthly, and this should be considered as the one most crucial ﬁnding of this work, an extension
of the classical growth model using the great preventive check principle of generation as fourth
universal principle is able to explain the fertility decline through decreasing mortality. Accord-
ingly, the fertility decline was not caused by a reversal of the principle of population, as is often
falsely asserted. Fifthly, we found evidence of an exogenous mortality decline. As a result, by
simulating the extended classical growth theory it was shown that the model can account for the
three combined stylized facts cross of wealth (declining fertility and increasing productivity),
demographic transition (declining mortality and declining fertility) and epidemiological tran-
sition (declining mortality due to the decreased prevalence of infectious diseases) by advancing
a simple chain of causality: Declining mortality causes fertility to decline, which enables produc-
tivity to increase. This theory is in line with the ﬁnding that there exists not a single economy
in which a longrun increase in GDP per capita can be observed without a simultaneous decline
in fertility and a preceding decline in mortality.
The narrative of the main ﬁnding of this work, the great preventive check principle of generation,
is as follows: As the positive checks to population (famines, epidemics, wars etc.) are supposed
to be nonexistent when the decline in mortality is complete, the question arose of how Malthus'
obvious and powerful preventive checks could be deﬁned which are claimed to be capable of
reducing the rate of population growth within manageable limits? To this end, it has been noted
that declining mortality implies (almost by deﬁnition) rising life expectancy. As the average
lifetime of a parent increased, his average working time was extended as well. Property rights,
inheritance, experience and reputation served the older cohorts to secure their economic niche
against upcoming competition from the younger cohorts. With a limited amount of niches
available, a large fraction of the young generation would ﬁnd it necessary to comply with the
advice not to procreate until they are established in a profession which may enable them to
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support a family without fearing the loss of their social rank. This generation conﬂict induces
delayed marriages and declining fertility. Consequently, it has been argued that chieﬂy a decrease
in mortality ought to be aimed at when trying to promote economic development. Moreover, this
process of intergenerational competition has been found to be in accordance with the Darwinian
theory of evolution by sexual selection.
Sixthly, the advanced classical growth theory has been shown to be capable of modeling a regime
of stagnation and a regime of development using one and the same uniﬁed growth model. Sev-
enthly, since we had so far merely reconstructed the stylized facts of stagnation and development
as a result of the concerted action of the four principles, it was considered necessary to evaluate
the eﬀects of the four principles separately. On the one hand, we found evidence of the princi-
ple of population and the principle of generation by using around 4,500 observations of annual
international data. A vector autoregression allowed us to conclude that there exists an almost
universal positive accumulated (shortrun) eﬀect of GDP per capita growth on birth rates as
well as an equal eﬀect of death rates on birth rates after four years. On the other hand, conjoint
evidence of the principle of diminishing returns and the principle of labor division was conﬁrmed
by applying OLS regressions from data of 104 countries to measure the average (longrun) eﬀect
of a change in birth rates on a GDP per capita growth. The results suggested that a 1% decrease
in birth rate induces GDP per capita growth to increase by 2%, spread over the subsequent
65 years. The robustness of the principles has been conﬁrmed by investigating countryspeciﬁc
national data.
Eightly, when using the classical uniﬁed growth model as a forecast, it points toward a future
regime of economic stagnation in GDP per capita as long as mortality remains constant. Nonethe-
less, since the birth rate is expected to stay above the level of the death rate, it is assumed that
this regime of stagnation is accompanied  as in the case of the early regime of stagnation  by
population growth and technological progress.
10.3 Consequences for the History of Economic Thought
As every student of the history of economic thought knows, Malthus suggested that popula-
tion had an inherent tendency to grow, that it would grow whenever the means of subsistence
increased and that it would even tend to outgrow the means of subsistence. Thanks to Dar-
win, we now know that this tendency resulted in competition and a struggle for life that has
been fundamental to the origin of species. Moreover, the classical economists  in most cases
well educated economic historians  understood that the doctrine of competition constituted the
foundation of the Smithian division of labor and thus of their entire theory of economic growth.
Accordingly, when intending to tread in their footsteps, it is essential to acknowledge that the
general tendency for competition is a result of a universally operating principle of population
and that nothing makes sense in classical economic growth theory if not seen in the light of the
theory of population.1
1 The reason for mainly relying on the logical arguments of the classical economists in this work may be due
to the zeitgeist of the nineteenthcentury, when deep and profound theoretical thinking was much more
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Notwithstanding its well-founded theoretical and empirical reasoning, there remains a fair portion
of skeptics, some of whom seem to have interpreted the classical theory of population surprisingly
incorrectly. Although these authors frequently refer to Malthus (1798) as chief historical source
and economic authority, it seems that neither the critics nor the majority of the proponents
of the classical theory of population have consulted Malthus' later editions (1803-1826) on the
principle of population. If they had done so, they might have arrived at the insight that the
proposed theory not only supplies a mechanism of a stylized historical regime of stagnation,
but at the same time oﬀers a mechanism by which stagnation could be overcome. Malthus
saw the possibility that productivity could increase and that fertility could decrease in the long
run  a prediction that has become reality in all developed countries. Moreover, he reasoned
that if fertility decreased, then productivity must rise, and that declining fertility was the only
way to escape the population trap. Most importantly, he suggested how fertility was to be
decreased, namely by reducing mortality. In this sense, Keynes' famous assessment may too be
best understood:
If only Malthus, instead of Ricardo, had been the parent stem from which nineteenth-century
economics proceeded, what a much wiser and richer place the world would be today! We
have laboriously to rediscover and force through the obscuring envelopes of our misguided
education, what should never have ceased to be obvious.2
Hence, this work recommends closing the chapter of dispelling Malthusian ideas over the past two
hundred years. Nonetheless, the author is quite aware that even if economists were to strongly
support the advancement of the Malthusian theory, it is questionable whether it will ever become
generally accepted.3
10.4 Consequences for Economic History
Likewise, economic historians should be aware that the Malthusian eﬀects have always been
well in place and persist until today. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the industrial revolution
and technological progress were often not by themselves capable of increasing average economic
productivity, albeit increasing economic output. Thirdly, we should bear in mind that, as a
consequence of the tendency to increase, human history and evolution have been constantly
accompanied by population expansion as follows. The rise and fall of civilizations may often be
ascribed to the degree of population growth. If the environment allowed for a strong increase,
we tend to observe urbanization, specialization and the rise of a culture. However, as soon as the
economy has reached its natural boundaries and therefore ceased to be capable of expansion, the
principle of generation tends to regulate the increase in numbers, often resulting in stagnation.
Stagnation, on the other hand, has in many historical instances proved lethal, particularly if
nearby civilizations continued to expand in numbers at the same time.
appreciated, as it was harder to discover correlations between variables without having computer software
and big data at hand.
2 Keynes (1933), Essays in Biography, Malthus, pp. 120121.
3 [W]hat a discouraging example Malthus is, to show during what long years the plainest case may be misrep-
resented and misunderstood. Darwin (1860).
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10.5 Consequences for Economic Growth Theory
The purpose of this work was to provide and validate a theory that solves the economic prob-
lem of stagnation and growth, or, in other words, to disentangle the eﬀects responsible for a
historical regime of economic stagnation and for a regime of economic development. Hitherto,
the ﬁeld of uniﬁed growth theory has attempted to oﬀer a theoretical analysis of the relation-
ship between the demographic transition and the economic transition to development. Having
retraced uniﬁed growth theory to its classical demographic predecessor, four classical elementary
principles were interpreted to account for the relevant interactions between demographic and
economic variables. While the principle of diminishing returns and the principle of labor division
are commonly acknowledged in economic theory in one form or another, the existence of the
principle of population remains debated. Furthermore, the great preventive check, the principle
of generation, has even been ignored in most arguably all recent evaluations of the Malthusian
model. However, when accounting for the last two principles, classical theory is found to match
the stylized facts of stagnation and development. These four universal principles should be ac-
cepted as constantly operating economic laws, although the displayed eﬀects of the principle of
population and the principle of generation are observed to vary over time. The universality of
the principle of population must be particularly emphasized, as it seems that its eﬀect has been
regularly misinterpreted in the past.
The resulting endogenous theory of growth can be subdivided into a theory of production and
a theory of population. The advanced classical theory of production is largely in line with the
neoclassical Solow model  one the best known and probably most frequently used models in the
ﬁeld of economics. Here, growth economists are advised to recognize that the simple Solow model
without technology is based on the classical principles of diminishing returns and labor division,
exhaustively deﬁning the classical theory of production by employing the axioms of constant
returns to scale and that population is the source of all value. The corresponding steadystate
equation suggests that, if positive population growth is reduced from a high level to a lower
level, population pressure from diminishing returns relaxes while the earlier established division
of labor derived from a formerly higher population growth continues to have a positive eﬀect.
Hence, the ﬁndings of the theory of production advanced in this work are easily summarized: A
change in population size aﬀects production proportionally over the longrun, while a change in
population growth produces a negative reaction of production per capita. With regard to the
theory of production, growth economists are therefore advised to continue using the Solow model
without technological progress as a proper tool of modeling economic growth.
In addition, since the theory of production assumed exogenous population growth, an endoge-
nous growth theory required the knowledge of the determinants of population growth, or in
other words, a theory of population. This work advanced the view that the reference point in
economicdemographic investigations should be the state of a Malthusian trap, where popula-
tion growth steadily tends to outperform economic growth. Having agreed that population has
the potential to outgrow GDP, we next asked what factors determined the speed of popula-
tion growth. Firstly, contrary to what has recently been implicitly assumed by a majority of
growth economists, there exists a diﬀerence between the classical principle of population and
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the Malthusian trap. The Malthusian trap deﬁnes a state of stagnating economic productivity
resulting from the operation of an unrestricted principle of population. As the Malthusian trap
is a testable fact, its existence was  following Malthus' experience  ﬁrst reasonably veriﬁed and
later equally reasonably falsiﬁed. In contrast, the principle of population is the incontrovertible
tendency of each living being to increase in numbers whenever its means of subsistence increase.
As the second determinant of population growth, growth economists are advised to model the
great preventive check principle of generation, which can account for the escape from the Malthu-
sian trap. Although the principle of generation has been extensively outlined in this work, it
cannot be said to have been exhaustively determined, except for stating that it is triggered by
diminishing mortality.
Combining the theory of population and the theory of production, we may state that if the
principle of population is allowed to operate freely, it causes rapid population growth, strong
competition for resources and consequently hardship and innovation. If, on the other hand,
population pressure was fully suppressed preventively, lack of competition would diminish the
number of innovations to a minimum level. As the two extremes of unchecked and fully checked
population growth are obvious, it follows that there must be some transitional, intermediate
point in which the two principles outweigh each other to such a moderate degree as to allow for
a slow increase of population and at the same time for an equally moderate pursuit of innovation
such that economic development is optimized.
To pursue the classical view, the above ﬁndings recommend a further move away from exogenous
toward endogenous growth theories and from shortrun theories toward uniﬁed growth theories
to explain economic development over the very long run in one framework together with the
demographic transition.
10.6 Consequences for Economic Development
To trigger the transition to economic development, classical uniﬁed growth theory proposes to
reduce mortality or, what is almost the same, to increase life expectancy. The demographic
structure resulting from such a change is much less prone to overpopulation, as a major part
of the population, in particular the part exhibiting a high social status, becomes infertile. If it
would not have been for the principle of generation, the population of the earth would certainly
not have been conﬁned to less than ten billion inhabitants. As a practical result, classical uniﬁed
growth theory asserts that the increase in production per capita over the past two hundred
years was chieﬂy owed to the epidemiological transition. Employing descriptive statistics, we
have illustrated for a large body of countries that there was indeed an epidemiological transition
followed by a demographic transition, which is in some parts of the world not yet ﬁnished and
that incomes were low before and increased strongly with the onset of the demographic transition.
While the size of a population has been found to have a neutral eﬀect on economic development,
our theory also suggests that a population growth rate change (in this framework measured
in terms of birth rate changes) may be the best predictor for economic development. Since
developmental economists currently tend to investigate the causes for improvements in GDP per
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capita by conducting regressions on an almost inﬁnite number of  often relatively arbitrary 
variables, it may be advisable to return to growth regressions with a sound theoretical fundament.
Although this work does not explicitly account for political interventions, we will shortly consider
in how far government action might speed up or slow down the process of development. Firstly,
as a consequence of the principle of generation, the most practicable and probably most human
way to limit population pressure lies in a reduction of the death rate that is largely kept high by
epidemics such as currently in subsaharan regions. This reduction of mortality will certainly
raise the population pressure on the upcoming generation for some time and correspondingly
increase poverty. However, so far no instance has been observed in which decreasing fertility
and increasing productivity was not preceded by such a transitional period. Secondly, with
the simultaneous establishment of the principle of population and the principle of generation,
classical uniﬁed growth theory yields an explanation that can solve the demographic economic
paradox, which stated that economies with higher productivity tend to exhibit lower birth
rates. For policy implications, it is important to realize that  in accordance with our empirical
ﬁndings  there exists no such negative causal link running from living standards to fertility. On
the contrary, development support in the form of wealth might even aggravate the population
problem, since we observe a signiﬁcant and robust positive eﬀect of growth in living standards
on fertility. Bluntly stated, development is not the best contraceptive, but contraception is
the best development.
10.7 Consequences for Natural Philosophy
In this dissertation, I have tried to clarify the theoretical channels through which economic
development works. There is no reason to doubt that an increase in life expectancy such that
two productive generations exist at the same time will (ceteris paribus) decisively delay the
propagation of its oﬀspring and therefore reduce fertility. We will ﬁnd the principle of population
and the principle of generation to prevail in every proper experiment on any natural species.
If, notwithstanding its evidence, we questioned or even rejected the most obvious channels of
operation  inheritance, infant mortality, sexual selection and infertility  we ought to ﬁnd some
other answer that explains why higher life expectancy reduces fertility.
Individual enlightenment has only very recently been perceived as an important driver of eco-
nomic development due to the fact that health has increased considerably and the average life
span of individuals has doubled over the past two hundred years, therefore increasing the ability
of the average individual to accumulate human capital in the form of education and experience.
On the contrary, in spite of what is often denoted as prudence, foresight or reason, the spirit of
materialism present throughout this work assumed that, although human individuals undoubt-
edly possess a higher potential for abstract thinking, i.e. more rational expectations, than
other living beings, they do not in reality decide selfreliably on the number of their progeny,
but they react to existing circumstances.4 The classical economists largely argued that indi-
vidual improvement would have ultimately been in vain, as long as population continued to
4 the existence of the Malthusian trap up until around 1800 AD - and in many countries until today - proves
that human communities are often not willing to collectively restrict their numbers. How else can we explain
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increase.5 This materialistic view enabled  albeit this happened at the cost of a very high
level of abstraction  the classical economists to model the human economy in the same sim-
ple and parsimonious manner as any animal economy by merely considering the variables birth
rate, death rate and productivity as exhaustively causing the development of the ratio between
production and population over the long run.
Accordingly, the history of mankind should be viewed neither as a history of technological
progress, nor as a history of political or institutional progress and much less as a history of
continuously improving individual enlightenment. The history of mankind is a history of pop-
ulation and the principle of population remains the big dark cloud above the enlightenment
movement. Since population is the only variable that possesses an inherent tendency to grow,
it causes at best a division of labor and what is generally perceived as progress in the form of
technological and institutional improvement. Whether an additional person contributes posi-
tively to average economic productivity seems  although in the short run inﬂuenced by the way
education has been conducted and by contemporaneous economic circumstances  to depend on
an evolutionary process of trial and error. This process cannot be imagined to take place without
population pressure.
If the above theory is independently conﬁrmed, it ought to be ranked as one of the most illumi-
nating achievements of thought on which every social science should be built upon. However, in
spite of this bold statement,
I by no means expect to convince experienced [economists] whose minds are stocked with
a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view directly
opposite to mine. It is so easy to hide our ignorance under such expressions as [technology,
institutions, enlightenment] etc., and to think that we give an explanation when we only
restate a fact. Any one whose disposition leads him to attach more weight to unexplained
diﬃculties than to the explanation of a certain number of facts will certainly reject the theory.
[. . . ]; but I look with conﬁdence to the future, to young and rising [economists], who will be
able to view both sides of the question with impartiality.6
the fact that immigrants tend to relatively quickly adjust to the habits of pairing and childbearing prevailing
in the new country?
5 The purposive adjustment of the birthrate to the supply of the material potentialities of well-being is an
indispensable condition of human life and action, of civilization, and of any improvement in wealth and
welfare. [. . . ] social cooperation is impossible if people give rein to the natural impulses of proliferation. v.
Mises (1949).
6 Darwin (1859), conclusion.
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11.1 Appendix for chapter 2
Figure A1: Indexed GDP per capita in selected countries 19602017. Left graph: Countries caught in stagnation.




11.2 Appendix for chapters 3, 4, 5, 6
Figure B1: 20 selected countries: Birth rates (blue), death rates (red) and GDP per capita (green); GDP per
capita is indexed to the year 2010 = 0.05, x- and y-axis intersect at value zero; arghun.
Source: Mitchell (2013).
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Figure B2: 20 selected countries: Birth rates (blue), death rates (red) and GDP per capita (green); GDP per
capita is indexed to the year 2010 = 0.05, x- and y-axis intersect at value zero; itaukc.
Source: Mitchell (2013).
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11.3 Appendix for chapter 7
11.3.1 Selection criteria
Table C1: British data: Lag selection criteria.
Selection-order criteria Number of obs = 459
Sample: 1552-2010
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 -4664.97 136775 20.34 20,350 20,367
1 -3622.06 2085.8 9 0.000 1511.8 15,835 15,877 15,943
2 -3564.38 115.36 9 0.000 1222.85 15,623 15,697 15,812
3 -3533.78 61,203 9 0.000 1113.02 15,528 15,635 15.798*
4 -3506.32 54,917 9 0.000 1027.03 15,448 15.586* 15,799
5 -3496.7 19,242 9 0.023 1024.3 15,445 15,615 15,877
6 -3486.65 20,103 9 0.017 1019.67 15,441 15,643 15,954
7 -3474.39 24,521 9 0.004 1005.37 15,427 15,660 16,020
8 -3460.36 28,052 9 0.001 983,691 15,405 15,670 16,079
9 -3442.45 35,812 9 0.000 946,374 15,366 15,663 16,122
10 -3429.8 25.315* 9 0.003 931.563* 15.345* 15,679 16,187
11.3.2 List of countries studied
Table C2: List of twenty countries studied.
CC Country CC Country CC Country
arg Argentina fra France nz New Zealand
au Austria ger Germany rom Romania
aus Australia hun Hungary spa Spain
can Canada ita Italy swe Sweden
chil Chile jap Japan swi Switzerland
den Denmark net Netherlands ukc Britain (Clark)
ﬁn Finland nor Norway ukb Britain (Broadb.)
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11.3.3 Robustness I: Coirfs using Broadberry et al. data
Figure C1: Britain 15412010: Coirf matrix based on a VAR(3) model.
11.3.4 Robustness II: Coirfs of logarithmized birth rates
Figure C2: Coirf of the eﬀects of the PoG (left) and the PoP (right) based on a VAR(3) model using
logarithmized birth rates. First line stacked data of 55 economies, second line British historical data.
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11.3.5 Robustness III: Coirfs using diﬀerent variable orderings
Figure C3: Coirf of the eﬀects of the PoG (left) and the PoP (right) based on a VAR(3) model using
alternative variable orderings. First line stacked data of 55 economies, second line British historical data.
Ordering ( b gy d )
′.
Figure C4: Ordering ( gy b d )′.
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Figure C5: Ordering ( gy d b )′.
Figure C6: Ordering ( d b gy )′.
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Figure C7: Ordering ( d gy b )′.
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11.3.6 Robustness IV: Countryspeciﬁc coirfs








11.4 Appendix for chapter 8
11.4.1 Global cross of wealth
Figure D1: Birth rate (blue) and indexed GDP per capita (green), aggregate global data, 19602014.
Source: World Bank (2018).
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11.4.2 List of countries studied









Botswana Hong Kong Philippines*
Brazil India* Portugal*
Burkina Faso Indonesia Romania
Burundi Iran, Islamic Rep. Rwanda
Cameroon Ireland* Senegal
Canada* Israel* Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Italy* Singapore
Chad Jamaica* South Africa
Chile* Japan* Spain*
China Jordan Sri Lanka*
Colombia* Kenya Sweden*
Congo, Dem. Rep. Korea, Rep. Switzerland*
Congo, Rep. Lesotho Syrian Arab Republic
Costa Rica Madagascar Tanzania
Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Thailand
Cyprus* Malaysia Togo
Denmark* Mali Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Mauritania Tunisia
Ecuador Mauritius Turkey
Egypt, Arab Rep.* Mexico* Uganda
El Salvador* Morocco United Kingdom*
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique United States
Ethiopia Myanmar Uruguay*
Finland* Namibia Venezuela, RB*
France Nepal Zambia
Gabon Netherlands* Zimbabwe
Gambia, The New Zealand*
